

15 OCTOBER 1947

I N D E X  
of  
WITNESSES

Defense' Witnesses

Page

KIDO, Koichi (resumed)

30881

Direct (cont'd) by Mr. Logan

30881

MORNING RECESS

30927

Direct (cont'd) by Mr. Logan

30928

NOON RECESS

30965

Direct (cont'd) by Mr. Logan

30966

AFTERNOON RECESS

31020

Direct (cont'd) by Mr. Logan

31021

I N D E X  
of  
EXHIBITS  
(none)

1 Wednesday, 15 October 1947

2 - - -

3  
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
5 FOR THE FAR EAST  
6 Court House of the Tribunal  
7 War Ministry Building  
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, all Members sitting, with  
14 the exception of: HONORABLE JUSTICE R. B. PAL, Member  
15 from India, not sitting from 0930 to 1600.

16 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

17 For the Defense Section, same as before.

18 - - -

19 (English to Japanese and Japanese  
20 to English interpretation was made by the  
21 Language Section, IMTFE.)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present  
4 except SHIRATORI, who is represented by counsel. We  
5 have a certificate from the prison surgeon at Sugamo  
6 certifying that he is ill and unable to attend the  
7 trial today. This certificate will be recorded and  
8 filed.

9 With the Tribunal's permission the accused  
10 TOGO will be absent from the courtroom the whole of  
11 the morning session conferring with his counsel.

12 Captain Kraft.

13 LANGUAGE ARBITER (Captain Kraft): If the  
14 Tribunal please, we submit the following language  
15 correction: Lines 11 and 22 of record, page 30,170,  
16 substitute "Government General" for "Governor General."

17 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

18 Captain Kraft, I think you had better give  
19 a copy of what you are going to say to the language  
20 section so they will be prepared.

21 Mr. Logan.

22 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, I shall  
23 continue reading KIDO's affidavit, page 94, paragraph  
24 122.

25 THE PRESIDENT: We all think that it is

1 desirable that you read more slowly so that we can  
2 take in what you are reading; not very slowly, but  
3 as you began yesterday. You were rather fast towards  
4 the finish.

5 MR. LOGAN: Yes, sir.

6 - - -

7 K O I C H I K I D O, an accused, resumed the stand  
8 and testified through Japanese interpreters as  
9 follows:

10 DIRECT EXAMINATION

11 MR. LOGAN (Continuing): "122. Prosecution  
12 exhibit 2271 as revised is my diary for August 4,  
13 1939. At that time, and as is shown in this exhibit,  
14 the people of Japan were hoping for a settlement of  
15 the Incident by the establishment of the Wang regime.  
16 They also hoped for the success of the Japan-British  
17 conference. This exhibit also shows that it was  
18 rumored in political circles that the Army and Navy  
19 still disagreed with each other on the problem of the  
20 Japan-German military alliance and consequently the  
21 Army became impatient and at last was planning to lead  
22 the cabinet to resignation en bloc by having the  
23 Minister of War resign, and to proclaim martial law  
24 by taking advantage of that opportunity and thus  
25 finally to establish a military government. I



1 advocated strenuous resistance to this. I considered  
2 that if the Army took such measures, public peace  
3 at home would be seriously endangered. So I told  
4 Minister of War ITAGAKI to that effect to urge him  
5 to consider the matter, as is shown in this exhibit.

6 "123. Prosecution exhibit 775 is an excerpt  
7 from my diary of August 22, 1939. As related, I was  
8 naturally surprised when I heard of the treacherous  
9 act on Germany's part in concluding the Non-Aggression  
10 Pact with Russia in view of the agreement between  
11 Germany and Japan against communism. Thus, exhibits  
12 2262, 2268-71, and 775 show there is no factual  
13 foundation for the prosecution's claim that I sup-  
14 ported a military alliance with Germany as stated in  
15 prosecution document 0003, page 47.

16 "124. As a result of the German-Russian  
17 Non-Aggression Pact, the HIRANUMA Cabinet resigned  
18 on August 28, 1939, and thus my service in the cabinet  
19 came to an end. My diary for this day, prosecution  
20 exhibit 2272 as corrected by errata sheet, is important  
21 for two reasons. First, it shows that I refused to  
22 interfere in conflicts within the Army when ITO of  
23 the Kempeitai sought my opinion on the appointment  
24 of Lieutenant General TADA as War Minister, and I told  
25 him I could do nothing about it. Secondly, regarding

1 the Emperor's order to the new Prime Minister, I was  
2 consulted and asked my opinion by Prince KONOYE  
3 regarding the Emperor's selection of a Minister of  
4 War. I gave him my view based upon my many years'  
5 experience which I gained in dealing with such affairs  
6 during my service as Chief Secretary to the Lord  
7 Keeper of the Privy Seal and advised him to settle the  
8 matter smoothly lest he should trouble His Majesty.  
9 This entry also shows the Emperor instructed the new  
10 Prime Minister that 'Diplomatic policy should follow  
11 the line of cooperation with Britain and the United  
12 States,' and also instructed him upon the importance  
13 of using discretion in the selection of the Home  
14 Minister because of the necessity of maintaining  
15 order at home.

16 "125. In prosecution document 0003, page  
17 47, the prosecution states that during the period I  
18 held cabinet posts, October 22, 1937 to August 30,  
19 1939, I have a general responsibility for all the  
20 events of this period shown on pages 55-100 of the  
21 summary (document 0001). I had absolutely nothing to  
22 do with most of these events such as the resignation  
23 of Italy from the League of Nations, the sinking of  
24 the U.S.S. Panay and Ladybird, the various rumors and  
25 opinions and statements of various Germans as



1 Von Neurath, Dirksen, Trautmann, Ott, Hitler and  
2 Ribbentrop contained in various telegrams and  
3 letters, opium, Non-Aggression Pact between Germany  
4 and the USSR, the Five Minister's Conference re  
5 Hainan Island and other events. With respect to  
6 the various bills (about 10), mentioned in the  
7 summary, they were approved by the cabinet and passed  
8 by the Diet. I did not participate in the drafting  
9 or preparation of any of them except one, the Motion  
10 Picture Law of April 5, 1939, which is explained fully  
11 elsewhere. I voted at the cabinet meetings in favor  
12 of these bills presented by other ministers based on  
13 the explanations given for their passage. At no time  
14 did I even know or suspect that any of these bills  
15 were designed for promotion of aggressive war. On  
16 the contrary the economic situation in Japan and in  
17 the world in general at that time was such as required  
18 their adoption, as has been shown heretofore in this  
19 trial. The other events set forth in the summary  
20 while I was a cabinet minister have been dealt with  
21 above in my affidavit.  
22

23 "126. With the resignation of the HIRANUMA  
24 Cabinet en bloc, I led a retired life, being detached  
25 from political circles. What was the political situa-  
tion then? Almost simultaneously with the formation

1 of the ABE Cabinet, the successor of the HIRANUMA  
2 Cabinet, the European war broke out. Everybody not  
3 only sensed the possibility of its developing to a  
4 second world war, but hoped that everything humanly  
5 possible might be done to avoid such an eventuality,  
6 having visualized as he did its appalling consequences.  
7 The ABE Cabinet, which was confronted with the out-  
8 break of a fresh war in Europe shortly after its  
9 formation, immediately issued a declaration for non-  
10 intervention in the European conflict.



1 "127. As I have mentioned before, the question  
2 of what procedure should be adopted in the selection  
3 of a new Prime Minister when a Cabinet fell, after  
4 either the incapacity or death of the Genro, Prince  
5 SAIONJI, was still being considered. The matter was  
6 brought to me again for my opinion by Prince KONOYE  
7 and on November 10, 1939, I had a talk with Marquis  
8 MATSUDAIRA, in which I expressed my opinion to him  
9 and later on the same day conveyed my ideas to Prince  
10 KONOYE, both of whom concurred in my opinion. These  
11 conversations are fully reported in my diary of  
12 November 10, 1939. The prosecution has submitted  
13 exhibit 2273 which purports to be a translation of  
14 this diary entry. This was one of the many excerpts  
15 from my diary which were rushed into evidence in the  
16 closing minutes of the prosecution's case on January  
17 24, 1947. Apparently this last-minute rush did not  
18 give the Language Section sufficient time to retrans-  
19 late some of these entries carefully or accurately,  
20 particularly this one. Exhibit 2273 is not a proper  
21 translation of what I said in my diary. I am making  
22 a point of this because the prosecution has based a  
23 serious contention against me in document 0003, pages  
24 47 and 48, in saying that when I was out of office  
25 this exhibit 2273 showed I thought the Lord Keeper

1 should not 'interfere' in the choice of a new premier,  
2 but that I dropped this idea when I became Lord Keeper  
3 in 1940 and assumed this function myself. For this  
4 reason I submit the following translation which  
5 accurately sets forth my opinions:

6 "November 10, 1939 -- At 10 A.M. Marquis  
7 MATSUDAIRA visited me. As I have been considering,  
8 at the request of Prince KONOYE, the best method of  
9 recommending a succeeding premier to the Throne in  
10 case of a cabinet resignation, I had a talk over the  
11 matter with the Marquis. The summary of my opinion  
12 is as follows:

13 "Recently, I had an interview with the  
14 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. The opinion of the  
15 Lord Keeper on this item was that no other method  
16 except the existing one was conceivable for him, because  
17 he would not entertain any other plan when the elder  
18 statesman (Prince SAIONJI) is still alive and well.  
19 I have no reason to object to this opinion, at present.  
20 But we must have ready some plan for the future after  
21 the death of the elder statesman. Besides, as a great  
22 deal of unsavory criticism has been directed in govern-  
23 ment circles against the present system, it is necessary  
24 to replace it with a more appropriate one. The duty  
25 of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal should be limited



1 to constant attendance on the Throne and it is undesir-  
2 able that he assumes full responsibility to recommend  
3 the succeeding premier. Furthermore, from the  
4 political point of view it is not a good thing that  
5 Court circles should become the object of direct action.

6 "Therefore, I believe that the duty on the  
7 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal should revert to that of  
8 constant attendance on the Throne and that in the  
9 event of a general cabinet resignation, former premiers  
10 should be questioned by the Emperor (TN: concerning  
11 the succeeding premier.) In the event of there not  
12 being a sufficient number of them, persons having the  
13 privileges of State Ministers could be included. Thus  
14 it is necessary to give earnest attention to the  
15 question as to whether the Lord Keeper of the Privy  
16 Seal should attend as a result of an Imperial Order  
17 or whether the matter should be decided by the Emperor  
18 upon receiving their report, without the Lord Keeper  
19 of the Privy Seal attending at all.

20  
21 "In connection with the question as to  
22 whether the President of the Privy Council should  
23 attend or not, I also believe that these two should  
24 be made an entirely separate system.

25 "Although those persons should assemble in  
one place after having received the Imperial inquiry,

1 this should not assume the form of a conference  
2 inasmuch as votes should not be cast, but rather  
3 a suitable number of opinions should be advanced  
4 and the matter should be left up to the Imperial  
5 decision.

6 "After I had stated largely as mentioned  
7 above, Marquis MATSUDAIRA agreed with my opinion and  
8 we mutually promised assistance.

9 "At 1:30 P.M. I visited Prince KONOYE at  
10 Ogikubo. In addition to discussing the home and  
11 internal situation, I spoke to him about the argument  
12 I had propounded to Marquis MATSUDAIRA this morning.  
13 Prince KONOYE was in agreement and, as he wished to  
14 put this method into practice on the next occasion,  
15 he stated that he wished to consider a rapid method  
16 of effecting it. However, as its introduction --  
17 during the life of the elder statesman would require  
18 considerable study -- I requested that, in addition to  
19 my studying the problem, that the Prince should give  
20 it full consideration.

21 "In response to KONOYE's question as to  
22 whether my suggestion involved the abolition of the  
23 post of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, I explained  
24 that it might do so theoretically, but in actuality  
25 there was enough room to keep him as a constant



1 attendant on the Throne. We parted at 3:00 P.M.'

2 "128. As shown, I suggested that it was  
3 undesirable to charge the Lord Keeper of the Privy  
4 Seal solely with the duty of selecting a new prime  
5 minister. I believed that the senior statesmen should  
6 deal with it. This suggestion, though supported by  
7 Prince KONOYE, did not materialize after all. I wish  
8 to point out at this time that when I was unexpectedly  
9 appointed the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the elder  
10 statesman, Prince SAIONJI, was still alive. I followed  
11 in general the principle which he had contemplated  
12 and reported confidentially to the Throne. After his  
13 death in October of 1940, I studied this problem from  
14 various angles, though I could not get in the end a  
15 definite plan for leaving the problem to the senior  
16 statesmen alone. So I was obliged to act according to  
17 the former principle.

18 "129. The ABE Cabinet fell on January 12,  
19 1940 and it was succeeded by the YONAI Cabinet. The  
20 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, YUASA Kurahei, became  
21 quite ill and I was informed on May 8, 1940 that  
22 Prince SAIONJI desired that I accept this post. My  
23 attitude upon hearing this is set forth in my diary of  
24 that day:

25 "May 8, 1940 -- Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA

1 called on me at the Kuwana. He said that the Lord  
2 Keeper of the Privy Seal may have to be replaced in  
3 view of his illness. HARADA mentioned that Prince  
4 SAIONJI is recommending me as successor. I said that  
5 I am not the right man. I recommended Prince KONOYE  
6 as being the most suitable man for the post of Lord  
7 Keeper, and Baron HIRANUMA for the chairmanship of the  
8 Privy Council.'

9 "130. After the outbreak of the European War  
10 the people, who had a premonition of a worldwide up-  
11 heaval, would not remain idle. Heated discussion  
12 began to be made on political reconstruction and  
13 concentration of political power, whose necessity was  
14 felt keenly by various quarters. An atmosphere was  
15 created for merging all political parties into a new  
16 one which would be set up; while the question of  
17 National reorganization was vigorously discussed by  
18 interested quarters. Meanwhile, a movement raised  
19 its head for having Prince KONOYE preside over the  
20 projected new political party. From early in 1940, the  
21 Prince seemed to have begun to consider these questions  
22 seriously, but he apparently paid more attention to the  
23 movement for national reorganization than his leadership  
24 of the new political party. It was the intention of  
25 the Prince to prevent the Army from making a political



1 advance, by concentrating and establishing political  
2 power. On the strength of my personal experience as  
3 Cabinet Minister I myself keenly felt the necessity  
4 for establishing political power, but was opposed to  
5 one state, one party, which was advocated by some  
6 sections of the public after the Nazi fashion. It was  
7 my hope that political power might be established by  
8 combining all the existing political parties. At  
9 that time, I stood aloof from political circles due to  
10 family circumstances, whose movements I knew only  
11 through information brought to me by my friends from  
12 time to time. It was Count ARIMA who first brought the  
13 question to me. On April 14, 1940, when he called on  
14 me, I had a free and frank exchange of views with him  
15 on the movement for combining all existing political  
16 parties and the emergence of Prince KONOYE as leader  
17 of the new political party. The new party movement  
18 began to gather momentum about that time, and persons  
19 who called on me in connection with this question  
20 increased in number.

21 "131. In those days it was rumored in political  
22 circles that the YONAI Cabinet would resign en bloc and  
23 an opinion prevailed that Prince KONOYE should be  
24 appointed the next premier. Having observed such  
25 atmosphere, Mr. IKEZAKI advised me as stated in my

1 diary of May 10, 1940 (prosecution exhibit 2274).  
2 However, it was my intention, so long as Prince  
3 KONOYE took a leading part while he was active in  
4 politics, I would assist him by playing a supporter's  
5 part. So I expressed my opinion frankly that I had no  
6 intention to become the president of a new political  
7 party which was to be established and that 'I had no  
8 intention of forming any other new political party.'  
9 Mr. IKEZAKI here referred to is Mr. IKESAKI, Tadateka  
10 who was at that time a member of the Lower House and  
11 had been the Councillor Parliamentary of Education  
12 while I had served as Minister of Education (from  
13 October 1937 to May 1938).

14 "132. The atmosphere that the YONAI cabinet  
15 would sooner or later retire and a KONOYE Cabinet  
16 would be formed became more pronounced day by day.  
17 Prince KONOYE keenly felt that his former cabinet,  
18 not being supported by any political party, had found  
19 it difficult to carry out every policy he had in mind  
20 and he was desirous of obtaining by all means the  
21 people's backing in some form in case he was asked to  
22 form a ministry.

23 "133. In the afternoon of May 24, 1940, I had  
24 interviews separately with Mr. YUZAWA Michi and  
25 Mr. GOTO Ryunosuke, who both stressed the tenseness of



1 the situation, especially the home situation, expressing  
2 their ardent hopes for the emergence of Prince KONOYE  
3 as a new Prime Minister. In view of the political  
4 tendency, which promised to develop quickly, Prince  
5 KONOYE, Count ARIMA and I dined together at the  
6 restaurant Kinsui, Kioicho, at 6 P.M., May 26, 1940  
7 when we took occasion to talk about the new party and  
8 national reorganization questions. The result of this  
9 meeting is set forth in my diary of May 26, 1940 (prose-  
10 cution exhibit 2275 and errata). At this dinner we  
11 consulted with one another on various affairs. In  
12 view of the political situation, we, setting aside such  
13 problems as basic organization of the people, inquired,  
14 at first, into a policy to be adopted in case the  
15 Imperial Command to form a ministry was given to  
16 Prince KONOYE; because there was a probability of the  
17 Imperial Command being given before the above mentioned  
18 problem would be solved. Prince KONOYE was most strongly  
19 opposed to the dictatorship of 'One State, One Party'  
20 and we were thinking at this conference about a union  
21 of political parties, but not of 'One State, One Party.'

22 "134. Prince KONOYE was strongly opposed to  
23 this point when the movement for establishing a new  
24 party was inaugurated at the time of the first KONOYE  
25 Cabinet. That Prince KONOYE's intention was like that

1 may be clearly judged from the fact that the said  
2 movement was stopped as a result of his efforts. (See  
3 Page 82 of this affidavit)(Transcript page 30,861).

4 "135. As shown in Item 1 of exhibit 2275,  
5 the proposed new party would emerge only after Prince  
6 KONOYE received an Imperial Mandate to form a new  
7 cabinet. Item 2 (a) shows that we agreed that due  
8 consideration should be given to organizing a Supreme  
9 National Defense Council. The object of this was to  
10 suppress the Army, which had held political leadership,  
11 and to restore it into the premier's hands and thus to  
12 have the premier take charge of government, based upon  
13 the backing of a new political party, namely, public  
14 opinion. As we were still at war with China, we  
15 believed consideration should be given to Army and Navy  
16 wishes regarding finances, national defense and foreign  
17 affairs, as shown in Item 2 (b). Consideration of a  
18 request to all political parties to dissolve is shown  
19 in Item 2 (c). If the new party was established, Items  
20 3 and 4 were to be considered.

21 "136. On May 31, 1940 Baron HARADA told me I  
22 was being recommended to the position of Lord Keeper of  
23 the Privy Seal. My response is set forth in my diary  
24 for that day:  
25

"May 31, 1940 -- At 8 A.M. Baron HARADA



1 came to tell me that I am to be recommended to  
2 succeed the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I  
3 told him that I had no confidence because of the  
4 grave situation we are facing today.'

5 "137. Prosecution exhibit 2276 and errata  
6 (my diary of June 1, 1940) shows I was recommended to  
7 the position of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal by such  
8 anti-militarists as Imperial Minister MATSUDAIRA,  
9 Prince SAIONJI, Premier YONAI, Lord Keeper YUASA,  
10 and Prince KONOYE. I know of no militarists who  
11 recommended me. That afternoon I accepted after  
12 giving the matter due consideration and was duly  
13 installed in the position. As is also shown in  
14 exhibit 2276, early in the morning of June 1, 1940,  
15 Mr. IKEZAKI visited me. Mr. IKEZAKI had an intention  
16 to recommend me as the president of a new party when  
17 it was organized. He had cherished an opinion that,  
18 if I became the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, his  
19 intention as mentioned above could not be realized.  
20 So being surprised at the news that I might be installed  
21 in the said post, he came to dissuade me from taking  
22 such an office. However, as I had from the first no  
23 intention of launching out on the formation of a new  
24 party, I did not lend my ear to his opinion. (See also  
25 my diary, May 10, 1940, prosecution exhibit 2274).

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1 "138. In document 0003, page 48, the prose-  
2 cution says that exhibit 619, among others, shows my  
3 attitude toward the United States, Great Britain and  
4 the Netherlands. This exhibit is my diary for June 19,  
5 1940. In that entry I merely reported what the Foreign  
6 Minister told me in talks I had with him before and  
7 after he was received in audience by the Emperor. As  
8 shown in that exhibit, he told me about what transpired  
9 at the Four Ministers' Conference the day before  
10 regarding French Indo-China. I did not attend this  
11 conference. As a matter of fact, the Lord Keeper never  
12 attends cabinet or minister conferences, and I never  
13 did as Lord Keeper. The complete statement of the  
14 Foreign Minister to me in exhibit 619 is the five para-  
15 graphs beginning with (1).

16 "139. Prosecution translation of my diary of  
17 June 27, 1940 (prosecution exhibit 1294) has given rise  
18 to an erroneous claim that it shows my attitude toward  
19 the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands  
20 (document 0003, page 48). Here again I merely reported  
21 what Foreign Minister ARITA told me regarding a conver-  
22 sation he had with Ambassador Grew about a proposal  
23 for a treaty between the U.S. and Japan. I ask that  
24 this entry be referred to the Language Section. In  
25 the sentence before the paragraph beginning with the



1 words 'Ambassador Grew,' there should be a period after  
2 the word 'palace,' the balance of the sentence stricken  
3 and the following added -- 'We had a talk and he told  
4 me the following.'

5 "Furthermore, each minister of the cabinet  
6 often came and told me matters as reference in the event  
7 the Emperor desired consultation with the Lord Keeper  
8 of the Privy Seal.

9 "140. In my diary of July 1, 1940 (prosecution  
10 exhibit 1295) I have recorded as it clearly shows what  
11 Foreign Minister ARITA told me. No statement of mine  
12 appears. I merely listened. The spectacular achieve-  
13 ments, attained by the Germans in the European theater  
14 of war in June 1940 imported such a strong stimulus  
15 to the army and rightists that an atmosphere for a  
16 reformist movement was brewed and the criticisms and  
17 attacks, heaped upon the YONAI Cabinet for its alleged  
18 pro-American and pro-British character as well as for  
19 its maintenance of the status quo, developed into a  
20 movement for its overthrow. The result was the round-  
21 up of the MAYEDA faction for its plot of direct action  
22 on July 5, 1940.

23 "141. Prosecution exhibit 532 contains entries  
24 from my diary for July 5, 7, 8, 16 and 17, 1940. The  
25 entry of July 5, 1940 refers to a report made to me

1 about the July 5 incident. This was to kill Premier  
2 YONAI, Mr. MACHIDA, Count MAKINO, Baron HARADA, Baron  
3 ICHIKI, Mr. IKEDA, Admiral OKADA, Mr. YUASA and House-  
4 hold Minister MATSUDAIRA, and I understood later I was  
5 also on the list. These men were all close personal  
6 friends of mine. They were known as members of the  
7 Court Circle, except Mr. MACHIDA and Mr. IKEDA and  
8 had the reputation of being against war. As shown in  
9 the excerpt I reported this incident to His Majesty  
10 and in response to his questions I told him the plotters'  
11 actions were blameworthy but in so far as their motives  
12 were concerned, the administrators must seriously  
13 reflect. In other words, since the government's ad-  
14 ministration contains many things to be improved, such  
15 untoward incidents would take place one after another  
16 unless the state leaders, being warned by an incident  
17 of this sort, made deep introspection, and therefore  
18 they had to take these points into consideration.

19  
20 "142. As evidence of the popularity of  
21 Prince KONOYE as Premier in the event of a cabinet  
22 change, I refer to my diary of July 7, 1940 (prosecution  
23 exhibit 532). This shows that Mr. OTA representing  
24 Baron HIRANUMA came and told me that, in the event of  
25 a possible ministerial change, no one but Prince KONOYE  
would be recommendable for the next premier. It



1 testifies that Prince KONOYE was almost the only person  
2 at that time who was fit for premiership.

3 "143. With respect to my diary entry of  
4 July 8, 1940 (prosecution exhibit 532) wherein it  
5 appears that the army would support Prince KONOYE as  
6 the next premier my reaction was as follows. Judging  
7 by the political situation, then prevailing, I thought  
8 that a political change might be inevitable sooner or  
9 later. And I thought about the countermeasures from  
10 time to time. As already mentioned, I had various  
11 occasions to discuss with Prince KONOYE the question  
12 of concentrating and strengthening political power.  
13 On the other hand, Prince KONOYE was identifying him-  
14 self with the establishment of a new political structure,  
15 having resigned as President of the Privy Council. I  
16 thought, therefore, that there would be no suitable  
17 candidate for the succeeding Prime Minister but Prince  
18 KONOYE. I felt somewhat uneasy, however, when General  
19 ANAMI, Vice-Minister of War, assured me that the army  
20 solidly desired for the Prince's emergence as Prime  
21 Minister, because I feared that the army might push  
22 its own policy, taking undue advantage of Prince  
23 KONOYE's overwhelming popularity. On the part of the  
24 Prince, however, it seemed that political moves were  
25 steadily taken to counter the army's advance on the

1 political field. Should I refuse to recommend Prince  
2 KONOYE for fear of the army's political machinations,  
3 the result would be to hand over political power  
4 entirely to the army. Therefore, I thought that I would  
5 have to recommend Prince KONOYE as succeeding Prime  
6 Minister.

7 "144. Prosecution exhibit 534, my diary of  
8 July 14, 1940, records the steps I took to ascertain  
9 the information which the Emperor requested me to obtain  
10 about heavy artillery mobilization in the South China  
11 campaign. This entry shows, to the Imperial question  
12 about this matter, I replied that I would from the  
13 standpoint of the duty and authority of the Lord Keeper  
14 of the Privy Seal, avoid negotiating directly with the  
15 military authorities, but have instead the Chief Aide-  
16 de-Camp to the Throne make an investigation on that  
17 matter; and in case his investigation was unsatisfactory,  
18 I personally would negotiate with the government about  
19 it. As the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, I always  
20 tried to avoid direct contact with the military  
21 authorities on operations and only discussed policy  
22 matters with them in order to get their opinions.

23 "145. In my diary of July 16, 1940 (prosecution  
24 exhibit 532), I set forth the circumstances as related  
25 to me concerning the resignation of the YONAI Cabinet.



1 It fell because after War Minister HATA's resignation,  
2 the army refused to suggest a successor. The entry  
3 also sets forth the procedure in the selection of a  
4 new Prime Minister. It shows that the procedure used  
5 by me was the same as that used by my predecessor, Lord  
6 Lord Keeper YUASA, except that the senior statesmen  
7 were to be consulted as a body and not individually and  
8 separately. This minor change had been previously  
9 discussed by me with Prince KONOYE and Marquis  
10 MATSUDAIRA on November 10, 1939 as set forth above and  
11 I discussed it again with Marquis MATSUDAIRA on June 27,  
12 1940 (prosecution exhibit 1294). Also as shown above,  
13 I had discussed this entire vexing problem with Prince  
14 SAIONJI on several occasions. In any event, the  
15 Emperor approved the procedure I outlined to him as  
16 disclosed in this entry in my diary.

17  
18 "146. At 1:00 p.m. July 17, 1940, a meeting  
19 of senior statesmen took place in the Imperial Palace  
20 to select a succeeding Prime Minister, comprised of  
21 President HARA of the Privy Council, and the six ex-  
22 Premiers, WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIROTA, HAYASHI, KONOYE  
23 and HIRANUMA. On that occasion, President HARA of  
24 the Privy Council, a noted pacifist, asked me about  
25 the truth about the resignation of the cabinet en bloc.  
I told them the gist of what I had learned. At the

beginning of the conference Mr. WAKATSUKI, former president of the Minsei Party (People's Government Party) was the first to recommend Prince KONOYE. The others present immediately agreed to this recommendation. I concurred as Prince KONOYE was depended upon to settle the China Affair. Thus to me it was apparent that Prince KONOYE was the popular choice of the political parties as well as the army. The conference only lasted 30 minutes, whereas usually they take much longer. I sent my chief secretary to Prince SAIONJI to hear his opinion, but he did not dare give any opinion for the reason of illness and old age. So I could not get his opinion and I reported to the Throne about this matter accordingly and obtained the Imperial assent. When I reported to His Majesty he asked me if he could give KONOYE some advice and I told him that Prince KONOYE would be especially prudent in the choice of Foreign and Finance Ministers due to conditions at home and abroad. All of the above, together with my conversation with Prince KONOYE after he received the Imperial command, appears in my diary of July 17, 1940 (prosecution exhibit 532).

"147. My diary entry of July 18, 1940 (prosecution exhibit 539) records my statement that it was wrong in formalities that HATA, Minister of War,



recommended to His Majesty that Lieutenant General TOJO  
be appointed his successor and I advised the Chief Aide-  
de-Camp that such an act should not be a precedent.

"148. Of all the members of the KONOYE Cabinet, it was Foreign Minister MATSUOKA who was regarded not only as a 'problem' minister, but also as a dangerous character by a section of the intelligent classes. On his assumption of the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, Mr. MATSUOKA immediately carried out a big shakeup of diplomatic representatives abroad on the ground that the current difficult situation could not be pulled through by the old court diplomacy. He conducted personnel affairs in a unique fashion, by jettisoning leading career diplomats. The Ambassadors chosen by him included Lieutenant General TATEKAWA, Yoshitsu, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General OSHIMA, Hiroshi, Ambassador to Germany, and Mr. MORIKIRI, Zembei, Ambassador to Italy, who attracted widespread attention. All people concerned felt deep concern over the unprecedented reshuffle, contemplated by Mr. MATSUOKA. I drew Prince KONOYE's attention to the matter. The Prince himself was deeply concerned over the far-reaching effects it might have on various quarters, but he could not stop it. As the result of Mr. MATSUOKA's shakeup, the pro-British and

1 pro-American colorings of Japan's diplomatic front  
2 began to fade rapidly. As an example of Foreign Minister  
3 MATSUOKA's actions, I refer to my diary of August 9,  
4 1940:

5 "August 9, 1940: For 35 minutes, starting  
6 1:50 p.m. I had an audience with the Emperor, when  
7 His Majesty told me mostly about Foreign Minister  
8 MATSUOKA's way of thinking. His way of thinking to  
9 endeavor to unify diplomacy and do his best to avoid  
10 diplomatic isolation was all right, but His Majesty  
11 expressed his regret that the Foreign Minister failed  
12 to have any clear perspective of America's future  
13 policy.'

14 "149. On August 10, 1940 I was told by the  
15 Emperor of his conversation with Prince FUSHIMI, Chief  
16 of the Navy General Staff, about the navy's attitude  
17 and lack of preparations for war. This is recorded  
18 in my diary for that day (prosecution exhibit 1298).

19 "150. On September 9, 1940, I was advised  
20 by the Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor that our  
21 proposal of the peaceful advance into Indo-China was  
22 in negotiation. Our forces suddenly invaded there,  
23 causing reversal of negotiation on the agreement. Being  
24 informed of the news, I was greatly indignant at the  
25 actions of the military authorities in the field



1 against the intention of the central authorities. This  
2 is recorded in my diary of September 9, 1940 (prosecu-  
3 tion exhibit 626).

4 "151. MATSUOKA's suggestion that an ultimatum  
5 be sent to French Indo-China was pending in September  
6 1940. The Emperor told me that the views of MATSUOKA  
7 and of the Army General Staff did not coincide exactly.  
8 In case the explanation of the government or the  
9 Supreme Command regarding any policy was deemed consi-  
10 derably well grounded, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal  
11 used to advise the Emperor to approve it. In such a  
12 case, however, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was  
13 always strictly cautious if he was asked and gave his  
14 own personal opinion. Such was the case with any Lord  
15 Keeper of the Privy Seal. Much more so in this case.  
16 As His Majesty told me that he thought there was nothing  
17 else but to have the government policy carried out, I  
18 replied that I agreed with him. However, as I was  
19 aware that things were grave and that he did not show  
20 his hearty approval, I added that he had better direct  
21 the government to take a cautious attitude. My advice  
22 to the Emperor on this occasion is set forth in my  
23 diary of September 14, 1940. The translation of this  
24 diary entry, prosecution exhibit 627, was submitted  
25 to the Language Section, whose corrections made on

1 October 4, 1946 and October 7, 1946, do not accurately  
2 set forth my advice that the government's policy should  
3 be followed, and that it should take a cautious atti-  
4 tude. Furthermore, this exhibit does not express my  
5 attitude toward United States, Great Britain and the  
6 Netherlands as is stated in document 0003. On its face  
7 it shows that I merely reported to the Emperor what I  
8 heard. I only advised him to follow constitutional  
9 government in my advice to him.

10 "152. In September 1940, Ambassador von Stahmer  
11 came from Germany, when an important negotiation was  
12 started for the conclusion of an alliance between Japan  
13 and Germany. It was reported that Foreign Minister  
14 MATSUOKA conducted the negotiation at his private  
15 residence. It was conducted so secretly that even the  
16 divisional chiefs of the Foreign Office were not aware  
17 of it with the exception of his diplomatic advisors,  
18 before a definite plan was evolved. I myself learned  
19 it from Prime Minister KONOYE for the first time on  
20 September 12, 1940 when I was surprised at its unexpected  
21 progress.

22 "153. This question worried me most. Here  
23 allow me to digress a little. I and Prince KONOYE  
24 were among the so-called disciples of Prince SAIONJI.  
25 Since I was appointed Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper



1 of the Privy Seal, I made it a rule to call on the  
2 aged Prince at Okitsu almost once every month and listen  
3 to his instructive talks. The Prince, who was deeply  
4 concerned over the situation in Japan, repeatedly  
5 stressed the necessity, I vividly recall, for basing  
6 Japan's foreign policy on cooperation with Britain and  
7 America. I entirely agreed with him. As I approached  
8 all questions with my way of thinking based on that,  
9 the question of alliance with Germany tormented me.  
10 I could not bring myself to approve of it.

1 "Especially I feared the alliance would  
2 necessarily lead to a war between Japan and America.  
3 From this angle, I drew the attention of Prince KONOYE,  
4 and Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, who, however, surprised  
5 me by arguing that the alliance was intended to pre-  
6 vent America from joining in the war and further that  
7 in case Japan was isolated in the Pacific without con-  
8 cluding the alliance with Germany, she might be attacked  
9 by America any moment. Notwithstanding their explana-  
10 tion to the contrary, I could not help feeling deeply  
11 concerned, as I thought that the alliance might cause  
12 an antithesis with America and eventually we would  
13 have to oppose both Great Britain and the United States.  
14 On September 16, 1940 I had an audience with the Emperor.

16 "'September 16, 1940: I was received in  
17 audience and inquired by his Majesty mainly about con-  
18 cluding an alliance with Germany. His Majesty aired  
19 his views and I submitted my opinions to the Throne.'

20 "I told the Emperor on this occasion that this  
21 alliance, if concluded, would divide the world into two  
22 parts, notwithstanding the opinions of the Prime Minister  
23 and Mr. MATSUOKA to the contrary. I also told him the  
24 China Incident was an irritant to the United States and  
25 should be concluded as quickly as possible.

"154. Prosecution exhibit 2277 (diary of



1 September 21, 1940) shows my forecast in another  
2 audience with the Emperor as follows:

3 "September 21, 1940: With regard to the  
4 solution of the China Incident, I expressed my opinion  
5 to His Majesty to the effect that we would have  
6 eventually to oppose both England and the United States  
7 if we conclude a military alliance with Germany and  
8 Italy. We should therefore make necessary adjustments  
9 regarding our relations with China as soon as possible.'

10 "155. I was helpless to prevent the govern-  
11 ment from approving this alliance, although in several  
12 talks with MATSUOKA and also with Prince KONOYE I  
13 disapproved of it as shown above. Once the govern-  
14 ment approved it, tradition, scrupulously observed  
15 since the Meiji Emperor, builder of modern Japan, dic-  
16 tates the Emperor to approve the government's decision  
17 when it is submitted to the Throne as national policy  
18 though prior to that, His Majesty may express his views,  
19 or caution the cabinet to request the cabinet to recon-  
20 sider its proposed attitude thereupon. In this case,  
21 it may be imagined that the Emperor inwardly felt un-  
22 easy, but sanctioned the requested conclusion of the  
23 alliance with Germany. The question of this alliance  
24 with Germany had caused a great deal of solicitude to  
25 the Emperor. His Majesty expressed his view also that

1 the conclusion of the alliance would necessitate an  
2 anticipation of an eventual war between Japan and  
3 America and asked Prime Minister KONOYE and Foreign  
4 Minister MATSUOKA about this. In reply, however, both  
5 of them stated that the alliance was intended to avert  
6 war between Japan and America and that if the alliance  
7 was not concluded, the danger of a Pacific war would  
8 be all the greater. On the strength of their conten-  
9 tion, they petitioned the Emperor to sanction the  
10 alliance. Judging by the result, the Emperor's ob-  
11 servation was correct.

12 "156. In order to prevent a war with the  
13 United States and Great Britain, I thought that we  
14 should eliminate one of the major factors which was  
15 irritating the United States and Great Britain -- the  
16 China Affair. It was for this additional reason that  
17 I advised the Emperor, as quoted above, exhibit 2277,  
18 to resolve the China Affair. I further told the Emperor  
19 at that time that this should be accomplished even if it  
20 necessitated making decisive concessions.

22 "157. On September 26, 1940 (prosecution  
23 exhibit 643) I was advised that an army unit had landed  
24 in French Indo-China to bomb Haifong. I was indignant  
25 at this as appears in the exhibit: 'It is indeed re-  
grettable that such measures are taken by those in the



1 field who do not understand the general situation. It  
2 is people like this who make the grave blunders.'  
3 Prosecution document 0001 P153 fails to record my in-  
4 dignation.

5 "158. On November 24, 1940 Prince SAIONJI  
6 passed away.

7 "159. There was no prospect of an early  
8 settlement of the China Affair; while peace moves,  
9 taken by the army and those interested in the China  
10 question, toward Chungking led to no tangible results.  
11 The result was that a fretful atmosphere began to pre-  
12 vail in various quarters. True to his policy of unify-  
13 ing diplomacy, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was determined  
14 to take up negotiations with Chungking in his own  
15 hands. With this in view, he dispatched Counselor  
16 TAJIRI, Mr. MATSUMOTO and others to Hongkong, who were  
17 instructed to conduct negotiations with Chungking. At  
18 first, the negotiation, conducted by the Foreign  
19 Minister's agents at Hongkong appeared to make fair  
20 progress, but later it proved to remain in the stage  
21 of political warfare, after all. In consequence, the  
22 liaison conference between the government and the High  
23 Command at its meeting of November 28, 1940, decided  
24 that a basic treaty be concluded between Ambassador  
25 ABE and President Wang Ching-wei, paying no attention

1 to the negotiation with Chungking. The result was  
2 that the China Affair entered a definite stage of  
3 protraction.

4 "160. As the year drew to a close, our power  
5 was becoming exhausted and I was extremely pessimistic  
6 as to the prospect for the settlement of the China  
7 Affair. I told the Throne that we would be unable to  
8 settle the affair by compromising with those positive  
9 action proponents in Japan and on the contrary we  
10 would only have the national strength exhausted, and  
11 I added that Japan's future was indeed a matter about  
12 which I felt a great concern. My diary of November 29,  
13 1940, prosecution exhibit 2278, as corrected, records  
14 that I advised the Emperor to the above effect. This  
15 reply was made to a query by the Emperor after His  
16 Majesty expressed his solicitude about Japan's formula  
17 for dealing with the China Affair which he said  
18 irretrievably would become a protracted one. His  
19 Majesty told me that the moves, hitherto taken toward  
20 Chungking in settling the China Affair must be regarded  
21 as failure; while conclusion of the treaty with the  
22 Wang Ching-wei Administration would irrevocably make  
23 the China Affair a protracted one.

24 "161. The success of the Russian Five-Year  
25 Plan and our relations with Russia were causing the



Emperor great concern. He asked me for my opinion.

As I was opposed to war and believed that nations may rise and fall without being involved in war and that Japan could grow peacefully, I advised him as recited in my diary of December 3, 1940.

"December 3, 1940: At 10:30 went on duty and was received in audience by the Emperor from 10:50 till 12:05. His Majesty disclosed his deep concern about the prospect of adjusting our relations with the Soviet and told me his various reactions. I stated to the following effect:

"Today, the USSR is in the most favorable position in the world. As things stand now, the less she moves the better her position gets. The fact being so, she is haughty, and it is possible that she will not readily concede to negotiating with Japan. After the present war, there is little doubt that the only uninjured countries will be the USSR and the United States, while others would be exhausted. Then Japan will be placed between the two powers and subjected to an extremely enduring hardship. However, we need not necessarily be pessimistic because even those two powers, when they lose their strong rival countries around them, will automatically become relaxed, then inevitably deteriorate. So provided that we

1 are prepared for ten years of hardships and culti-  
2 vate a morale based on simplicity and virility, I  
3 believe it is not so difficult to emerge favorably  
4 in the end."

5 "162. In the European theater of war, the  
6 Germans were daily adding to their military achieve-  
7 ments. It had far-reaching effects on the various  
8 quarters of Asia, particularly on French Indo-China,  
9 whose motherland had collapsed and Thailand, who had  
10 hitherto been under British influence. The question  
11 arose in the intellectual classes as to the propriety  
12 or otherwise of advancing to the south on the part of  
13 Japan, taking advantage of the great upheaval. It  
14 was hotly discussed, while various plans were formu-  
15 lated by the army for the purpose. When Japan  
16 mediated in the border dispute between French Indo-  
17 China and Thailand, an 'outline of operations on  
18 French Indo-China and Thailand' was adopted for the  
19 purpose of establishing leadership positions in the  
20 south and having access to raw materials on the one  
21 hand, seizing occasion and on the other bringing  
22 pressure to bear upon China from the south so as to  
23 hasten the settlement of the China Affair. It was  
24 natural that Japan could not look on the world-wide  
25 upheaval with folded arms, there being no objection



1 to try to have access to oil, rubber and iron resources  
2 on the part of Japan, who was lacking in them; but  
3 moves for the purposes must be taken through peaceful  
4 channels. To resort to armed force in impatience  
5 should be most strictly guarded against. I feared  
6 that tactless display of armed force might excite  
7 needless doubt to Britain and America and possibly  
8 lead to a clash with them. Therefore, I drew Prince  
9 KONOYE's attention to this point. The Emperor was  
10 also very solicitous about it. When the chiefs of  
11 staff of the army and navy reported to him on the  
12 military agreement with Thailand, the Emperor expressed  
13 his fear that it might stimulate Britain and America  
14 with which I agreed.

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1 "His Majesty paid cautious consideration to  
2 it. My diary of January 24, 1941, recites:

3 "January 24, 1941 -- At 11:10 (till 11:25 A.M.)  
4 had an Imperial audience and was told by the Emperor  
5 that he had said to the two Chiefs of the General Staff  
6 as follows: 'The matters you reported to me yesterday  
7 have had my due consideration. In view of the strong  
8 influence of Great Britain and the United States over  
9 the politics of Thailand, I fear lest the enforcement of  
10 this agreement stimulate these two powers and might  
11 cause grave consequences and further consider it may not  
12 be advisable to irritate French Indo-China with whom we  
13 maintain at present friendly relations as the result of  
14 the solution of the rice problem, etc. So you are  
15 requested to give due deliberation together with the  
16 Government with regard to the time of enforcement and  
17 after coincidence with the opinions of both parties you  
18 are to carry out the plan. On condition that the above  
19 is strictly observed, your reports have my approval.'

20 "163. On February 1, 1941, the Chief Aide-de-  
21 Camp to the Emperor came to me and stated in substance:  
22 'The outline of operations on French Indo-China and  
23 Thailand' is intended to establish Japan's leader  
24 position in the south so as to prepare the ground for  
25 her southern advance, taking occasion of French



1 Indo-China and Thailand's acceptance of Japan's media-  
2 tion in their border dispute. The Navy intends to use  
3 Camranh Bay and also the air base near Saigon, but its  
4 objects cannot be boldly expressed, so that such phrase-  
5 ology as safeguarding of trade and communication and  
6 guarantee for the prevention of a recurrence of disputes  
7 between French Indo-China and Thailand is used. In case  
8 armed force is to be resorted to, it is arranged that  
9 Imperial sanction be obtained afresh. This report is  
10 set forth in my diary of February 1, 1941, together with  
11 a statement made to me by MATSUOKA (prosecution exhibit  
12 1303). The term 'leader position' used by the Chief  
13 Aide-de-Camp above, began to be used frequently about  
14 this time, which fact worried the Emperor. His Majesty  
15 stated that one's leader position should not be imposed  
16 on others and therefore that Japan's leader position would  
17 be established only when she was looked up to as leader,  
18 deprecating any hasty action in this direction. That  
19 the Emperor only half-heartedly agreed with the measures  
20 taken appears in my diary of February 3, 1941:

21 "February 3, 1941: At 10:00 A.M. went to my  
22 office. From 10:10 to 11:00 I was received in audience,  
23 during which time I asked His Majesty about an account  
24 of the audience that was granted to the Chiefs of both  
25 Army and Navy General Staffs and the Premier on the

1 1st.

2 \* \* \* \* \*

3 "When I was received in audience this morning  
4 His Majesty related to me the following: (I was over-  
5 awed at His Majesty's exceeding concern).

6 "'On Saturday last the Chiefs of the Army and  
7 Naval General Staffs and the Premier reported to me  
8 the measures to be taken toward French Indo-China and  
9 Thailand. Personally, I do not approve in principle  
10 of these policies of taking advantages and making demands  
11 while the opponent is weakened; that is, I do not approve  
12 of anything in the nature of a thief at fire. However,  
13 in dealing with the fast-changing world of today, it would  
14 not be gratifying to err on the side of benevolence.  
15 So I approved those policies but we must be very cautious  
16 in carry them out.'

17 "I regretted that the Emperor's advice was not  
18 embodied in the measures taken by the Government. In  
19 a subsequent conversation with Prince KONOYE I gathered  
20 an impression that the Emperor's advice as quoted above  
21 was given by him to the Chiefs of the Army and Navy  
22 General Staffs and the Premier, but I am not certain.

23 "164. I did not approve of MATSUOKA's proposed  
24 visit to Europe which he told me he intended to make  
25 (prosecution exhibit 1302, diary of February 1, 1940)



1 and suggested to both the Emperor and Prince KONOYE  
2 that careful consideration be given to this.

3 "My diary for February 18, 1941, states:

4 "February 18, 1941: At 2:15 I was granted  
5 an Imperial audience. I suggested to His Majesty that  
6 inasmuch as our relations with the United States and  
7 Britain have become radically aggravated of late, we  
8 must have the government carefully study the effect  
9 that MATSUOKA's visit to Europe will bring about in  
10 our country and in the world. At 2:30 I withdrew from  
11 the Emperor's presence.

12 \* \* \* \* \*

13 "At 6:00 I talked with Prince KONOYE over  
14 the phone, asking him to give careful thought to Foreign  
15 Minister MATSUOKA's pending journey abroad."

16 "165. Prosecution exhibit 1058, my diary of  
17 April 3, 1941, recites that my advice was sought by  
18 Prince KONOYE on the prospective appointment of Admiral  
19 TOYADA as Minister of Commerce and Industry and Lieu-  
20 tenant General SUZUKI as President of the Planning  
21 Board. It was for carrying out personnel affairs  
22 smoothly that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was  
23 consulted about the appointment of a minister. There-  
24 fore, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal used to agree  
25 about that matter in case there was nothing particular

1 to be censured concerning the character and career of  
2 the person in question. This was to insure that there  
3 would be no reflection on the Emperor as to the char-  
4 acter of his appointees.

5 "During the party government some ministers  
6 were occasionally charged with criminal offenses,  
7 which worried the Emperor. This necessitated the Lord  
8 Keeper of the Privy Seal to pay considerable attention  
9 to the character and career of the person to be ap-  
10 pointed a minister. The usage of consulting with the  
11 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal about the appointment of  
12 a minister did not originate when I was in that position.  
13 It had been practiced for many years.  
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1 "166. A string of various questions cropped up  
2 in April 1941 one after another in quick succession.  
3 Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, on his way home from his visits  
4 to Germany and Italy, succeeded in concluding a pact of  
5 neutrality with Premier Stalin at Moscow, thereby adjusting  
6 the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. On  
7 the other hand, a telegram was received on April 18,  
8 1941 from Ambassador NOMURA, asking for instructions on  
9 a draft plan for understanding between America and Japan,  
10 which had evolved as the result of negotiations, con-  
11 ducted by the Ambassador with Secretary of State  
12 Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt in absolute secrecy.  
13 The Ambassador's telegram delighted Prince KONOYE,  
14 especially as he had come to realize that the Tri-Partite  
15 Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy had failed to  
16 restrain America, as it was intended to, but on the con-  
17 trary the relations between Japan and America had tended  
18 to go from bad to worse. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, who  
19 who was responsible for the Tri-Partite Pact, was still  
20 on the way to Tokyo.. The Prince got in touch by telephone  
21 with the Foreign Minister, who was stopping at Dairen  
22 and pressed him to hurry home. The Prince was very  
23 enthusiastic over the projected understanding with America.  
24 No less enthusiastic were the Army and Navy over it.  
25 The China Affair was stalemated, so that the Army thought

1 it would be fortunate if the China Affair was settled as  
2 a sequel to an understanding with America. Regarding  
3 the policy of the Co-prosperity Sphere in the East Asia,  
4 too, we were convinced that its object did never lie in  
5 conquering by arms various countries in the South; and  
6 it was also never in conflict with the relations with  
7 America for Japan to strive for promoting mutual pros-  
8 perity together with those countries in the South. Thus  
9 the conclusion we arrived at was that, on the one hand,  
10 we had to make our best to explain the Japanese policy  
11 clearly enough to remove misunderstanding which America  
12 seemed to have, while on the other hand, we must, by all  
13 means, materialize the understanding between Japan and  
14 America. Concerning the meaning of the Co-prosperity  
15 Sphere in East Asia, I, at that time, had the following  
16 opinion, on the basis of which I talked with Prince  
17 KONOYE: 'The reason why such a policy was necessary  
18 for Japan was that the actual situation at that time  
19 was that France and the Netherlands, to which various  
20 colonies in the South-western Pacific belonged, had  
21 fallen and Great Britain was also being threatened with  
22 landing operation by Germany owing to the "Dunkirk  
23 Tragedy".

24 "167. So the issue of the southern colonies,  
25 such as Malaya, Java, Sumatra, and French Indo-China  
and its effect upon Japan's existence had come to be



1 regarded as a matter of grave national concern among the  
2 intelligentsia of our country. Some positives  
3 advocated that Japan should immediately secure those  
4 areas in the South even by appealing to force. Being  
5 very much worried about this trend of public opinion,  
6 Prince KONOYE and some others thought of such a policy  
7 as mentioned above with a view to unifying confused  
8 public opinion and checking such a radical idea of ad-  
9 vancing southward with arms. From this point of view  
10 I also agreed to this policy; but was strongly opposed  
11 to advance with arms. At that time there were prevalent  
12 among intelligent people an opinion that the French  
13 Indo-China might become German Indo-China or might become  
14 American Indo-China if America participated in the war  
15 which would present a grave menace to the existence of  
16 our country. This was what Prince KONOYE was greatly  
17 concerned about. The foregoing is a complete summary of  
18 the talks I had with the Emperor and also with Prince  
19 KONOYE on April 19, 1941, which is referred to in my  
20 diary of that day, prosecution exhibit 1065, as corrected,  
21 page 10,664.

22 "168. On April 28, 1941, the Premier, the  
23 Foreign Minister and I were all ill. (of diary of that  
24 day, prosecution exhibit 1066.) Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA  
25 called and told me that the Emperor wanted my opinion as  
to whom he should consult on diplomatic matters, if,

1 as today, we three were ill simultaneously. The  
2 specific Imperial question on this matter was -- 'In  
3 this case unless the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal is  
4 ill, he can convey an Imperial question to the Premier  
5 or the Foreign Minister who are ill in bed and report  
6 their replies to the Emperor, but in case the Lord Keeper  
7 of the Privy Seal is also ill, how to deal with it?' I  
8 told MATSUDAIRA that as the Lord Keeper of the Privy  
9 Seal had no authority concerning diplomatic matters but  
10 to convey Imperial questions to the Premier and the  
11 Foreign Minister, nor had he any authority to answer  
12 about a diplomatic problem in his own responsibility  
13 and if the Lord Keeper is also ill, the Imperial inquiry  
14 should be conveyed by the Grand Chamberlain to the  
15 Premier, or to the Foreign Minister. On that occasion,  
16 I submitted my views on the Japanese-American negoti-  
17 ation to the Emperor through the messenger on the basis  
18 of what I had heard from Prime Minister KONOYE and others  
19 about the outline of the developments of the parley.  
20 I do not fully remember what I stated, but recall that  
21 I submitted my outlook on the Japanese-American negoti-  
22 ation that it would make a favorable development, because  
23 the Prime Minister was anxious to push the negotiation  
24 by all means, though there was some difficulty so far  
25 as Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was concerned.

"169. When Foreign Minister MATSUOKA returned  
to Tokyo, on April 23, 1941 a liaison conference between



1 the Government and the High Command was held the same  
2 night to deliberate over the instructions to be sent to  
3 Ambassador NOMURA. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, however,  
4 who was extremely dissatisfied with the negotiation with  
5 America attended the conference, but, I learned from  
6 Prince KONOYE later, withdrew from the conference before  
7 it was closed, without touching on the question. For  
8 the subsequent two weeks, the Foreign Minister made no  
9 progress with the plan under the pretext of study.

10 Meanwhile the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of  
11 the War Ministry, the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau  
12 of the Navy Ministry and others paid frequent visits to  
13 the Foreign Minister and urged him to approve of the  
14 projected understanding with America, as the result of  
15 which instructions were cabled to Ambassador NOMURA on  
16 May 12, 1941 on his approval. But the negotiation did  
17 not progress, due to the Foreign Minister's indifferent  
18 attitude.

19 "170. Prosecution exhibit 1084, my diary of  
20 June 6, 1941, merely shows I read Ambassador OSHIMA's  
21 telegram re the outbreak of war between Germany and the  
22 USSR and also MATSUOKA's estimate that this was not so  
23 imminent. Prosecution exhibit 1089, my diary of June 18,  
24 1941, shows that MATSUOKA told me that he had sent in-  
25 structions to the German Government to negotiate with  
the Vichy Government in connection with the French

Indo-China problem.

"171. The substance of my one hour conversation with Prince KONOYE briefly reported in my diary of June 20, 1941, prosecution exhibit 1090, as corrected by Language Section, record page 10,664, is as follows: Prince KONOYE who was a man of weak character, worried himself very much about Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's attitude at that time, so that he told me again his intention to resign the post. But I could not agree with his proposed resignation. So I told him that prior to his resignation he had better talk frankly with MATSUOKA and ascertain his real intention and at the same time explain distinctly his administrative policy and persuade MATSUOKA into it. If MATSUOKA still did not agree to it, there would be no alternative but to ask him to resign his position; but if KONOYE met MATSUOKA's refusal to do so, then, for the first time, KONOYE must take the responsibility for lacking the unity of the Cabinet."

THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:)



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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: With the Tribunal's permis-  
4 sion, the accused KIMURA will be absent ~~from the~~  
5 courtroom for the second half of the morning session  
6 conferring with his counsel.

7 Mr. Logan.

8 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, I con-  
9 tinue reading KIDO's diary, page 128:

10 "172. My diary of June 21, 1941, prosecution  
11 exhibit 781, records the gist of a talk between Prince  
12 KONOYE, Baron HIRANUMA and I. As shown in this exhibit,  
13 we discussed with one another on the basis of my opinion  
14 which I told KONOYE the previous day. We gave Prince  
15 KONOYE words of encouragement and hoped that he would  
16 dare to display his power and take a lead on this  
17 occasion of emergency and we urged him to take a firm  
18 stand.

19 "173. On June 22, 1941, hostilities opened  
20 between Germany and the Soviet Union. It was not an  
21 unanticipated affair, but none the less it was a big  
22 question for Japan, anyhow, as Germany was Japan's ally;  
23 while a pact of neutrality was in existence between  
24 Japan and the Soviet Union. To conduct foreign  
25 affairs in the midst of such a complicated situation

1 was a delicate and difficult question for Japan. As  
2 might be expected, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA began to  
3 advocate, over Prince KONOYE's head, a military  
4 expedition to Siberia, but his contention met with  
5 disapproval not only from the Cabinet Ministers,  
6 including Prime Minister KONOYE, but also the leaders  
7 for the Army and Navy. The liaison conference between  
8 the Government and the High Command met in session  
9 frequently, as the result of which it was decided to  
10 seek a settlement of the China Affair by bringing  
11 pressure to bear upon China from the south instead of  
12 pursuing the Foreign Minister's policy.

13 "174. Prosecution exhibit 1093, as corrected  
14 record page 10,664, my diary of June 22, 1941, shows  
15 I reported to His Majesty the talk I had the day before  
16 with Prince KONOYE and Baron HIRANUMA; that MATSUOKA  
17 had an audience with the Emperor; that there was a  
18 difference of opinion between the Foreign Minister and  
19 the government and the High Command regarding  
20 MATSUOKA's opinion that Japan would advance to both  
21 Northern and Southern regions as pointed out to  
22 MATSUOKA by the Emperor; that I phoned Prince KONOYE  
23 to be prudent and that at 12:30 a.m. MATSUOKA told  
24 Prince KONOYE that his report to the Throne did not  
25 refer to immediate action. His Majesty was perturbed



1 with MATSUOKA's opinion. Since coming back from his  
2 visit to Germany, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA used to  
3 show an attitude not understandable. Especially he  
4 often took a disdainful behavior toward Premier  
5 KONOYE. I very often heard the Premier complaining  
6 that he could not understand Foreign Minister  
7 MATSUOKA's attitude. And a report told me that  
8 Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was emphasizing the neces-  
9 sity of dispatching troops as far as Irkutsk and  
10 Soviet Russia. Expecting that he would be sure, on  
11 receiving a report of the outbreak of the Russo-  
12 German war, to proceed to the Imperial Palace, and to  
13 express his opinion to the Emperor, I previously told  
14 His Majesty on this day, June 22, 1941, about  
15 MATSUOKA's possible action for reference, asking him  
16 to be prepared for it.

17 "175. The next day, June 23, 1941, as shown  
18 in my diary (prosecution exhibit 1094) I was received  
19 in audience by the Emperor in the morning. I reported  
20 to him on that occasion the conversation of Prince  
21 KONOYE at 12:30 a.m. with MATSUOKA, in order to ease  
22 the Imperial mind. The conversation which I had with  
23 Prince KONOYE on the afternoon of June 23, 1941, which  
24 is referred to in my diary was as follows: I exchanged  
25 views with Prince KONOYE on various problems

1 accompanying the outbreak of such a grave affair as  
2 Russo-German War. He requested my opinion so I replied  
3 for reference what occurred to me at that time. I  
4 remember I told him that Germany by waging a war  
5 against the Soviet Union had violated the principle  
6 that it was necessary for both states to make a stride  
7 in adjusting the diplomatic relations with the Soviet  
8 Union. On this principle, Germany agreed at the time  
9 when the alliance between Japan and Germany was con-  
10 cluded. In other words Germany's waging a war had  
11 changed one of the elements by which the Alliance was  
12 formed. Therefore, on this occasion the Prime  
13 Minister should consider most carefully as to whether  
14 the Alliance should be continued any longer. Prince  
15 KONOYE, agreeing with me about this point, said that  
16 he would examine into the matter at once. Prince  
17 KONOYE, as I heard later, expressed to MATSUOKA his  
18 strong desire for reconsidering with him the matter  
19 concerning the Alliance, but MATSUOKA did not take it  
20 seriously and only made a protest by telegram to the  
21 German Foreign Minister.

22 "176. My diary entry of June 25, 1941  
23 (prosecution exhibit 1095) recites what Prince KONOYE  
24 told me of his conversation with Wang Ching-wei the  
25 previous evening. Also that the Premier and Chiefs



1 of the Army and Naval General Staffs reported to the  
2 Emperor the decisions of the Liaison Conference with  
3 respect to entry of Japanese troops into French Indo-  
4 China.

5 "176-A. On June 28, 1941, after an audience  
6 with the Emperor, War Minister TOJO explained to me  
7 the matters listed in my diary of that day (prosecution  
8 exhibit 1098, as corrected by Language Section, record  
9 page 10,665). I expressed no opinion of my own and  
10 recorded this for reference. At that time it was a  
11 grave concern among the intelligent people that the  
12 Kwantung Army with the outbreak of a war between  
13 Germany and the Soviet Union might probably start some  
14 action. So the War Minister told me on that occasion  
15 that the Kwantung Army was especially taking so calm  
16 and prudent an attitude that it would not violate  
17 military discipline and asked me to set my heart at  
18 ease. He said that while the China Affair remained  
19 unsolved the war had broken out between Germany and  
20 the Soviet Union, so the situation had become the more  
21 strained, therefore he should like to have the Imperial  
22 Headquarters strengthened so that the staff members  
23 might gather at the Palace every day and prepare for  
24 any situation to come. He also spoke to me about  
25 information from ambassadors here which they were

1 sending to their home countries, and of the progress  
2 of Japan's political demarches toward China.

3 "177. Prior to the Imperial Conference of  
4 July 2, 1941, I was advised that the discussions at  
5 the Liaison Conferences centered primarily around  
6 MATSUOKA's idea of proceeding North against Russia,  
7 and which Prince KONOYE was opposing. Of secondary  
8 importance, after the outbreak of the Russian-German  
9 war, was the public discussion of the necessity of  
10 Japan advancing southward to obtain materials and  
11 necessities for national defense and to end the China  
12 war. After the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941, I  
13 was informed generally that MATSUOKA's idea of going  
14 north had been disapproved, and that Japan's national  
15 policy was to proceed south by peaceful means. My  
16 diary for that day, prosecution exhibit 1108, states  
17 that the national policy was decided. I never knew,  
18 until I saw Prince KONOYE's memoirs that the plan  
19 decided at the Conference contemplated an advance to  
20 French Indo-China and was to be carried on even if it  
21 meant recourse to war against the U.S.A. and Britain.  
22 I was greatly surprised when I read in the memoirs that  
23 such a clear cut policy had been decided.

24  
25 "178. My diary of July 5, 1941 (prosecution  
exhibit 1112, as corrected, record page 10,666) sets



1 forth what Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's attitude was  
2 toward the Japanese troops marching into French Indo-  
3 China. As I heard these circumstances I did not ex-  
4 press my views. I was interested in getting this  
5 information as the situation was getting more critical  
6 and I wanted to have all the knowledge I could so that  
7 when I was asked questions by the Emperor I would be  
8 in a position to reply. The relations between Prime  
9 Minister KONOYE and Foreign Minister MATSUOKA were  
10 extremely aggravated about this time. The Prime  
11 Minister frequently told me that he could not grasp  
12 the real motives of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

13 "179. On July 3, 1941, a personal message  
14 was received by Prince KONOYE from Secretary of State  
15 Cordell Hull. This was the so-called oral statement.  
16 I do not remember its contents clearly, but it was  
17 apparently intended to hint that the Secretary of State  
18 could not trust Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, though it  
19 was couched in diplomatic phraseology. The Foreign  
20 Minister was indignant over the message, which he re-  
21 garded as national humiliation, comparable to a de-  
22 marche used by Germany to force French Foreign Minister  
23 Delcasse out of office during the Morroco question.  
24 He contended that it be first refused and then the  
25 matter for negotiation be communicated to the American

1 Government. But Prime Minister KONOYE held that it  
2 be handled lightly so as not to hamper the negotiation  
3 between Japan and America and that the reply to the  
4 oral statement be sent simultaneous with the matter  
5 for negotiation on the ground that there was fear that  
6 the negotiation with America might be interrupted if  
7 the Foreign Minister's contention was accepted. The  
8 Army and Navy authorities, too, supported the Prime  
9 Minister, who, accordingly, sent Diplomatic Adviser  
10 SAITO to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA for the purpose of  
11 making the latter agree to his view. However, not  
12 only the Foreign Minister made no reply to the Prime  
13 Minister's proposals till midnight, but also it trans-  
14 pired later that he sent a reply to the oral statement  
15 on his own judgment. Hence Prince KONOYE's decision  
16 that he could not work together with Foreign Minister  
17 MATSUOKA. As shown in my diary of July 15, 1941  
18 (prosecution exhibit 1115, as changed by Language  
19 Section, page 10,666) the details of the above were  
20 all reported to me by my Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA,  
21 who had a meeting with Prince KONOYE. As the diary  
22 further shows I told my Chief Secretary that I thought  
23 MATSUOKA should resign, so as to prevent a resignation  
24 en bloc, but if he did not, we thought it best to have  
25 Premier KONOYE form a new cabinet upon a resignation



1 en bloc. I reported all this to the Emperor. Later  
2 that day Prince KONOYE told me the same information  
3 MATSUDAIRA had given me. As set forth in exhibit 1115:

4 "I thought it was advisable to urge Mr.  
5 MATSUOKA's resignation to avoid a change of Cabinet,  
6 but the Premier disagreed with me saying that if this  
7 were done Mr. MATSUOKA and his party would make propa-  
8 ganda to the effect that the cause which had compelled  
9 his resignation was nothing but pressure on the part  
10 of the U.S.A. upon our Government. He considered this  
11 would have a bad effect.'

12 "My interest in this matter was based on the  
13 fact that the Emperor was anxious to conclude peace-  
14 ful relations with America and MATSUOKA was proving  
15 to be a stumbling block. In order to accomplish the  
16 Emperor's purpose and set His Majesty's mind at ease,  
17 as a resignation en bloc might entail, among other  
18 things, worry on the part of the Emperor, I made the  
19 above suggestion to Prince KONOYE. Prosecution's  
20 summary of this exhibit in document 0001, page 226,  
21 is inaccurate.

22 "180. The Second KONOYE Cabinet resigned en  
23 bloc at 9 p.m. on July 16, 1941. As recorded in my  
24 diary for that day (prosecution exhibit 1116, as  
25 corrected, page 10,667) I was summoned to the Palace

1 and received an Imperial order as follows: 'The  
2 Premier has tendered the general resignation of his  
3 Ministry. In regard to the selection of the next  
4 Cabinet, I have ordered the Lord Chamberlain to in-  
5 vite the President of the Privy Council and the ex-  
6 Premiers together at the Palace and the Lord Keeper  
7 of the Privy Seal will ask their opinions in order to  
8 reply to my question as to who is the suitable person.'

9 "181. The following day a conference of  
10 senior statesmen was held to choose a succeeding Prime  
11 Minister. The Prince was again commended by the  
12 Emperor to form a Cabinet. At that time, the most  
13 important question, which faced Japan was adjustment  
14 of relations with America. In view of the fact that  
15 negotiation had been in progress with America for that  
16 purpose, it was generally thought that there was no  
17 other suitable candidate for the succeeding Prime  
18 Minister but Prince KONOYE, who would be most suitable  
19 for proceeding with the negotiations with President  
20 Roosevelt, especially since he had a personal talk  
21 with the American President some time ago. This con-  
22 ference of Senior Statemen is set forth in my diary of  
23 July 17, 1941 (prosecution exhibit 1117, as corrected  
24 by Language Section, page 11,138). Senior Statesman  
25 ABE was the first one to recommend Prince KONOYE and



1 the others heartily concurred, except WAKATSUKI and  
2 HIROTA who supported him but not so positively.  
3 YONAI said no other person would do than Prince  
4 KONOYE. I made my report to the Emperor.

1 "182. In forming a new cabinet Prince KONOYE  
2 enlisted the services of Admiral TOYODA as Foreign  
3 Minister in place of Mr. MATSUOKA. I understood that  
4 Admiral TOYODA's appointment was aimed at facilitating  
5 the negotiation with America. The Cabinet change in  
6 Japan synchronized with a flareup of anti-Japanism in  
7 the United States of America, which fact caused so  
8 much concern to the Emperor that His Majesty referred  
9 to it every time when I was received in audience. The  
10 anti-Japanism in America was directly stimulated by  
11 the dispatch of Japanese troops to French Indo-China.  
12 It was profoundly regrettable that Imperial concern  
13 about the operations turned true. Late in July, the  
14 United States of America froze Japanese assets. The  
15 effect of this on Japan's economic structure, particular-  
16 ly industry, became a common subject of discussion and  
17 it was recognized that the situation was extremely  
18 critical. War clouds were gathering and a rupture with  
19 America seemed inevitable. Those not trained in  
20 diplomatic matters thought the freezing of assets was  
21 America's first step towards war with Japan. Notwith-  
22 standing this I felt hopeful of peaceful relations with  
23 America.

24 "183. On July 31, 1941, when Admiral NAGANO,  
25 Chief of Staff of the Navy, was received in audience by



1 the Emperor, he reported to His Majesty on the  
2 contingency of war between Japan and America. It  
3 became a matter for profound solicitude to the Emperor.  
4 I submitted my views to the Throne, refusing to share  
5 Admiral NAGANO's simple statement and instead stressing  
6 the necessity for pushing the negotiation tenaciously  
7 with America. I desire to read my diary entry of  
8 July 31, 1941 (Prosecution exhibit 1125, as changed  
9 by the Language Section, record page 10,667).

10 "July 31, 1941: From 10:15 a.m. to 11 a.m.  
11 I was received in audience by the Emperor, and His  
12 Majesty was pleased to inform me about the report of  
13 Admiral NAGANO, Chief of Naval General Staff, in reply  
14 to the Imperial question regarding our policy toward  
15 the U.S.A. as follows:

16 "1. His opinion regarding war was the same  
17 as that of the former Chief of Naval General Staff,  
18 Prince FUSHIMI, in that we should try to avert war as  
19 much as possible.

20 "2. He seemed very strongly opposed to the  
21 Tripartite Alliance. He also seemed to be of the  
22 opinion that so long as such an alliance existed, the  
23 adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations  
24 would be impossible.

25 "3. Suppose the adjustment of diplomatic

1 relations between the U.S.A. and Japan were impossible  
2 and we were cut off from supplies of oil, our oil  
3 stored up would run out in two years. In case a war  
4 with the U.S.A. breaks out the supply of oil would  
5 be only sufficient for one and a half years. Under  
6 these circumstances, there would be no other alternative  
7 but to take the initiative.

8 "4. According to the written report submitted,  
9 the Emperor believed that we would win, since it is so  
10 stated there. When NAGANO was asked if it would be  
11 possible to win a sweeping victory as in the Russo-  
12 Japanese War, he replied to the Emperor that it was  
13 even doubtful whether or not we would even win, to say  
14 nothing of a great victory as in the Russo-Japanese War.

15 "5. I was filled with trepidation by the  
16 Imperial anxiety about the danger of having to wage a  
17 desperate war.

18 "My answer to the Imperial speech was as  
19 follows:

20 "1. Admiral NAGANO's opinion was too simple.

21 "2. The U.S.A. recognized the existence of  
22 the Tripartite Pact in our previous parley with America,  
23 and I was very doubtful whether we could deepen the  
24 confidence of the U.S.A. for us by the act of annulment  
25 of the Pact, as the U.S.A. was a nation which showed



1 respect for international treaties, or we would only be  
2 held in contempt by the U.S.A.

3 "There are several means to be tried regarding  
4 the relationship between America and Japan. We must  
5 deliberate patiently on the matter in a constructive  
6 manner. I would urge the Premier's careful consideration  
7 on this point. I met Navy Minister OIKAWA at noon to  
8 talk over Admiral NAGANO's report to the Throne. The  
9 Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor visited me at 1 p.m.  
10 to talk with me on the same subject.'

11 "184. As this point I wish to point out that  
12 the prosecution in document 0003 which purports to be  
13 a summary of proceedings of this trial has on page 232  
14 entirely misconstrued this entry of my diary and omitted  
15 an important part. The prosecution says: 'KIDO disagreed  
16 with NAGANO and stated that if the Tripartite Pact was  
17 annulled the United States would not have any more faith  
18 in Japan than before.' I never said this. My expression  
19 was one of contrast. The excerpt above clearly shows  
20 that I told the Emperor that I was doubtful whether we  
21 could deepen the confidence of the United States in us  
22 if we annulled the Pact or whether we would be held in  
23 contempt if we annulled it. The prosecution also in the  
24 summary overlooked my advice that there were several  
25 means to be tried yet with respect to our relationship

1 with America, and that further constructive deliberation  
2 was necessary. In order to make sure what Admiral  
3 NAGANO's expression of opinion meant, I spoke with  
4 Navy Minister OIKAWA. I did this so that I could relieve  
5 His Majesty of his anxiety in dealing with the matter.

6 "185. Up to that time, Premier KONOYE had  
7 taken such an attitude as to control the Army by relying  
8 upon the influence of the Navy which had maintained  
9 prudent and negative attitude toward the U.S. question.  
10 However, the Navy markedly stiffened its attitude since  
11 Admiral NAGANO made the report to the Throne on July  
12 31, 1941. Prince KONOYE, being very anxious about it,  
13 consulted with me on August 2, 1941. Our conversation  
14 is outlined in my diary of that day (Prosecution exhibit  
15 1129 as corrected by Language Section, record page  
16 10,667). When he came to my room, he expressed mis-  
17 givings about the Government's cooperation with the  
18 High Command, pointing out the fact that opinion was  
19 gaining strength in naval circles for a vigorous policy  
20 toward America. Thereupon I told him:

21 "It's an awfully troublesome question. It  
22 should not be hastily decided to go to war with America.  
23 Now. First of all, Japan's actual power is not fully  
24 studied, is it? If so, it is extremely dangerous. It  
25 will be necessary to have an exhaustive discussion of



1 fundamental national policies with the Ministers of the  
2 fighting services and probe the matter to the bottom  
3 without a moment's delay. Should you fail to come to  
4 an agreement of views with them after exhausting all  
5 possible means, it might be inevitable that you should  
6 quit.'

7 "Prince KONOYE apparently was satisfied with  
8 my advice and said:

9 "I thought you would say that it would be  
10 embarrassing if I quit. If you think that way, I feel  
11 quite reassured. I will think it over carefully.'

12 "186. I was glad to hear him say so. From  
13 this and other talks I had with him I know that Prince  
14 KONOYE wanted to pursue a peaceful policy toward America,  
15 desirous of settlement of the pending questions between  
16 the two countries through diplomatic channels; but the  
17 Army stood pat on a vigorous policy toward America on  
18 the basis of its continental policy; while on the other  
19 hand a section of the Navy advocated the necessity for  
20 opening war with America to forestall her for fear of  
21 a steady drain on Japan's oil supplies. But the Prince  
22 did not evolve a plan for saving the situation in the  
23 direction counselled by me. Instead he made up his mind  
24 to cross the Pacific and have personal talks with  
25 President Roosevelt so as to seek a political solution

1 of the pending question. He submitted his plan in the  
2 form of a memorandum to the Ministers of the fighting  
3 services, who approved it, so that the question was  
4 developing in this direction. Considered in the light  
5 of the situation, common sense told us that the outcome  
6 of a war with America would be horrible, even if we  
7 did study it on a scientific basis. As an agreement  
8 between Japan and America was not easily arrived at,  
9 Prince KONOYE was much worried about this and often  
10 complained about his painful position. When August  
11 came, the Navy's attitude suddenly began to become  
12 strong, about which Prince KONOYE was very much concerned.  
13 So he came and asked my advice about the matter.



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1 "187. Then as is described in the diary of  
2 August 7, 1941 (Pros. Exh. 1130, as corrected Record  
3 10,667), I expressed my opinion, asking him to make de-  
4 liberate consideration. As this excerpt reveals, I most  
5 sincerely and earnestly tried to show Prince KONOYE the  
6 hopelessness of Japan even considering going to war with  
7 America. I told Prince KONOYE that it was high time for  
8 the Government to put forth a concrete and constructive  
9 view and to learn clearly whether or not it was accept-  
10 able to the Army, with a view to checking the army from  
11 rushing to war and to getting it to keep pace with the  
12 policy adopted by the Government. I pointed out to him  
13 the hopelessness of the situation from the standpoint of  
14 oil alone. My sole thought in talking to him was to advance  
15 ~~such~~ positive arguments that he would be able to con-  
16 vince the military. I intentionally omitted what was re-  
17 lated to humanity and peace as these are fundamental  
18 matters. As my diary also shows, I concluded my talk with  
19 him by advocating that we should do everything in our  
20 power to restore friendly relations between the U.S.A. and  
21 Japan. Although we were being pressed economically, I  
22 felt and told him we should resolve to toil through ten  
23 years of hard struggles. I also pointed out that we  
24 needed materials, and that our hopes lay in the Southern  
25 regions. I had no thought in mind of obtaining these

1 other than by peaceful means. I fully realized in my  
2 talk with him that if Japan succeeded in warding off a  
3 war with America and the present European war came  
4 to an end, the desire for peace would not be impossible  
5 to be created after the war and that therefore it  
6 might be possible to get politics to follow their  
7 proper course until that time through making re-  
8 doubled efforts to reconstruct politics and to check  
9 the military. My above views were expressed for the  
10 purpose of convincing the militarists of the vital  
11 necessity for reaching an understanding with America,  
12 as they would not swallow the no-war formula about  
13 America, unless it was accompanied with a constructive  
14 plan in another direction. I also thought that it  
15 might be possible to secure required raw materials if  
16 Japan fostered her resources. Be that as it may, I  
17 was prompted by the desire to avert war under all cir-  
18 cumstances.

19 "188. Prince KONOYE listened to my views with  
20 evident interest. I expected him to take a step in the  
21 direction, counselled by me. Judging by the result,  
22 however, he made no development in that direction and  
23 instead he committed himself irretrievably to the fate-  
24 ful Imperial Conference of September 6, 1941.

25 "189. Ever since August 1935, when Major



1 General NAGATA was assassinated by Lieutenant Colonel  
2 AISAWA, the Metropolitan Police had continuously pro-  
3 tected my family and me from the militarists and  
4 rightists by assigning five policemen for this purpose.  
5 One policeman constantly protected me, and the others  
6 protected my home in shifts of two at a time. In  
7 August 1941, after an attempt was made by a rightist  
8 to assassinate Baron HIRANUMA, the Metropolitan Police  
9 increased my guards from five to ten, doubling the  
10 number on each shift. This was because of my well  
11 known pro-American and pro-British and anti-militaris-  
12 tic stand as told me by the chief of the Metropolitan  
13 Police YAMAZAKI.

14 "190. At 4:30 PM, September 5, 1941, when  
15 Prime Minister KONOYE proceeded to the Palace to submit  
16 the agenda of the Imperial Conference to the Throne,  
17 he came to my room. The draft agenda consisted of the  
18 following three points:

19 "1. War preparations by made against America  
20 and Britain.

21 "2. In parallel, the negotiations with America  
22 be pushed very hard.

23 "3. In case no prospect of an amicable con-  
24 clusion of the negotiation with America came in sight  
25 by the first ten days of October, Japan make up her

mind to wage war with America and Britain.

"To that very day, Prince KONOYE made no reference to the question which was abruptly advanced to me. I was astonished at its nature, which was too serious. I blamed him, therefore, for submitting such a serious plan to the Emperor so suddenly, as it would embarrass His Majesty, there being no time to think over it. I further told the Prince on that occasion:

"The plan shows that the time limit is fixed in the first ten days of October. I think it very dangerous to fix time limit. Is it not possible to modify even this point alone? Can't you see your way to abandoning the plan, which I'm afraid may eventually lead to war?"

"In reply, Prince KONOYE stated as it had been already decided by the liaison conference between the Government and the High Command, it was difficult to modify or give up the plan, adding that there would be no alternative left to him but to devote his all to bringing the negotiation to an amicable conclusion, now that things came to such a pass.

"191. When Prince KONOYE proceeded to the Imperial presence and submitted the agenda of the proposed Imperial conference to the Throne, His Majesty put various strategical questions to him, to which he



1 found it impossible to make replies, and petitioned  
2 His Majesty to summon the Chiefs of Staff to the Army  
3 and Navy. This appears in my diary of September 5,  
4 1941 (Pros. Exh. 1134, as corrected by the Language  
5 Section, Record Page 10,668), as follows:

6 "The Premier said that as the Emperor asked  
7 many questions as to our policy towards U.S.A. from  
8 the point of view of war strategy, he had advised the  
9 Emperor to summon the Chief of General Staff and the  
10 Chief of the Naval General Staff and had promised to  
11 consult with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I,  
12 therefore, proceeded to the Palace to advise the Em-  
13 peror to follow the Premier's advice. I requested  
14 Aide-de-Camp YOKOYAMA to call the Chief of the General  
15 Staff, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and the  
16 Premier to the Palace. At 6 PM they were granted an  
17 audience by the Emperor to answer the Imperial ques-  
18 tions.'

19  
20 "As stated the only advice I gave the Emperor  
21 was that he should follow the Premier's advice to the  
22 Emperor to summon the Chief of the General Staff and  
23 the Chief of the Naval General Staff. The Chiefs of  
24 Staff of the Army and Navy proceeded to the Palace and  
25 Prince KONOYE was received in audience by the Emperor  
together with them at 6:00 PM. I did not attend the

1 audience with the Emperor. Although not included in  
2 Prosecution exhibit 1134, my diary for that day also  
3 states:

4 "After his retirement from the presence of  
5 the Emperor the Premier called on me to have a talk  
6 with me. / He took leave at 7:00 PM.'

7 "192. At this time Prince KONOYE told me His  
8 Majesty put various questions to them, including that  
9 put to Marshal SUGIYAMA, Chief of Staff of the Army  
10 as to when the projected southern campaign would be  
11 terminated. The Chief of Staff of the Army replied to  
12 the Emperor that he expected that the campaign would  
13 be terminated in a short period of time. Whereupon,  
14 His Majesty reprimanded Marshal SUGIYAMA, reminding him  
15 that he said a similar thing at the outbreak of the  
16 China Affair, which was not yet settled. The Marshal  
17 pleaded that there was a difference between the two,  
18 China being a continent, while the southern area mostly  
19 consisted of islands. But even his pleading would not  
20 persuade His Majesty to approve of his contention. I  
21 learned from Prince KONOYE that Fleet Admiral NAGANO,  
22 Chief of Staff of the Navy, interposed:

23 "If things go on as they are, we shall stead-  
24 ily lose the game, but there will be a hope of recovery  
25 if a drastic operation is undergone. That's war.'



1 "Prince KONOYE further told me that the  
2 Emperor asked why diplomatic negotiation was not  
3 placed first, stating that the order in the plan was  
4 rather strange. I understood that the Prince replied  
5 that it was aimed at attaching primary importance to  
6 diplomatic negotiation, as would be done in placing  
7 diplomatic negotiation first in the plan. The Prince  
8 petitioned His Majesty to approve the plan as it was,  
9 since it had been decided by the liaison conference.  
10 The Council in the Imperial Presence was to be held  
11 the next day. Before being summoned by the Emperor  
12 the next morning, September 6, 1941, I suggested to  
13 Mr. HARA that he ask some questions at the Imperial  
14 Conference pointing toward emphasis on continuation  
15 of diplomatic negotiation rather than preparation for  
16 for war. When summoned by the Emperor he told me he  
17 would like to put questions to the Imperial Conference  
18 today and asked me various questions. In reply, I  
19 stated:

20 "That will be a good idea, but I think that  
21 Mr. HARA, President of the Privy Council, will cover  
22 the important points in his questions. Therefore, it  
23 is my desire that Your Majesty will finally point out  
24 the importance of the conference's decision, on which  
25 Japan's future prosperity will hinge, and order the

1 High Command to extend a full measure of cooperation  
2 in bringing diplomatic negotiation to an amicable  
3 conclusion.'

4 "193. I was not present at the Imperial  
5 Conference which was held in the presence of the  
6 Emperor, Mr. HATA, President of the Privy Council,  
7 asked if primary importance was attached to diplomatic  
8 negotiation, to which question Admiral OIKAWA, Navy  
9 Minister, alone replied, and there was no reply from  
10 the High Command. This was regretted by the Emperor,  
11 who took the High Command to task for it. He read  
12 the poem, composed by the Emperor MEIJI:

13 "'Yomono umi

14 Minaharakarato

15 "'Omouyoni

16 Nado Adanamino

17 Tachisawaguran'

18 "(Over the four seas

19 prevails universal fraternity,

20 "I think

21 Why turbulent waves

22 wage so furiously).

23  
24 "His Majesty ordered the High Command to  
25 extend a full measure of cooperation in the diplo-  
matic negotiation, clearly manifesting Imperial wishes t



KIDO

DIRECT

30,954

1 avoid a war by all means. The above was told me by  
2 the Emperor and is reported in my diary of September  
3 6, 1941, Pros. Exh. 1135.  
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"194. On September 11, 1941, War Minister TOJO came to see me after he had an audience with the Emperor and told me the result of preparations for war with the U. S. A., as shown in prosecution exhibit 1138. my diary for September 11, 1941. In view of the decision made by the Imperial Conference of September 6, 1941, the Army was investigating the preparations against the worst; namely, a case in which there was no hope of leading the Japanese-American negotiations to a successful conclusion. I was told the results of those investigations by TOJO. That the details of these preparations were I do not recall, but I remember that the talk we had on that day gave me the impression that preparations were being made. He further told me that when His Majesty elicited his opinions about preparations being under way, His Majesty said he understood that his words at the Imperial Conference had made it clear to the Minister of his desire to avert war. Then War Minister TOJO explained, I remember, that the army, understanding fully the Emperor's desire, was making strenuous efforts in bringing the negotiations to conclusion. He added that the army was bound, at the same time, to make adequate preparations by the decision of the Imperial Conference. As is also shown in that part of my diary for September 11, 1941, which was not



1 reproduced in prosecution exhibit 1138, Foreign Minis-  
2 ter TOYODA told me about the progress of peace negotia-  
3 tions with America, which I discussed later with the  
4 Emperor.

5 "Foreign Minister TOYODA had audience with  
6 the Emperor at 2 p. m. After his visit to the Emperor,  
7 we talked about the progress of the negotiations between  
8 the U.S.A. and Japan. I had audience with the Emperor  
9 from 2:25 p. m. to 3:40 p. m."

10 "195. I tried to keep abreast of the peace  
11 negotiations which were under way, and was happy to  
12 receive any reports regarding them. Ambassador SHIGE-  
13 MITSU spoke to me about their progress on September 25,  
14 1941, as shown in my diary of that day (prosecution ex-  
15 hibit 2279 as corrected). As is also shown there, I  
16 was advised about a report of the Chief of the Army  
17 General Staff to the Throne. I do not recall what was  
18 that report.

19 "196. On September 26, 1941, Prince KONOYE  
20 came to my room and told me that he could not but quit,  
21 as he had no confidence, if the Army meant to start war  
22 by all means on October 15, 1941. He appealed to me  
23 for sympathy in his predicament. Whereupon, I chastized  
24 him as follows:  
25

"You are responsible for the decision of the

1 Imperial Conference of September 6, aren't you? It  
2 will be irresponsible of you to quit, by leaving the  
3 decision of September 6 as it is. If you are in such a  
4 predicament, it will be better for you to propose a re-  
5 view of the decision of September 6. In case you fail  
6 to reach an agreement of views with the Army, it can't  
7 be helped that you will quit. Otherwise, it is irres-  
8 ponsible of you to step out by leaving things as they  
9 are, isn't it?

10 "My diary of that day refers to this talk  
11 (prosecution exhibit 1141), at the end of which I cau-  
12 tioned him to be prudent. As I remember, he made no  
13 definite answer to my remarks, I did not discuss the  
14 possibility of war as the prosecution stated on page  
15 10,230 when this exhibit was introduced. The exhibit  
16 itself shows that the prosecution is in error.

17 "197. On September 29, 1941, His Majesty  
18 ordered me to investigate the amount of rubber, tin,  
19 etc. resources in United States, South and Central  
20 America and other places from which the United States  
21 would be able to secure them. He was worried about some  
22 propagandistic news appearing in the newspapers of  
23 those days, underestimating the national power of  
24 America. He was afraid that such news might mislead the  
25 people. So he wanted to investigate the real amount of



1 rubber, etc. On the same day, President HARA told me  
2 that he was of the opinion that, in the face of the  
3 situation which was now becoming very serious, the  
4 Imperial conference as it stood was so perfunctory that  
5 it would after all but pass any bill in its original  
6 form and, therefore, the method of the conference had to  
7 be improved. He asked me if there was any way of having  
8 the attendance of senior statesmen as members to ex-  
9 press their opinions and discuss the matters fully. I  
10 made a reply to the effect that, though I also admitted  
11 the existing defects and any remedial plan would have  
12 possible merits and demerits. Although it would be  
13 very difficult to realize it I would consider the matter  
14 carefully. President HARA said he made this suggestion  
15 in connection with the Imperial Council meeting in which  
16 the decision as to war would have to be made if the  
17 diplomatic parley failed. As it turned out, his sugges-  
18 tion was followed in that meeting which was held on  
19 November 29, 1941. President HARA and I both felt the  
20 prudence and acumen of the Senior Statesmen would have  
21 a steadying influence. The two matters above are re-  
22 ferred to in my diary of September 29, 1941, prosecu-  
23 tion exhibit 1142. This exhibit does not show 'war  
24 preparations' as claimed by the prosecution when it was  
25 offered in evidence, record 10,231.

1 "198. The gist of my talk with SUZUKI,  
2 President of the Planning Board on October 1, 1941, was  
3 that we were both worried about the adjustment of diplo-  
4 matic relations between Japan and America which made  
5 little progress. We agreed that the war should be  
6 evaded by all means. This conversation is referred to  
7 in my diary of that day (prosecution exhibit 2280).

8 "199. The prospect of the negotiations with  
9 America became slimmer and slimmer while war moves, let  
10 loose by the military, began to gather momentum. On  
11 October 7, 1941, Mr. TOMITA, Chief Secretary of the  
12 Cabinet, came and told me about the growing tenseness  
13 of the situation. He said that he would urge the Prime  
14 Minister to display his powerful leadership. He also  
15 explained the attitude of various factions in the Army  
16 and Navy as revealed in my diary of that day, prosecu-  
17 tion exhibit 1143 as changed by the Language Section,  
18 record page 10,668. I merely listened to him without  
19 expressing any opinion of my own. I remember he further  
20 said he was worried about the fact that the date fixed  
21 by the Imperial Conference of September 6, 1941, was  
22 drawing near. I also regarded the situation with deep  
23 concern so that on October 9, 1941. when Prime Minister  
24 KONOYE proceeded to the Palace I had an interview with  
25 him and counselled him among other things to the follow-



ing effect:

1            "'The decision of the Imperial Conference of  
2            September 6 appears too abrupt to me, it not being  
3            fully discussed. Is it not better for you, therefore,  
4            to change the policy so as to devote your all to the  
5            solution of the China question instead of deciding on  
6            war with America?'

7            "200. With this thought in mind I then set  
8            forth a positive solution which he could use in arguing  
9            with the military. This concrete and constructive policy  
10           was given him for the same purpose as the policy I ad-  
11           vanced to him on August 7, 1941. I took great pains in  
12           carefully impressing him with the logic of my opinion.  
13           My opinion is set forth in my diary for October 9, 1941  
14           (prosecution exhibit 1146) as corrected by the Language  
15           Section Record, page 11,139. I wish to quote it here.  
16

17           "'October 9, 1941. I met Prince KONOYE at  
18           10:30 a. m. after his audience with the Emperor. He  
19           was quite uneasy about the future of the parley with  
20           Washington, and his hopes for a satisfactory compromise  
21           were very discouraging. I expressed my opinion for his  
22           information as follows:

23           "'1. The resolution of the Council in the  
24           Imperial presence on the 6th of September seemed to me  
25           too outright. It was not the conclusion of exhaustive

1 discussion in my opinion.

2 "12. Judging from the situation both at home  
3 and abroad, it is very difficult to predict the outcome  
4 of war with the U.S.A. So we had better reconsider it.

5 "13. It would be inadvisable to declare war  
6 against the U.S.A. immediately.

7 "14. Rather it should be made clear that the  
8 termination of the China incident is the first consider-  
9 ation.

10 "15. We should acquire freedom without paying  
11 any attention to economic pressure by the United States.

12 "16. The people should be made to understand  
13 the necessity for ten or fifteen years of hard struggle  
14 on the part of our nation and to establish a highly  
15 defensive nation.

16 "17. If necessary, we were ready to put  
17 belligerency in action to promote the completion of the  
18 Chinese Incident and to use our whole military force in  
19 China in order to realize our plans against Kunming and  
20 Chungking.

21 "ARITA, Hachiro, visited me to talk about the  
22 American problems and the general resignation of the  
23 cabinet.'

24 "201. The situation was so bad at that time  
25 that I knew the Army would never agree unless some posi-



1 tive diversionary attitude was put forward. It was for  
2 this reason that I offered Item 7, if necessary, as an  
3 inducement to them to complete the China Affair. In  
4 other words, I knew the Army was so bent on war that  
5 they would not listen to any plan which meant entire  
6 cessation of hostilities. So I suggested, if they must  
7 fight, they should confine their activities to China.  
8 It was a sop I was offering in a situation which afford-  
9 ed no other alternative. In this way I thought a clash  
10 with America could be avoided. The prosecution's  
11 sketchy resume of exhibit 1146 contained in document  
12 0001, page 248, is incomplete and the latter part of it  
13 is inaccurate.

14 "202. Prosecution exhibit 1147 as corrected  
15 by the Language Section, record 11,139, my diary of  
16 October 12, 1941, entirely relates what was told me by  
17 three different people. No opinion of mine appears  
18 there. KOYAMA, Kango, former newspaperman, was a  
19 liberalist who found favor with Prince SAIONJI, called  
20 at 10 a. m. Indignant at the Army controlling politics,  
21 he expressed his opinion that he wished for redoubled  
22 efforts by Prince KONOYE to get politics to take again  
23 its own course. Major-General KATO who called a little  
24 later was at that time Commander of the Gendarmerie. He  
25 told me about the political situations viewed from the

1 side of the Gendarmerie, but I don't remember anything  
2 particular concerning his talk. Prime Minister KONOYE  
3 had called a conference of the War, Navy and Foreign  
4 Ministers and the President of the Planning Board at his  
5 villa at Ogikubo on that day to discuss how to deal  
6 with the decision of the Imperial Conference of Septem-  
7 ber 6, 1941. TOMITA, Chief Secretary to the Cabinet, my  
8 third visitor, came by order of Premier KONOYE to tell me  
9 about the conference. According to the information I  
10 received from him, War Minister TOJO contended that the  
11 Government should make up its mind to wage war with  
12 America in accordance with the decision of the Imperial  
13 Conference of September 6, 1941, as he thought that  
14 there was no hope for the negotiations with America. He  
15 added, however, that he did not want war if an explana-  
16 tion, convincing enough, was forthcoming that the nego-  
17 tiation with America would be brought to an amicable  
18 conclusion with confidence. Navy Minister OIKAWA said in  
19 substance:

20 "I think that there is still hope for the  
21 negotiations with America. Japan now stands at a  
22 crossroads of diplomacy or war. If we are to restore  
23 friendly relations through diplomacy it is necessary to  
24 do it in a thoroughgoing manner. If the negotiation  
25 with America is to be brought to an amicable conclusion



1 through diplomatic channels, it is to be desired that  
2 Japan should come to terms with America, even making  
3 considerable concessions. It will be really embarrass-  
4 ing to conduct half-baked diplomatic negotiation for some  
5 time and then suddenly start war. In any event, the  
6 Prime Minister is desired to display his clearcut  
7 leadership.'

8 "Foreign Minister TOYODA said that it would be  
9 impossible to make any prediction, as there was the other  
10 party to reckon with (America), but he thought there was  
11 some hope for the negotiation with America. Prime Min-  
12 ister KONOYE stated that if he was called upon to ex-  
13 press his view on the negotiation so far conducted with  
14 America, there was still hope for the negotiation, which,  
15 therefore, he should like to continue. The War Minister  
16 was not satisfied with the Prime Minister's explanation.  
17 Finally the conference rose after it was decided to draft  
18 a memorandum at his instance and entrust the Foreign  
19 Minister with its study. TOMITA also told me that from  
20 conversations he had with Admirals OKA and OIKAWA, the  
21 Navy was opposed to war with America, but could not  
22 openly express its views and would leave it to the Prime  
23 Minister to make a decision whether Japan should go to  
24 war with America."  
25

THE PRESIDENT: This is a convenient break.

KIDO

DIRECT

30,965

1 You are about to read a long entry.

2 We will adjourn until half-past one.

3 (Whereupon, at 1157, a recess  
4 was taken.)



## AFTERNOON SESSION

1  
2 The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

3 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
4 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

6 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, I will  
7 continue reading KIDO's affidavit, page 155.  
8

9 - - -

10 K O I C H I K I D O, an accused, resumed the stand  
11 and testified through Japanese interpreters as  
12 follows:

## DIRECT EXAMINATION

13 MR. LOGAN (Continuing): "October 12, 1941.

14 "At 10:00 a.m. KOYAMA Kango called on me to  
15 express deep resentment at the recent political  
16 situation, urging all possible efforts of the Premier.  
17 Major General KATO visited my house to explain the  
18 gendarmerie's interpretation of present conditions.  
19 TOMITA, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, visited me  
20 and stated as follows, "The War, Navy and Foreign  
21 Ministers and President of the Planning Board held a  
22 meeting in the Prince's house at Ogikubo at 2:00 p.m.  
23 to discuss the adjustment of diplomatic relations  
24 between the U.S.A. and Japan. The War Minister calls  
25

1 for great resolution since he sees no hope for  
2 arrival at an understanding between Japan and the  
3 U.S.A. However, that if he could hear an explanation  
4 such that he could persuade himself to be sure of  
5 arrival at an understanding, why, of course, he  
6 didn't insist on war. The Navy Minister said that  
7 we should try to avoid war as much as possible.  
8 Now this country was standing at the crossroads,  
9 having two ways to choose; one is the restoration  
10 of friendly relations by diplomatic negotiations;  
11 the other the declaration of war on the U.S.A. If  
12 the former was our choice, we must do it thoroughly.  
13 To turn to war after a patched-up compromise would  
14 be most undesirable. Anyhow, the Premier's strong  
15 leadership was the most urgent matter. The Premier  
16 expressed his conviction of the successful conclusion  
17 of the parley, and hoped to continue to act with this  
18 idea, asking their cooperation with his policy. The  
19 Foreign Minister was of the opinion that he was not  
20 quite sure of the outcome of the parley, although he  
21 could not flatly deny that the meeting would end in  
22 success. They made the following agreement among  
23 themselves on the advice of the War Minister:

24 "1. In Japanese-American relations:

25 "1. We should not change our policy of



1 stationing troops in China or the other policies  
2 connected with it.

3 "2. We should not entertain anything  
4 that might affect the result of the China Incident.

5 "With these points in view, it should be  
6 found out whether negotiations within the time set by  
7 High Command can be successful. When this has been  
8 ascertained the matter should be settled through  
9 diplomacy. Such being the case, all operational  
10 preparations be discontinued. The Foreign Minister  
11 should study the above to find out whether it is  
12 possible or not."

13 "203. So the last important meeting held  
14 during the existence of the third KONOYE Cabinet  
15 ended with no decision as to whether Japan would go  
16 to war with America. As recorded in my diary the  
17 only decision reached as reported to me by TOMITA did  
18 not involve a decision for war--it concerned the  
19 policy to be adopted toward the China Incident as  
20 related to Japanese-American negotiations, and the  
21 possibility of negotiations with America. Thus the  
22 situation was becoming more and more complicated.  
23 Everyone's opinion at the meeting hinged on the suc-  
24 cess or failure of negotiations with America. Even  
25 the Foreign Minister could not answer the War Minister's

inquiry.

1           "204. On October 13, 1941, in consequence  
2 of the Ogikubo conference, the political atmosphere  
3 became so tense that it was feared that a war would  
4 break out at any moment under forcible pressure of  
5 the militarists. The situation was so delicate that  
6 the Emperor showed his concern in discussing with me  
7 an Imperial Rescript in case he was required to grant  
8 sanction to the opening of war. This is shown in my  
9 diary of October 13, 1941. The prosecution only  
10 quoted the last paragraph of this entry in its  
11 exhibit 1149.  
12

13           "'October 13, 1941 - Monday, fair.

14           "'On duty at 10:00 a.m. At 10:20, Imperial  
15 Household Minister MATSUDAIRA called to consult me  
16 about the Imperial message to be given at the coming  
17 Harvest Festival. Expressed my approval of the plan.  
18 Was received in audience by the Emperor from 10:35  
19 to 11:45. His Majesty talked chiefly on Japan-United  
20 States problems. He said:

21           "'(1) Japan-United States negotiations seem  
22 to be growing less and less hopeful. If it should end  
23 up in war, we should have to issue a proclamation of  
24 war. In past Imperial edicts, especially in the one  
25 issued at the time of our withdrawal from the League



1 of Nations, we emphasized the cause of World Peace,  
2 of the necessity for harmonious cooperation of the  
3 civil and military officers in the country, but the  
4 people seem to have overlooked this point. It is  
5 highly regrettable that when the edict was issued  
6 at the conclusion of the Japan-German-Italian Pact,  
7 the people missed the point that the Pact was proposed  
8 to bring the peace and took it as if it were our  
9 challenge to the United States and Britain. We  
10 therefore desire that if we should in the future be  
11 obliged to issue a proclamation of war, we would like  
12 to have KONOYE and KIDO assist us and have our sin-  
13 cere thoughts well expressed in the proclamation.

14 "(2) In case we decide on war with the  
15 United States and Britain, we must study well condi-  
16 tions in Europe, especially the truth underlying the  
17 peace talks between Britain and Germany and the latter  
18 and Russia. We must, through diplomatic maneuvers,  
19 stop Germany from concluding an individual peace. We  
20 must have her assist us in our war with the U.S.  
21 From the beginning we must also make plans as to what  
22 to do at the termination of the war.

23 "'For this we must adopt good will policies  
24 such as exchanging envoys with the Vatican City.

25 "'At 2:00 p.m. Premier KONOYE came to the

1  
2 Palace and after having a conference with the  
3 Emperor, he came to talk with me from three o'clock  
4 to about four o'clock about Japan-United States  
5 problems. At five o'clock, Foreign Minister TOYODA  
6 came to the Palace. After retiring from the Emperor's  
7 presence, he talked with me from about 5:30 to 6:30.

8 "SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board,  
9 visited me at 8:00 p.m. to talk about his political  
10 views which might contribute in some way to the  
11 making of a new turn in our political condition. I  
12 expressed my opinion to him. Our conclusion of the  
13 talk was this: The Premier should make an effort to  
14 promote mutual understanding with the War and Navy  
15 Ministers.'

16 "With respect to the last paragraph,  
17 President SUZUKI, being in fear of a possible change  
18 of government or a sudden plunge into war due to the  
19 intensified political situations, came and expressed  
20 his opinion about his concern. At that time I com-  
21 municated my views to him to the effect that Premier  
22 KONOYE, assuming a resolute attitude, should have a  
23 full talk with the Minister of War and Navy in order  
24 to solve the dilemma by some means to bring about a  
25 peaceful solution.



1 "205. The desire for a cabinet, led by a  
2 prince of the blood, suddenly raised its head about  
3 this time . . . a cabinet led by Prince HIGASHIKUNI.  
4 It was expressed by the followers of both Prince  
5 KONOYE and War Minister TOJO. Rightist quarters  
6 also voiced a similar desire. It was no wonder  
7 that a cabinet, led by a prince of the blood, should  
8 be desired by people in an extremely tense situation.  
9 But I thought that it would lead to grave conse-  
10 quences, unless the matter was handled cautiously  
11 and tactfully. Therefore, on October 15, 1941, when  
12 Mr. SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, came to  
13 convey the War Minister's intentions and referred to  
14 a HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet, I told him that anything re-  
15 lating to the Imperial family must be handled most  
16 cautiously and further that the petition to Prince  
17 HIGASHIKUNI to emerge as Prime Minister must be  
18 predicated on an agreement of views between the  
19 army and the navy, that is, a cautious policy de-  
20 cided by them. I asked him if my understanding was  
21 correct, and stressed the necessity for studying the  
22 question more fully. Later that morning Prince KONOYE  
23 asked my opinion about a HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet and I  
24 told him I was giving it careful consideration. After  
25 further careful deliberation, I decided to follow a

1 policy not to recommend Prince HIGASHIKUNI as suc-  
2 ceeding Prime Minister for the following reasons:  
3 Advocates of a HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet had all different  
4 motives. There was no manner of doubt that Prince  
5 KONOYE wished for Prince HIGASHIKUNI's emergence as  
6 Prime Minister, motivated to restrain the army and  
7 avert war. As for the army, even granted that War  
8 Minister TOJO was like-minded as Prince KONOYE, there  
9 was ample scope for doubt as to the real motives of  
10 the young military officers who formed the mainstay  
11 of the army. Further, the possibility of availing  
12 themselves of the prince's emergence as Prime Minister  
13 and dragging the country into war on the part of the  
14 rightists was in full evidence, especially since the  
15 Prince's entourage included many dangerous elements.  
16 For instance, YASUDA, Tetsunosuke, one-time aide to  
17 the prince, was involved in the god-sent troop incident  
18 of July 1934, and took moves about this time for the  
19 emergence of the prince together with AMANO, Tatsuo  
20 and others. It was thought almost impossible to purge  
21 these elements in forming a succeeding cabinet on the  
22 part of Prince HIGASHIKUNI. It is true that Prince  
23 HIGASHIKUNI was talented, but he was lacking in politi-  
24 cal experience and training. Therefore, it was ex-  
25 tremely difficult, if not impossible, for the prince



1 to grasp the situation which was so complicated and  
2 work out a plan to cope with it. The result would  
3 be that the prince would be reduced to a mere figure-  
4 head, and actual political power would be assumed by  
5 the Deputy Prime Minister. And judging by personali-  
6 ties, available at that time, the probability was  
7 quite high that the post of Deputy Premier would be  
8 concurrently assumed by the Minister of War. Such  
9 being the case, the possibility of averting war would  
10 be very slim under the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet. Should  
11 war break out, the direct responsibility therefore  
12 would have to be borne by the Imperial family. My  
13 outlook on the situation between Japan and America  
14 was that no optimism should be warranted for a Pacific  
15 war, but on the contrary a very pessimistic view must  
16 be taken of its outcome. Should the worst eventually  
17 happen, therefore, I thought the Imperial family might  
18 become the target of hatred by the people with the  
19 result that the question of national polity would be  
20 involved. The only case in which a cabinet formed  
21 by a prince of the blood was permissible would be  
22 that of one organized as the result of the army being  
23 convinced of its error and deciding to effect a volte-  
24 face. For the purpose, the army might petition a  
25 prince of the blood to form a succeeding cabinet, as

1 it would be beyond the power of a subject to effect  
2 such a big reorientation of policy. In other words,  
3 the services of a prince of the blood might be in-  
4 voked to deal with the aftermath of a big change of  
5 policy.

6 "206. At 4 p. m. on the same day Prince  
7 KONOYE told me he would have to resign as a breach  
8 between him and the War Minister had reached the  
9 point where TOJO did not wish to speak with him.  
10 In response to his request for my opinion about a  
11 HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet I repeated to him what I had told  
12 SUZUKI in the morning. I also spoke with MATSUDAIRA,  
13 Tsuneo, Minister of the Imperial Household, about a  
14 HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet and he strongly objected to it.  
15 In the afternoon of the 15th I spoke with SUZUKI  
16 again, trying to find out TOJO's real intention with-  
17 out success and requested him to find this out for me  
18 and report. Prince KONOYE joined us and said he had  
19 seen the Emperor who would approve a HIGASHIKUNI  
20 Cabinet if the army and navy would first agree on a  
21 peaceful policy. Later SUZUKI reported to me that  
22 TOJO wanted to establish harmony between the army and  
23 the navy by the influence of Prince HIGASHIKUNI. I  
24 told him I objected to this as a peaceful policy should  
25 be first agreed upon. The substance of the foregoing



is set forth in my diary of October 15, 1941.

Prosecution exhibit 1150 as corrected by the Language Section, record, 11,140.

"October 15, 1941.

"Mr. Tate (YAKATA) visited me at 9 a. m.

At 9:30 a. m. Lieutenant General SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, visited me to deliver War Minister TOJO's message, the purport of which is as follows: If the Premier would not change his mind, the general resignation of the cabinet would be unavoidable. And as for the succeeding premier, although it may not be well to designate the next premier, he made it essential that the next premier should be able to bring the army and the navy together and not depart from the Imperial will. When one considered this point, it seemed very difficult to find a suitable person among ordinary Japanese subjects. He mentioned Prince HIGASHIKUNI as a possibility for the next premier. To this I answered that we should be very careful as it was a matter concerned with the Imperial family, and if we had to ask the prince's acceptance of the premiership, a common policy between the army and the navy should be worked out beforehand; the establishment of a prudent policy would take precedence of all other questions. I asked if

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1 the War Minister had any accurate forecast to make  
2 on this point, then added that the matter needs to  
3 be studied carefully.  
4  
5 to study the procedure of the materialization of the  
6 HIGASHIKUNI plan. I visited the Emperor from 1:15 p.m.  
7 to 2 p.m. to report upon the pressing political sit-  
8 uation. At 2 p.m. YAMAZAKI, Chief of the Metropolitan  
9 Police Bureau came and spoke to me of current political  
10 affairs. Premier KONOHE visited me at 4 p.m. to say  
11 that he could not hold his premiership any longer, for  
12 the breach with the War Minister was becoming wider  
13 every day until at last the War Minister gave vent to  
14 his discontent saying that he did not like to hold any  
15 further conversation with the Premier, as he was not  
16 sure if he could suffice his feelings. Finally he asked  
17 my opinion regarding the proposed HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet,  
18 so I told him what I stated to President SUZUKI this  
19 morning. As I had yet to know whether the War Minister  
20 had changed his opinion in order to effect a compromise  
21 with the Navy or whether he intended to put the Emperor  
22 on the throne, I telephoned to the President  
23 of the Planning Board to request him to visit me. I  
24 visited the Minister of the Imperial Household Depart-  
25 ment to talk about the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet plan. The



"I went to the office at 11 a.m. Prince  
1 KONOYE visited me to ask my opinion regarding the HIGA-  
2 SHIKUNI cabinet. I answered that it was still under  
3 consideration. I requested MATSUDAIRA, Chief Secretary,  
4 to study the procedure of the materialization of the  
5 HIGASHIKUNI plan. I visited the Emperor from 1:15 p.m.  
6 to 2 p.m. to report upon the pressing political si-  
7 tuation. At 2 p.m. YAMAZAKI, Chief of the Metropolitan  
8 Police Board came and spoke to me on current political  
9 affairs. Premier KONOYE visited me at 4 p.m. to say  
10 that he could not hold his premiership any longer, for  
11 the breach with the War Minister was becoming wider  
12 every day until at last the War Minister gave vent to  
13 his discontent saying that he did not like to hold any  
14 further conversation with the Premier, as he was not  
15 sure if he could stifle his feelings. Finally he asked  
16 my opinion regarding the proposed HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet,  
17 so I told him what I stated to President SUZUKI this  
18 morning. As I had yet to know whether the War Minister  
19 had changed his opinion in order to effect a compromise  
20 with the navy or whether he intended to put the Prince's  
21 shoulder to the wheel, I telephoned to the President  
22 of the Planning Board to request him to visit me. I  
23 visited the Minister of the Imperial Household Depart-  
24 ment to talk about the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet plan. The  
25

1 Minister seemed astonished and strongly objected to  
2 this plan. At 4:30 p.m. SUZUKI, President of the Plan-  
3 ning Board, visited me. I asked him as to the real  
4 meaning of the War Minister's intentions, but in vain.  
5 I urged him to supply me with a definite report on this  
6 matter. The Premier, who joined our conversation on his  
7 withdrawal from the presence of the Emperor, said that  
8 when he made a report to the Emperor on the proposed  
9 plan, His Majesty said that if the army and the navy  
10 agreed upon the peaceful policy and it is the outcome  
11 of necessity to have the Prince's cabinet, then there  
12 was no alternative but to approve the plan.

13 "I talked with the Premier until 5:30 p.m.  
14 regarding the political situation. At night SUZUKI  
15 telephoned to report on the result of his conversation  
16 with War Minister TOJO. According to his report, TOJO's  
17 purpose was to establish harmony between the army and  
18 the navy by the influence of the Prince. So I objected  
19 to the plan. The Premier also telephoned me to say  
20 that he wanted to secure an informal consent of Prince  
21 HIGASHIKUNI. I answered that it would be too early  
22 to do so, though I had no objection to him so long as  
23 his action was in his capacity as Premier. At midnight  
24 the Premier sent me a report saying that Prince HIGA-  
25 SHIKUNI had asked for a few days' consideration on his



1 part and a meeting with War Minister and the Lord  
2 Keeper of the Privy Seal. From 5:35 p.m. to 5:50 p.m.  
3 I was received in audience by the Emperor; His Majesty  
4 gave me his opinion on the proposed premiership of  
5 Prince HIGASHIKUNI, reported to him by the Premier.'

6 "207. A cabinet change at this time presented  
7 a crisis in Japan's history. In order to meet it  
8 successfully, it was necessary to comprehend fully  
9 Japan's situation in world affairs as they then existed.  
10 I gave them all serious thought and viewed them from  
11 all possible angles. I spent sleepless nights in my  
12 endeavor to find a solution which would avert a war  
13 which I know would be catastrophic for Japan. Fore-  
14 most was the negotiations for peace with America,  
15 which were pending. An atmosphere was being created,  
16 partly due to militarist propaganda, for making the  
17 people keenly feel pressure from the so-called ABCD  
18 encirclement line. Germany was advancing in Russia.  
19 News flashed from abroad was stimulating the nerves  
20 of the people, including landing of British and  
21 Australian troops at Singapore, increased aid to China,  
22 mobilization of the Filipinos, and continued concen-  
23 tration of the American fleet in Hawaii. The young  
24 military and naval officers who formed the mainstay of  
25 the fighting services and who had secured the decision

1 of the Imperial conference of September 6, 1941 proved  
2 to be a powerful driving force for an ominous situation.  
3 I realized it was not too much to say that it would  
4 be well-nigh impossible to form, in such an extra-  
5 ordinarily tense situation, a cabinet aimed at effect-  
6 ing a volte-face. Nor would it be possible for anyone  
7 unacquainted with the circumstances to form a succeed-  
8 ing cabinet, especially since serious difficulty would  
9 be experienced in appointing the War Minister, just  
10 as Mr. UGAKI failed to form a cabinet due to diffi-  
11 culty to enlist the services of a general in active  
12 service as War Minister some years prior. Troops  
13 having been sent to as far as Southern French Indo-  
14 China, nobody could tell that if the army got out of  
15 control, an untoward incident might not occur. If it  
16 took a long time in forming a succeeding cabinet on  
17 the other hand, I was afraid that the country might  
18 be plunged into confusion, which might readily further  
19 develop to a civil war, according to the political  
20 colorings of the Premier designate. The military might  
21 have resorted to anything, especially as they were in  
22 high spirits with their armaments replenished, had the  
23 government made a bid for a volte-face. In such an  
24 eventuality the negotiations with America would have  
25 broken down.



1 "208. On the morning of October 16, 1941,  
2 SUZUKI called on me and I explained to him the reasons  
3 why a Prince's cabinet would be impossible. This is  
4 set forth in my diary of that day (prosecution exhibit  
5 1151 as corrected by the Language Section, page 11,141)  
6 in part as follows:

7 "'October 16, 1941. At 8:30 a.m. President  
8 SUZUKI visited me, and we discussed the Prince's  
9 cabinet. The reasons I gave him for opposing the  
10 Prince's cabinet are as follows:

11 "'1. The formation of a Prince's cabinet  
12 should be carried out only when unavoidable, for example,  
13 when even if the army and navy agree, force of circum-  
14 stances makes it necessary to have a prince of the blood  
15 solve their difficulties.

16 "'2. According to what developed since last  
17 night the difficulties have not been solved, and a  
18 member of the Imperial family should never be asked  
19 to overcome these obstacles.

20 "'3. In a way the formation of this Prince's  
21 cabinet would indicate that we lacked a suitable person  
22 among our subjects, and a great problem would be created  
23 if war with the U.S.A. were to break out when such a  
24 cabinet existed. There were important reasons why even  
25 Prince KONOYE was prevented from carrying out the

1 policies decided at councils in the Imperial presence,  
2 and if we ask a member of the Imperial House to assume  
3 a responsibility he cannot fulfil, it would cause the  
4 Imperial House to become an object of public hatred.'

5 "209. At 3 p.m. in the afternoon of October 16,  
6 1941 I happened to be asked by War Minister TOJO for  
7 an interview, and received him in the official room  
8 of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. War Minister  
9 TOJO repeatedly stressed on that occasion that the  
10 time was come and therefore there was no course left  
11 to Japan but to carry out the decision of the Imperial  
12 conference of September 6. In reply, I stated that  
13 it was needless to say that the decision of the Imperial  
14 conference was extremely important and therefore must  
15 be respected and faithfully executed, but asked him  
16 if it was not proper to reconsider in case there was  
17 found any point manifesting want of care therein  
18 because I thought the decision was careless. I drew  
19 his attention to the report that the navy necessarily  
20 had no confidence in itself. Thereupon, the War Minis-  
21 ter agreed with me, adding that the decision of the  
22 Imperial conference could not be executed as it was,  
23 though he did not receive such a report about the navy.  
24 The War Minister went on:  
25

"If things cannot go on as they are, it will



1 be difficult for the KONOYE Cabinet to handle the  
2 situation. Therefore, I think that there will be no  
3 alternative but to petition a prince of the blood to  
4 form a succeeding cabinet.'

5 "Whereupon, I asked in return:

6 "'Does that mean that the army has decided to  
7 completely change its past policy and that a prince  
8 of the blood will be petitioned to dispose of the after-  
9 math, as such a volte-face could not be effected by  
10 a subject?'

11 "The War Minister's reply was in the negative.  
12 He added that a prince of the blood would be petitioned  
13 to form a succeeding cabinet for the purpose of deciding  
14 on the policy in the future. To which I raised a  
15 strong objection, stressing that a cabinet, headed by  
16 a prince of the blood, should not be formed except  
17 when the country decided on an absolutely peaceful  
18 policy. War Minister TOJO kept his silence for some  
19 time, from which he emerged with his abrupt question,  
20 'What will become of Japan then?' I remember that I  
21 replied to him that Japan might become a third or fourth-  
22 rate power, if what he was doing was persisted in. I  
23 also pointed out that the least Japan expected was  
24 true amity between the army and the navy.  
25

"210. My interview with War Minister TOJO

1 led to no definite results, but I thought at that time  
2 that if I talked to Prince KONOYE and if the Prince  
3 exerted a little harder, a way out of difficulty might  
4 be found, judging by my interview with the War Minister.  
5 I lost no time in telephoning Prince KONOYE, who,  
6 however, had been making his cabinet colleagues tender  
7 their resignations. And it was extremely regrettable  
8 that the Prince tendered his resignation to the Throne  
9 the same evening.



1 "211. What should be done to save the  
2 situation? As I thought that a succeeding Cabinet,  
3 headed by a prince of the Blood would not be sanctioned  
4 by the Emperor before the Government had established an  
5 absolutely peaceful policy, I consulted Prince KONOYE  
6 about the measures to cope with the situation, after  
7 he had presented the resignations to the throne. At  
8 that time I told Prince KONOYE in substance that the  
9 decision of the Imperial conference of September 6 was  
10 'cancer,' so to speak, and should be scrapped by all  
11 means so as to start afresh with a clean slate. For the  
12 purpose, one fully acquainted with the whole circum-  
13 stances, must undertake the formation of a succeeding  
14 Cabinet. I further told him, on the other hand should  
15 one, not acquainted with those circumstances, which  
16 were kept secret, attempt at forming a succeeding Cabinet,  
17 there is almost no manner of doubt that he would meet  
18 with Army opposition, finding it extremely difficult to  
19 organize a new Cabinet. Therefore, I thought that there  
20 would be no other course but to make Admiral OIKAWA or  
21 General TOJO form a new Cabinet and told Prince KONOYE  
22 to that effect. I pointed out the good and bad features  
23 of the appointment of either of them. Since TOJO had  
24 disagreed with him, it might be taken as a surrender if  
25 TOJO were appointed. On the other hand if it were offered

1 to OIKAWA, because the Navy did not want war, the  
2 Army might react stronger. Thus if TOJO were selected  
3 and ordered to disregard the Imperial Conference of  
4 September 6, he would be able to control the Army and  
5 if he continued peaceful negotiations, the effect on  
6 America, would be favorable as she expects war upon the  
7 resignation of his cabinet. Prince KONOYE agreed with  
8 me and said substantially that Japanese armed forces are  
9 now down south as far as Southern French Indo-China.  
10 Should the Army get out of control, no one can tell  
11 what situation might be precipitated by troops on the  
12 spot. They might eventually drag Japan into war. To  
13 avoid such an eventuality, TOJO who has the Army in hand  
14 anyhow must be made to undertake the formation of a  
15 succeeding Cabinet, especially since he does not advocate  
16 waging war immediately with America, judging by his  
17 remarks, made in the past few days. As he says that  
18 Japan will not be able to wage war with America if the  
19 Navy has no confidence, it will not mean opening of  
20 hostilities with America, even if he has organized a  
21 new Cabinet. A way out of the difficulty may be found,  
22 if the Emperor grants a message to TOJO on this point  
23 when His Majesty commands him to form a succeeding  
24 Cabinet. I asked KONOYE to give this matter further  
25 consideration and to let me know. That night and the



next morning I gave the question further thought.

1       "212. Recalling my interview with TOJO I  
2 had noticed that the General became more thoughtful,  
3 as it did not seem that he would necessarily advocate  
4 war with America, if the Navy was opposed to war. A  
5 change had apparently come over his way of thinking in  
6 the past few days. Another reason was his character.  
7 Since he was appointed Minister of War, TOJO much  
8 respected Imperial wishes. Respect for Imperial wishes  
9 was common to all soldiers, but it was stronger in TOJO.  
10 This was one of the reasons why TOJO was pressing for  
11 the execution of the decision of the Imperial conference  
12 of September 6, which was held in the presence of the  
13 Emperor. If it was commanded by the Emperor to scrap  
14 the decision of the Imperial Conference in question and  
15 review the situation on a fresh basis, I had sincere  
16 confidence that TOJO would change his policy in  
17 pursuance of Imperial wishes, as the backbone of his  
18 contention would be gone, it being not obligatory to  
19 execute the decision of the Imperial conference of  
20 September 6 and further it became clear from the develop-  
21 ment of the situation in the past few days that it would  
22 be difficult to carry out the past policy. In this  
23 connection, I understood that cynical criticisms were  
24 rampant among foreign residents in this country at that  
25

1 time that it would be no use to ask the Prime Minister  
2 or the Foreign Minister about Japan's foreign policy,  
3 which would be known only at the General Staff of the  
4 Army. In deference to those cynical criticisms, I  
5 thought that if the Army was made to conduct state  
6 affairs and if the Cabinet, formed by the Army, itself,  
7 undertook to adjust the relations with America in dead  
8 earnest, American misgiving might be dispelled.

9 with either TOJO or OIKAWA before the meeting of the  
10 Senior Statesmen and so far as I know, TOJO never  
11 knew I was going to recommend him. Chief Secretary  
12 MATSUDAIRA, with whom I had several conversations about  
13 the succeeding Prime Minister, was of the same opinion  
14 as Prince KINOKE and I.

15 "21A. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA made the  
16 necessary arrangements for the Senior Statesmen's  
17 Conference that morning. It started at 1:30 p.m. and  
18 ended at 3:45 p.m. The gist of the conference is set  
19 forth in my diary for that day, presentation exhibit  
20 1354, as corrected by the Language Section, page 13, 143.

21 "215. Several days after the conference I  
22 dictated a resume of it from notes I took during the  
23 conference to my Chief Secretary, MATSUDAIRA, who wrote  
24 it out and went over it with me as is shown in my diary  
25 of October 24, 1941. The following is a true copy of



1 "213. The next morning, October 17, 1941,  
2 Prince KONOYE telephoned me and said that it was his  
3 opinion that TOJO would be a better choice as Prime  
4 Minister than the Navy Minister, provided that he was  
5 given an Imperial command to scrap the decision of  
6 September 6th; use his efforts to effect co-operation  
7 between the Army and Navy and strive for peace. I did  
8 not discuss the appointment of TOJO as Prime Minister  
9 with either TOJO or OIKAWA before the meeting of the  
10 Senior Statesmen and so far as I know, TOJO never  
11 knew I was going to recommend him. Chief Secretary  
12 MATSUDAIRA, with whom I had several conversations about  
13 the succeeding Prime Minister, was of the same opinion  
14 as Prince KONOYE and I.

15 "214. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA made the  
16 necessary arrangements for the Senior Statesmen's  
17 Conference that morning. It started at 1:10 p.m. and  
18 ended at 3:45 p.m. The gist of the conference is set  
19 forth in my diary for that day, prosecution exhibit  
20 1154, as corrected by the Language Section, page 11,142.

21 "215. Several days after the Conference I  
22 dictated a resume of it from notes I took during the  
23 Conference to my Chief Secretary, MATSUDAIRA, who wrote  
24 it out and went over it with me as is shown in my diary  
25 of October 24, 1941. The following is a true copy of

1 it, the original of which is still on file in the  
2 Inner Court Document Section Board of Chamberlain.

3 "216. 'A RESUME OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE  
4 CONFERENCE OF SENIOR STATESMEN, which was opened at  
5 1:10 p.m., October 17, 1941.

6 "'The Grand Chamberlain conveys Imperial  
7 wishes to those assembled.

8 "'The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal's address:

9 "'As the present Cabinet change is very much  
10 complicated, I intended to invite Prime Minister  
11 KONOYE to this meeting to give an explanation. For  
12 this purpose I obtained Imperial permission and also  
13 Prince KONOYE's consent. But he has just sent me word  
14 that since he fell ill last night and is feverish, he  
15 is unable to attend the conference. But he has sent  
16 me a document, showing the development of the political  
17 change. I should like to read it now. As the document  
18 deals with each question separately, however, before  
19 reading the document, I will make a summary review of  
20 the circumstances leading up to today's situation.  
21 (After making such a review of the development of the  
22 situation since the conference at Ogikubo on October  
23 12, he read the attached paper).'

24 "The original of the document from Prince  
25 KONOYE which I read to the Senior Statesmen is also on



1 file in the Inner Court Document Section of the Board  
2 of Chamberlain. I shall now read it.

3 "Development of the Negotiation between Japan  
4 and America and the Reason for the Resignation of the  
5 Cabinet, sent by Prince KONOYE, outgoing Prime Mini-  
6 ster at the Request of the Conference of Senior  
7 Statesmen which was held following the resignation of  
8 the Third KONOYE Cabinet.

9 "(1) The Divergence of Views between the  
10 Government and the Army.

11 "1. The Decision of the Imperial Conference.  
12 The Outline of Execution of the Empire's National  
13 Policies, decided by the Imperial Conference of  
14 September 6, this year, provides:

15 "2. In case there is no prospect of our  
16 contentions being accepted through diplomatic negoti-  
17 ation in the foregoing item by about early in October,  
18 the Government immediately makes up its mind to open  
19 war with America (Britain and the Netherlands).

20 "In this connection, judging by the situation  
21 of the negotiation with America, prevailing about early  
22 in October, the Army has held that 'there is no pros-  
23 pect of our contentions being accepted' and therefore  
24 contended that it has been the natural conclusion,  
25 based on the decision of the Imperial Conference to

1 make up its mind to go to war at the middle or about  
2 late in October at the latest. Whereas the Government  
3 has contended that the current situation of the  
4 negotiation with America could not be regarded as  
5 'no prospect of contentions being accepted' and further  
6 that judging by the notes exchanged with America and  
7 other various informations America also desires to  
8 have the negotiation with Japan brought to an amicable  
9 conclusion. It is to be considered that the real in-  
10 tentions of President Roosevelt and Secretary of State  
11 Hull have been obscured by misunderstanding and mis-  
12 giving in the meantime (For instance the Japanese  
13 Army units in North French Indo-China have been grad-  
14 ually increased piecemeal since early in October --  
15 though this has been done in accordance with treaty  
16 provisions, third Powers' alienation of America from  
17 Japan, wait-and-see policy toward the international  
18 situation, especially the European war, stiffening  
19 attitude of the Far Eastern Affairs Division of the  
20 State Department and growing activities of anti-  
21 Japanese elements. Therefore, the Government has held  
22 that if more time was given, it could not be thought  
23 hopeless to bring the negotiations to an amicable con-  
24 clusion even with the terms, now submitted to America.  
25 If the Army modified its terms (which would be reducible



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1 to withdrawal of troops after all), as stated later,  
2 the Government has believed, therefore, that there is  
3 hope even now for amicable conclusions of the negoti-  
4 ation with America.

1 "Attention must be especially paid to the fact  
2 that the Army, which in pursuance of the demand from  
3 the Supreme Command, has been urging the government  
4 to make up its mind to go to war by early in October  
5 as decided by the Imperial Conference, is now pressing  
6 the government to do so by the middle of October and  
7 at the latest by the end of October in an unavoidable  
8 case. Otherwise, the Army warns the government that  
9 it would be extremely disadvantageous for this country  
10 in prosecuting war. Thus, from the middle to the end  
11 of October is the deadline laid down by the Army.

12 "(2) The Difficult Points in the Negotiation  
13 with America (Especially the Question of Withdrawal of  
14 Troops.)

15 "The negotiation with America is still on the  
16 way. It cannot be imagined that America's real inten-  
17 tions have already been fully clarified, but difficulty  
18 which has been so far experienced in the negotiation  
19 may be reduced to the following three points:

20  
21 "1. The question of withdrawal of troops  
22 from China and stationing of troops in China.

23 "2. Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite  
24 Alliance Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy.

25 "3. The question of commercial non-discrimin-  
ation in the Pacific area.



1            "And these three difficult points center in  
2 the question of withdrawal of troops from China and  
3 stationing of troops in China. Therefore, it may be  
4 said that the only difficulty in the negotiation with  
5 America is the question of withdrawal of troops from  
6 China.

7            "The Army's contention with regard to the  
8 question of withdrawal of troops from China may be  
9 summed up as follows:

10           "Japan's terms for peace with China, as sub-  
11 mitted to America are extremely generous, demanding  
12 no territorial annexation or reparation. As it is,  
13 however, communistic and other lawless agitations are  
14 rampant in the interior of China, thus menacing the  
15 security of both Japan and China. It is necessary,  
16 therefore, for economic development as well as for  
17 peace and prosperity of Japan and China, to station  
18 Japanese troops in designated districts of China for a  
19 prolonged time so as to carry out joint defense against  
20 these lawless elements. But the Japanese troops may  
21 be withdrawn from China following the settlement of  
22 the China Affair with the exception of these needed for  
23 stationing as mentioned above. According to the Army's  
24 contention, stationing of Japanese troops in designated  
25 districts of China is absolutely necessary. Accordingly,

1 therefore, stationing of troops is the first basic  
2 principle, because it is the only result of the China  
3 Affair. Therefore, should the China Affair be settled  
4 on the basis of withdrawal of Japanese troops without  
5 permitting Japan to station her troops in designated  
6 districts of China, the Army could not acquiesce in it.  
7 Stationing of troops in designated districts of China  
8 is the Army's heart, without which defeatism would  
9 spread through the Army, so that it would be impossible  
10 to maintain its high morale.

11 "On the other hand, America's real intentions  
12 with regard to the question of withdrawal of troops  
13 from China have not yet been manifested. It is not  
14 necessarily thought impossible, therefore, to have our  
15 terms accepted by America if only more time is given  
16 for negotiation; but the main points of America's  
17 contention have been so far regarded as follows:

18 "1. Withdrawal of troops should be accepted  
19 by Japan in principle (consequently the question of  
20 stationing of troops will be settled after this basic  
21 point is settled.) It is not necessarily clear if  
22 America will recognize Japan's stationing of troops,  
23 to be sure; but judging by the development of the  
24 negotiation in the past, there is a point which gives  
25 an impression that America will not pursue an attitude



1 which will flatly refuse to recognize Japan's station-  
2 ing of troops.

3 "2. America wants to ascertain Japan's  
4 sincerity concerning withdrawal of troops (for instance,  
5 in his conversations with Minister WAKASUGI on October  
6 13, Mr. Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary of State,  
7 said to the following effect:

8 "In short, that will depend upon Japan's  
9 sincerity. If Japan sincerely intends to withdraw her  
10 troops, there may be room for negotiation about its  
11 execution.')

12 "The Government's stand on the question of  
13 withdrawal of troops is as follows:

14 "(1) The negotiation with America should be  
15 kept up, with some more time granted for the purpose.

16 "(2) It goes without saying that Japan should  
17 demand the right to station her troops in view of its  
18 necessity, but should this question become the key to  
19 the success of the entire negotiations, how about giving  
20 up the name and instead gaining the substance, that is,  
21 accepting withdrawal of troops in principle, and  
22 formally making a concession to America to make an  
23 arrangement for having Japan's stationing of troops  
24 virtually recognized by America?

25 "(3) The Views of the Government and the Army

1 on War. Pointing out that it has become almost impossible  
2 to import military supplies (especially petroleum) since  
3 America, Britain and others froze Japanese assets, the  
4 Army holds that if the situation is allowed to take its  
5 own course without being remedied, Japan will become  
6 steadily impoverished, so that she will be eventually  
7 paralyzed. Then she will not be able to counter it  
8 even if America outrageously brings pressure to bear  
9 upon her, nor will she be able to rise in self-defense,  
10 even if her existence is menaced. The Army further  
11 contends that there is some risk, to be sure; but if  
12 only the nation united together in overcoming the  
13 national crisis, there will be no occasion for anxiety;  
14 because they have their own weakness just as we do.  
15 What is now needed is only decision. On the other hand,  
16 the Army holds that if too generous terms are offered by  
17 Japan in settling the China Affair through the inter-  
18 mediary of America, it will serve to deepen China's  
19 contempt for this country with the result that it may  
20 become necessary for Japan to launch a second punitive  
21 expedition against China within three years though the  
22 current affair may be settled for the time being. To  
23 this view the Prime Minister holds that it would be  
24 impossible for one who keenly feels his growingly heavy  
25 responsibility since the outbreak of the China Affair,



1 to plunge into a big war, whose outcome would defy  
2 prediction, in the midst of the China Affair itself.  
3 A dwindling of war supplies in stock since the Anglo-  
4 American freezing of Japanese assets may represent  
5 the so-called steady impoverishment of Japan, but  
6 with regard to securing of oil resources, about which  
7 the greatest anxiety is being felt of all war supplies,  
8 it is problematical whether Japan will be able to expect  
9 her desired volume of oil in a year or two, even if  
10 she conquers the Dutch East Indies; because destruction  
11 and risks of oil transportation must be taken into  
12 consideration. If it is planned to increase output of  
13 synthetic oil by mobilizing materials and labor instead  
14 of going to war, it will not be necessarily impossible  
15 to produce 500,000 tons of synthetic oil by the end of  
16 1943 and increase the figures to 4,000,000 in the course  
17 of 1944. Japan's national resources are now drained  
18 and popular morale is rather lax due to the China Affair  
19 which is now in its fourth year. Therefore, the Prime  
20 Minister believes that at this juncture Japan should  
21 settle the China Affair by some means and steadily  
22 foster her resources, by going through hardship and  
23 privation with her Navy in being as her hope.  
24  
25

## 1 "4. The Navy's View."

2 "The Navy is generally believed to embrace  
3 the following view:

4 "Japan now stands at a crossroads whether to  
5 stick to diplomatic negotiation or make up her mind  
6 to go to war. If it is to be settled through diplo-  
7 matic negotiation, Japan must stick to diplomacy to  
8 the finish. She must be confidential enough to con-  
9 duct diplomatic negotiation to an amicable conclusion.  
10 It is impossible to go to war, after conducting dip-  
11 lomatic negotiation two or three months, on the ground  
12 that there is no chance of success for diplomatic  
13 negotiation. Inasmuch as it is the Government that  
14 decides whether to depend on diplomacy or go to war,  
15 it must be left entirely to the Prime Minister's  
16 decision to take the course to the right or to the left  
17 on the part of this country.

18 "It may be added that a pretty strong opinion  
19 prevails among Navy circles that war should be avoided  
20 as far as possible and that the best must be done to  
21 adjust the relations between Japan and America through  
22 diplomatic negotiation.

23  
24 "(2) The Development of the Diplomatic  
25 Negotiation with America.

"At the middle of April, this year, Mr.



1 Sumner Welles, Secretary of State, submitted the so-  
2 called draft understanding between Japan and America  
3 to Ambassador NOMURA, telling him that the relations  
4 between the two countries will be able to be decided-  
5 ly adjusted, if the situation is clarified and im-  
6 proved on the following points:

7 "1. The attitude of the Governments of  
8 the two Powers toward the European war.

9 "1. The relations of the two Governments  
10 to the China Affair.

11 "1. Trade between the two Powers.

12 "1. The policies of the two Governments  
13 concerning political stability of the Pacific.

14 "Japan's counter-proposals to the American  
15 proposals were sent after they were approved by a  
16 liaison conference between the Government and the  
17 Supreme Command at the middle of May (late in April,  
18 Foreign Minister MATSUOKA returned from his trips in  
19 Germany and Italy, and it took him a considerable time  
20 to study Japan's reply to America in the form of  
21 counter-proposals). Late in June, America submitted  
22 counter-proposals to Japan, it happened that hostili-  
23 ties opened between Germany and the Soviet Union late  
24 in June, adding to the gravity of the international  
25 situation. On the other hand, Japan sent her troops

1 to south France Indo-China in accordance with treaty  
2 provisions, due to necessity in connection with the  
3 China Affair. Whereupon, however, America froze  
4 Japanese assets with the result that the situation  
5 between Japan and America grew tense. At the middle  
6 of July, Japan sent her reply to the American counter-  
7 proposals of late June, but the second KONOYE Cabinet  
8 resigned en bloc before Ambassador NOMURA handed it  
9 to the American Government. Early in August the  
10 third KONOYE Cabinet proposed a personal interview  
11 between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister KONOYE  
12 to the American Government so as to enable them to  
13 have heart to heart talks on the restoration of  
14 friendly relations between Japan and America, the  
15 China question and world peace, prompted by the desire  
16 to bring the diplomatic negotiation between Japan and  
17 America to an amicable conclusion by all means. Late  
18 in August, Prime Minister sent his personal message  
19 to President Roosevelt.  
20

21 "An 'Outline of Execution of the Empire's  
22 National Policies' was decided by the Imperial Con-  
23 ference of September 6, but it is clear from the  
24 circumstances before and after the Conference that  
25 the 'Outline' is aimed at settling the pending ques-  
tion with America (and Britain) through diplomatic



1 negotiation by all means and that recourse to war may  
2 be had only when there is absolutely no chance of  
3 success for diplomatic negotiation.

4 "Early in September, in order to hasten the  
5 personal interview between President Roosevelt and  
6 Prime Minister KONOYE, the Japanese Government sub-  
7 mitted to the American Government matters which  
8 might form a basis for the said interview.

9 "Further, on September 20, the Japanese  
10 Government collected the proposals made by America  
11 and Japan's counter-proposals and arranged them in  
12 order and submitted it to the American Government.

13 "In acknowledgment, the American Government  
14 on October 2 sent an aide-memoire to the Japanese  
15 Government. With regard to this American aide-  
16 memoire, a divergence of views has developed between  
17 the Government and the Army, one holding that there  
18 is no chance of success for the diplomatic negotia-  
19 tion with America, as America has no good will sin-  
20 cerity to bring the negotiation to an amicable con-  
21 clusion; while the other refuses to believe that  
22 there is no chance of success for the diplomatic  
23 negotiation with America and contends that the ne-  
24 gotiation be kept up or that the terms for negotia-  
25 tion be somewhat modified.

1 "I shall now continue to read the Resume of  
2 the Proceedings of the Conference of Senior Statesmen.

3 "All confereer then put preliminary ques-  
4 tions. More important ones were as follows:

5 "MR. WAKATSUKI: Advocates of a war with  
6 America often base their arguments upon the danger  
7 of Japan's resources being gradually exhausted.  
8 Nothing could be more dangerous. Should Japan wage  
9 war with America, what would be the outcome? The  
10 question calls for study with the utmost care.

11 "MR. HARA: I think that the oil question  
12 seems to be the crux of the situation. I am told  
13 that the Navy's oil stock will last two years, but  
14 I should like to know how much oil the Army has in  
15 stock. To this query nobody gave a full answer.

16 "MR. OKADA: After all, the oil question,  
17 no matter at what length we might discuss it, would  
18 afford no conclusion.

19 "MR. ABE: Those advocating extremist views  
20 or those desirous of prolonging diplomatic negotia-  
21 tion are all prompted by the same sentiment. After  
22 all, it comes down to the question of oil. I wonder  
23 how deeply the Prime Minister has pursued his study  
24 on the subject.  
25

"LORD KEEPER: It seems that the Prime Min-



1 ister has duly pursued his study pretty deep, but I  
2 think he has not been able to handle the question  
3 fully.

4 "MR. WAKATSUKI: It goes without saying that  
5 the decision of an Imperial conference should be re-  
6 spected, but it's handling is totally legalistic.

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1       "Even if there is little hope of attaining  
2 the objective through diplomatic negotiations, is it  
3 wise to wage war at once? As it involves risking  
4 Japan's national existence, is it not proper to pay a  
5 little more political consideration to the question?

6       "Mr. ODADA: The Navy's contention that if we  
7 go by treaties, everything must be regulated by  
8 treaties in the thoroughgoing manner may be admissible.  
9 Has not the Navy comparatively much oil?

10       "Mr. KIYOURA: Why must the Government decide  
11 its attitude at once when the Ambassador abroad says  
12 there is a chance of success?

13       "Lord Keeper: As for that point, the Imper-  
14 ial conference fixed the date of decision in the first  
15 part of October. Therefore, there developed a diver-  
16 gence of views between the Government and the Army,  
17 and I think the Government could not help but be pushed  
18 to the wall.

19       "Mr. ABE: As Mr. KIYOURA pointed out, it is  
20 incomprehensible why the Government had to quit when  
21 there was a chance of success.

22       "Lord Keeper: That point is difficult to  
23 understand. In short, America who believes that Japan  
24 is dominated by the Army will not reveal her real  
25 intentions so easily; Prince KONOYE, on the contrary,



1 wants to meet President Roosevelt\* and decide policies  
2 on broad lines in an effort to create a political situ-  
3 ation and thereafter decide upon details. Herein lies  
4 the divergence of views. While America's final reply  
5 has not yet been forthcoming, the date of the Imperial  
6 conference is fast approaching. That is the actual  
7 situation.

8 "Mr. WAKATSUKI: The China Incident is already  
9 four years old. Just how long do they think the war  
10 with America will last?

11 "Mr. YONAI: The Navy says that Japan will  
12 win if she wages war with America -- which means that  
13 the Japanese Navy will win if its fights with the  
14 American fleet take place in the Pacific. No one can  
15 tell when such an engagement will take place. Our  
16 endurance is another question.

17 "Mr. HIROTA: As we are in the midst of the  
18 China Incident, I think even politics must be conducted  
19 with the intentions of the Imperial General Headquarters  
20 at center.

21 "Lord Keeper: Since we are in war time, it  
22 is needless to say that the intentions of the fighting  
23 services are important. Especially when a question  
24 such as risking Japan's national existence is concerned,  
25 a perfect agreement of views between the Army and Navy

1 is essential. It is indeed the state's minimum re-  
2 quirement today.

3 "Mr. ABE: The present moment calls for a  
4 certain influence rather than a specific man.

5 "Mr. HIROTA: The backing of the Army and  
6 Navy is necessary.

7 "Mr. OKADA: It is necessary to enlist the  
8 services of a man who will be able to bring the Army  
9 and Navy into a harmonious relationship.

10 "Mr. HIROTA: Is it not necessary to ask the  
11 Imperial General Headquarters' desires?

12 "Mr. HARA: Does Mr. HIROTA mean to make the  
13 Supreme Command recommend the candidate for the next  
14 Prime Minister?

15 "Mr. HIROTA: I think that may be one of the  
16 plans worth studying.

17 "Mr. OKADA: I wonder if that will be advis-  
18 able.

19 "Lord Keeper: I think to make the Supreme  
20 Command recommend the candidate for the succeeding  
21 Prime Minister will be a question to be studied most  
22 cautiously. The Supreme Command may be embarrassed.  
23 It may not be able to recommend a candidate.

24 "Mr. HIROTA: That may be quite possible.

25 "Mr. HAYASHI: I should like to express my



1 view. It may seem rather extraordinary, but I am  
2 laying it before you as material for study. As already  
3 explained, it is necessary by all means to establish  
4 teamwork between the Army and Navy and effect coopera-  
5 tion between the Government and the Supreme Command.  
6 But it is extremely difficult. How about asking a  
7 Prince of the Blood to form a succeeding Cabinet at  
8 this juncture? And judging by the prevailing situation,  
9 I think it proper to ask an Imperial Prince in naval  
10 service to form a new Cabinet.

11 "Mr. YONAI: Theoretically, it may be a good  
12 plan, but I am afraid that practically it may not work.

13 "Lord Keeper: To speak the truth, it is  
14 proposed in some quarters to ask an Imperial Prince  
15 to form a succeeding Cabinet. And the proposition  
16 may be a practicable plan if the Army and Navy have  
17 given up their past contentions in favor of teamwork,  
18 also if the services of an Imperial Prince are desired  
19 as a transition step toward formally establishing cooper-  
20 ation between the two fighting services which in view  
21 of the past relations might be impossible to realize  
22 on the part of a mere subject. But the prevailing  
23 situation has not reached such a stage yet. It will  
24 be a serious question, therefore, to ask an Imperial  
25 Prince to tackle this vexed question. In the first

1 place, people might wonder if subjects lack talent,  
2 indeed so much so that they might have to ask an  
3 Imperial Prince to form a new Cabinet. Second, should  
4 the new Cabinet formed by an Imperial Prince decide to  
5 wage war with America, the said Prince would be called  
6 upon to tackle a question so difficult to solve that  
7 even a statesman of Prince KONOYE's caliber and exper-  
8 ience has failed to manage it, leading to his failure  
9 to execute the decision of the Imperial conference.  
10 Again should the Imperial Prince fail in tackling this  
11 knotty question, the Imperial family might come in for  
12 a storm of denunciation from the people. Such being  
13 the case, I cannot agree to the plan for forming a  
14 succeeding Cabinet by an Imperial Prince.

15 "Mr. WAKATSUKI: Lord Keeper of the Privy  
16 Seal, you must be fully acquainted with various cir-  
17 cumstances leading up to the present situation and its  
18 development. Let us hear your view on a succeeding  
19 Cabinet.

20 "Lord Keeper: It is a very difficult question  
21 as to who should be recommended to the Throne for a  
22 succeeding Cabinet. To state the conclusion first, I  
23 think it may be the best for the Emperor to command  
24 War Minister TOJO to form that Cabinet. Paradoxical  
25 as it may sound, and it may be difficult for you to



1 understand, today's poisonous and irradicable source of  
2 difficulty is after all the decision of the Imperial  
3 conference of September 6. On this point I had a free  
4 and frank exchange of views with War Minister TOJO,  
5 the result being to ascertain that the Army is fully  
6 aware that it will be impossible to wage war with Ameri-  
7 ca without the Navy's real determination, but the Army  
8 cannot help proceeding forward in accordance with the  
9 decision of the Imperial conference unless the Navy  
10 manifests its definite intention to modify the decision  
11 of the Imperial conference. It is to be judged, there-  
12 fore, that when real cooperation between the Army and  
13 Navy is still not forthcoming, the important decision  
14 of the Imperial conference was hurriedly made. This  
15 is the actual situation. If so, I think it will be the  
16 most practical way for saving the situation to commend  
17 TOJO to form a succeeding Cabinet on the part of the  
18 Emperor and at the same time order him to effect real  
19 cooperation between the Army and Navy and re-examine  
20 the decision of the Imperial conference, as TOJO is  
21 fully acquainted with the development of the situation  
22 and has the difficulty of attainment keenly driven home  
23 to himself. Even if a general or admiral not in ac-  
24 tive service is commanded to form a succeeding Cabinet,  
25 there may be fear of an unexpected result, in case his

1 formation of the new Cabinet is restricted by a section  
2 of the public with the decision of the Imperial confer-  
3 ence.

4 "Mr. KIYOURA: As for the Cabinet to be formed  
5 by an Imperial Prince, some one mentioned the name of  
6 Prince HIGASHIKUNI to me, but I think the idea is not  
7 proper. This time it may be proper for one represent-  
8 ing the military authorities to come forward and form a  
9 new Cabinet.

10 "Mr. TAKATSUKI: The idea of the Lord Keeper  
11 of the Privy Seal is reasonable, but I should like to  
12 recommend General UGAKI, though I do not do so, simply  
13 because he was in the same Cabinet with me. General  
14 UGAKI is not only the Nestor of the Army but a man of  
15 strong will. He may be one of the most powerful candi-  
16 dates for saving the situation, though it would be  
17 embarrassing should the militarists be opposed to him  
18 as before.

19 Lord Keeper: I also think General UGAKI is  
20 one of the most powerful candidates. He is outstand-  
21 ing, too, as the possessor of actual power. But some  
22 time ago the General declined the Imperial offer to  
23 form a succeeding Cabinet, due to the actual opposition  
24 of the military authorities. Therefore, in petitioning  
25 the Emperor to command the General to form a new Cabinet



1 again my sense of responsibility dictates caution to  
2 me. As the present political change has occurred so  
3 suddenly, I have not yet explored the ground in that  
4 direction. According, however, to the Chief Secretary,  
5 who has inquired at two or three places, in case the  
6 General is commanded by the Emperor to form a succeed-  
7 ing Cabinet, I think there may not be such opposition  
8 to him from the military authorities as before; never-  
9 theless, there has not yet been created in the Army  
10 an atmosphere in which to extend a full measure of  
11 support to him. I am inclined to believe that it will  
12 be extremely difficult for General UGAKI to restrain the  
13 militarists.  
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1 "MR. WAKATSUKI: Some of you hail from the  
2 military services. What do you think about General  
3 UGAKI?

4 "MR. ABE: I know General UGAKI very well,  
5 as I assisted him as Vice Minister when he held the  
6 portfolio of War. General UGAKI used to be looked  
7 upon as an influence by circles other than the  
8 military when it was desired that the Army be re-  
9 strained. Therefore, the name of General UGAKI gives  
10 one an impression that he is the very man for curbing  
11 military demands. In consequence, he always finds  
12 himself in a sorry plight. I think it may be very  
13 difficult for General UGAKI to control the situation  
14 under the prevailing circumstances.

15 "MR. OKADA: I have no intention to say  
16 anything personal against War Minister TOJO, but  
17 judged by the development of the present political  
18 change, the cabinet may be regarded as having been  
19 overthrown by the Army. I am skeptical as to  
20 whether it will be proper for the Emperor to command  
21 the War Minister representative of the said Army to  
22 form a succeeding cabinet.

23 "Lord Keeper: My version is rather differ-  
24 ent on that point. The attitude taken by War Minister  
25 TOJO in the present political change is different



1 from that taken by War Minister HATA under the YONAI  
2 Cabinet. On the basis of a survey of the truth of  
3 the case, it cannot be said that the Army alone is  
4 to blame.

5 "MR. OKADA: In any case, the Army embraces  
6 a vigorous opinion. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal  
7 says that the Army fires the rifles from the rear,  
8 but I am afraid that it may develop into a gun.

9 "Lord Keeper: It cannot be said that there  
10 is no occasion for worry on that point, but in short,  
11 the question is how useful the Navy's strength will be.

12 "MR. YONAI: Did not Prime Minister KONOYE  
13 quit because the Navy is not only ambiguous in atti-  
14 tude, but unreliable?

15 "Lord Keeper: It cannot be said so clearly.  
16 An agreement of views between the Army and Navy and  
17 a re-examination of the decision of the Imperial  
18 Conference must be the foundation for saving the  
19 situation; it may be also a good idea to make the  
20 Navy Minister undertake the job, as he stands for  
21 prudence.

22 "MR. OKADA: I think it will not be abso-  
23 lutely proper for the Navy to recommend a succeeding  
24 Prime Minister from among its leaders at this time.

25 "MR. YONAI: (Was of the same opinion as

Mr. OKADA).

1           "MR. OKADA: I think General UGAKI may be  
2 a good candidate, if the military circles can be  
3 reconciled with him.

4           "MR. WAKATSUKI: If War Minister TOJO is  
5 chosen I think a bad impression may be created  
6 abroad. We shall have to be prepared for a very  
7 unfavorable impression abroad.

8           "MR. HARA: If it is to be arranged as the  
9 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal stated, I think it may  
10 be necessary for the Emperor to show the course of  
11 action clearly in issuing the Imperial command to  
12 form a new cabinet.

13           "Lord Keeper: I think I shall pay full  
14 consideration to that point.

15           "MR. HIROTA: Is it the Lord Keeper of the  
16 Privy Seal's plan to make the Prime Minister concur-  
17 rently assume the portfolio?

18           "Lord Keeper: Yes.

19           "MR. HIROTA: Then it will be all right.

20           "MR. ABE: I support the Lord Keeper's plan.

21           "Lord Keeper: I think Mr. WAKATSUKI has  
22 recommended General UGAKI. Has Mr. OKADA also recom-  
23 mended General UGAKI?

24           "MR. OKADA: No, I have not necessarily  
25



1 recommended General UGAKI, but I think there are some  
2 points in the Lord Keeper's plan to cause worry.

3 "MR. HARA: The Lord Keeper's plan cannot  
4 be said to be satisfactory, but as there is no other  
5 good plan, we cannot help proceeding forward with it.

6 "Lord Keeper: I have now understood your  
7 views on the whole. I will fully report them to the  
8 Throne and obtain Imperial sanction."

9 "217. In Appendix E of the Indictment, I am  
10 charged with being 'present at and concurred in the  
11 decisions taken \* \* \*' at the conference of October  
12 17, 1941 (Ex-Premiers) which decision 'prepared for  
13 and led to unlawful war on 7th/8th December 1941.'

14 No such decision was made at that conference. I  
15 listened to the Senior Statesmen's opinions and  
16 expressed my opinions. It was subsequent events  
17 which led to war. At that time in recommending TOJO  
18 neither the Senior Statesmen nor I had the slightest  
19 intent to do anything or had any opinion that we were  
20 doing anything preparing for or leading to war. We  
21 expressed our opinions in the hopes and expectations  
22 that the recommendation of TOJO would avoid war.

23 "218. I reported fully the results of the  
24 Senior Statesmen's Conference to the Emperor and  
25 recommended TOJO to the Throne for the next Prime

1 Minister. As it was evidently difficult to settle  
2 the political situation by merely setting up a new  
3 cabinet by Imperial command, I asked the Throne that  
4 special instructions as set down below, be given  
5 directly upon the issuance of the Imperial command  
6 to General TOJO, and later to Admiral OIKAWA, the  
7 Navy Minister, so as to make clear the Imperial wish  
8 for closer cooperation between the army and the navy,  
9 and disregarding the September 6th decision. The  
10 Emperor gave his consent. I waited in the antechamber  
11 for the return of the two ministers from the audience  
12 hall, and conveyed to them the wish of His Majesty  
13 under orders from the sovereign, thereby nullifying  
14 the resolution of the September 6 Imperial Conference,  
15 as follows:

16 "I presume that you have just received  
17 Imperial words in regard to cooperation between the  
18 Army and the Navy. As regards the fundamental line  
19 of national policy I am commanded to convey to you the  
20 Imperial desire that the careful considerations be  
21 taken by studying both the internal and the external  
22 situations more comprehensively and more profoundly  
23 than ever regardless of the resolution of the September  
24 6 Imperial Conference."

25 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen



minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:)

reading KIDO's affidavit, page 188:

"7194. The Imperial Instructions to War Minister TOJO and Navy Minister OKADA are as follows:

"Imperial Instructions, To War Minister TOJO,

"I command you to form a new cabinet. You

will observe the provisions of the Constitution. I

believe the country is confronted by a most serious

situation. At this juncture you will see to it that

the cooperation between the army and the navy is made

closer than ever. I intend to tell this to the Navy

Minister later by calling him in later.

"To Navy Minister OKADA,

"I have called in War Minister TOJO and

commanded him to form a new cabinet. I told him that

I believe the country is now confronted by a most

serious situation, and he must see to it that the

cooperation between the army and the navy is made

closer than ever. You will exert yourself in conformity with

my wish."

"220. The prosecution in document 0005, page

has stated in referring to me, 'It is significant that

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

4 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, I continue  
5 reading KIDO's affidavit, page 188:

6 "219. The Imperial instructions to War Minister  
7 TOJO and Navy Minister OIKAWA are as follows:

8 "'Imperial Instructions, To War Minister TOJO.

9 "'I command you to form a new cabinet. You  
10 will observe the provisions of the Constitution. I  
11 believe the country is confronted by a most serious  
12 situation. At this juncture you will see to it that  
13 the cooperation between the army and the navy is made  
14 closer than ever. I intend to tell this to the Navy  
15 Minister later by calling him in later.

16 "'To Navy Minister OIKAWA.

17 "'I have called in War Minister TOJO and  
18 commanded him to form a new cabinet. I told him that  
19 I believed the country is now confronted by a most  
20 serious situation, and he must see to it that the  
21 cooperation between the army and the navy is made closer  
22 than ever. You will exert yourself in conformity with  
23 my wish.'

24 "220. The prosecution in document 0003, page 4  
25 has stated in referring to me, 'It is significant that



1 he makes it clear in exhibits 1196 and 2250 that he  
2 rejected the appointment suggested by WAKATSUKI and  
3 others, of General UGAKI, the only man who might perhaps  
4 have averted war altogether.' The prosecution and I  
5 thus agree that an army man was the proper choice;  
6 we only disagree on which one. As shown, at the Senior  
7 Statesmen's Conference at which WAKATSUKI, HARA, OKADA,  
8 ABE, KIIYOURA, YONAI, HIROTA, and HAYASHI were present,  
9 only WAKATSUKI favored UGAKI, and one, HAYASHI, suggested  
10 a prince of the blood. The reasons why UGAKI was not  
11 acceptable are fully set forth above. What he 'might'  
12 have done is problematical and speculative. It was  
13 my considered opinion shared by others, that he would  
14 not have been able to form a cabinet, or if he did,  
15 that there would have been a revolution in Japan, and  
16 war would have resulted as he was not able to control  
17 the army. As was pointed out at the conference, UGAKI  
18 had once before failed to form a cabinet when given  
19 the Imperial Command, because of the opposition of  
20 the military. I did not suggest TOJO until I was asked  
21 my opinion. Neither exhibits 1196 or 2250 are authority  
22 for the prosecution's statement.

23  
24 "221. The prosecution has also stated in  
25 substance in document 0003, page 49, that I made no  
attempt to induce TOJO to adopt an attitude toward

1 peace negotiations which would offer the slightest  
2 hope of their success. In explanation of that I wish  
3 to point out that I was opposed to the Pacific War from  
4 the beginning to the end and as the prosecution said  
5 about my advice to KONOYE on August 7, 1941 (prosecution  
6 exhibit 1130), 'No doubt if his advice has been taken  
7 we should not be holding this trial today...' As Lord  
8 Keeper I could not induce TOJO to take any steps.

9 "222. The official duties of the Lord Keeper  
10 of the Privy Seal which I held dictated me not to  
11 interfere in national policies. Therefore, I was not  
12 in a position to give expression to my opposition  
13 publicly. When Prince KONOYE was Prime Minister he  
14 sought my views from time to time, as he was one of  
15 my very close friends. Therefore, I often took occa-  
16 sion to stress to him the necessity for working hard  
17 to avoid war with America by all means (Cf. My diary  
18 for August 7, 1941 and October 9, 1941 - exhibits 1130  
19 and 1146, both as corrected). Meanwhile, the situation  
20 went from bad to worse. I, as one of those serving  
21 the Emperor close to him with official duties to offer  
22 assistance to him, gave the most serious and constructiv  
23 thought to enable the Emperor to do his best dis-  
24 passionately as sovereign under constitutional govern-  
25 ment. Put in another form, I made it a rule to petition



1 the Emperor to make the government study the situation  
2 as cautiously as possible from all possible angles  
3 before making a decision and for that matter to draw  
4 attention or caution the government without reservation  
5 to anything which His Majesty may have deemed necessary,  
6 thereby putting forth all possible efforts on the part  
7 of the latter so as to have nothing to regret later.  
8 Once, however, the government decided on a national  
9 policy, I used to counsel the Emperor to approve it,  
10 by trusting the government in accordance with consti-  
11 tutional government. When the TOJO Cabinet was formed,  
12 the Emperor commanded Prime Minister TOJO through me  
13 to scrap the decision of the Imperial conference of  
14 September 6, a line of action which had no parallel  
15 even under the reign of the Emperor MEIJI, the builder  
16 of modern Japan. I presume that the Emperor had  
17 recourse to it as a last resort.

19 "223. In explanation of the prosecution's  
20 statement in document 0003, page 49, that I '...induced  
21 the Emperor to give, or gave in the Emperor's name,  
22 an instruction to the navy which could only mean that  
23 they should appoint a Navy Minister who would do what-  
24 ever TOJO told them,' I wish to state that as shown  
25 above, the Emperor told both TOJO and OIKAWA, 'At  
this juncture you will see to it that the cooperation

between the army and navy is made closer than ever.'

1 Neither one was told to do the bidding of the other.

2 In view of His Majesty's desire for peace there can

3 be no question that his thought coincided with mine,

4 that on the part of the army it was to refrain from

5 acting as it pleased in defiance of the intentions of

6 the navy which was anxious to avoid war with America

7 and on the part of the navy to manifest its intentions

8 clearly so as to seek a peaceful solution of the out-

9 standing question between Japan and America. This

10 was the thought behind my statement at the Senior

11 Statesmen's Conference when I advocated an instruction

12 to TOJO as follows:

13 "If so, I think it will be the most practical  
14 way for saving the situation to command TOJO to form  
15 a succeeding cabinet on the part of the Emperor and  
16 at the same time order him to effect real cooperation  
17 between the army and navy and re-examine the decision  
18 of the Imperial Conference.'

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1 "224. The prosecution states in document  
2 0003, page 49, 'It is also significant that in exhibit  
3 2250 written in November, he abandoned altogether the  
4 excuse for appointing TOJO which he had given the  
5 Emperor on 2 October (exhibit 1155).' Frankly this  
6 puzzles me. I have never offered any excuse to any  
7 one at any time for TOJO's appointment. I have set  
8 forth my reasons for doing so. Furthermore, exhibit  
9 1155 is my diary for October 18, 1941. In that entry  
10 there is no mention of any reasons why TOJO was  
11 appointed. Likewise, if the prosecution is referring  
12 to my diary of October 2, 1941, no reasons are set  
13 forth there which was two weeks before he was even  
14 appointed. I do not know to which document the  
15 prosecution refers and can find none to sustain any  
16 such conclusion. I had nothing to do with the appoint-  
17 ment of any member of TOJO's Cabinet. I was never  
18 consulted by any one as to whom to appoint, and I do  
19 not know with whom TOJO consulted.  
20

21 "225. On the evening of October 17, 1941,  
22 Prince KANIN summoned me and asked me to submit to  
23 the Throne a memorial having War Minister TOJO remain  
24 in active service and promoting him to full general.  
25 Prince KANIN said that TOJO had requested to do so,  
as it was a matter relating to himself, but that Prince

1 KANIN requested me to do so as it was a formality and  
2 an exceptional case. I merely acceded to Prince KANIN's  
3 request to transmit the memorial to the Throne the next  
4 day as appears in prosecution exhibit 1155, diary of  
5 October 18, 1941.

6 "226. As a result of the formation of the  
7 TOJO Cabinet, Premier TOJO in obedience to the  
8 Emperor's instruction, cancelled the decision of the  
9 Imperial Conference on September 6 and set about re-  
10 examination of it. This consequently eased the  
11 tension for a war which had threatened to break out  
12 at any moment on October 13 and 14. His Majesty was  
13 exceedingly glad and spoke to me about it on October  
14 20, 1941. As shown above, I had only one motive in  
15 recommending TOJO, and that was to avert war with  
16 America. Thus as shown in my diary of October 20, 1941,  
17 prosecution exhibit 1156, I sincerely felt that the war  
18 had been averted and the situation had taken a new turn  
19 for the better. His Majesty's words 'Nothing ventured,  
20 nothing gained' expressed to me that he was pleased  
21 that he had succeeded in making those who held strong  
22 opinions give in to his own ideas to avert war. I  
23 told him one mistaken step taken in the present cabinet  
24 change might have needlessly plunged us into war, and  
25 that the recommendation I had made was the only choice



1 possible after due consideration.

2 "227. Following the formation of his Cabinet,  
3 Prime Minister TOJO devoted his all to the negotiation  
4 with America in pursuance of Imperial wishes. In form-  
5 ing his Cabinet, TOJO held the portfolio of Home  
6 Affairs concurrently. Asked why he assumed the port-  
7 folio of Home Affairs concurrently, though it might  
8 be understandable that he would hold the portfolio of  
9 war in addition to Premiership, the General told me  
10 that in case the negotiation with America was brought  
11 to an amicable conclusion, thereby adjusting the re-  
12 lations between the two countries, he was afraid that  
13 the country might possibly be plunged into serious con-  
14 fusion, in which eventuality he would like to assume  
15 the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and  
16 order. In joining the TOJO Cabinet, I heard from  
17 both Finance Minister KAYA and Foreign Minister TOGO  
18 that they asked General TOJO if his Cabinet would be  
19 a war cabinet and that they accepted the offers only  
20 after the General assured them that his Cabinet would  
21 not be a war Cabinet, but on the contrary it would  
22 devote its all to adjustment of the relations between  
23 Japan and America.

24  
25 "228. Since the formation of his Cabinet,  
General TOJO made serious efforts to overcome difficulty

1 possible after due consideration.

2 "227. Following the formation of his Cabinet,  
3 Prime Minister TOJO devoted his all to the negotiation  
4 with America in pursuance of Imperial wishes. In form-  
5 ing his Cabinet, TOJO held the portfolio of Home  
6 Affairs concurrently. Asked why he assumed the port-  
7 folio of Home Affairs concurrently, though it might  
8 be understandable that he would hold the portfolio of  
9 war in addition to Premiership, the General told me  
10 that in case the negotiation with America was brought  
11 to an amicable conclusion, thereby adjusting the re-  
12 lations between the two countries, he was afraid that  
13 the country might possibly be plunged into serious con-  
14 fusion, in which eventuality he would like to assume  
15 the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and  
16 order. In joining the TOJO Cabinet, I heard from  
17 both Finance Minister KAYA and Foreign Minister TOGO  
18 that they asked General TOJO if his Cabinet would be  
19 a war cabinet and that they accepted the offers only  
20 after the General assured them that his Cabinet would  
21 not be a war Cabinet, but on the contrary it would  
22 devote its all to adjustment of the relations between  
23 Japan and America.

24 "228. Since the formation of his Cabinet,  
25 General TOJO made serious efforts to overcome difficulty



1 in the negotiation with America, by holding the  
2 Liaison Conference day after day. General TOJO pro-  
3 ceeded to the Palace almost every other day for the  
4 purpose of reporting to the Emperor. Every time he  
5 had an audience with the Emperor, he came to my office  
6 room and briefly told me about his report to His  
7 Majesty.

8 "229. Every interview was a very short one,  
9 so that both of us had no time to have an exchange of  
10 views. Since its emergence on October 17, 1941, the  
11 TOJO Cabinet was studying the pending question from  
12 various angles. SUZUKI reported to me on October 29,  
13 1941, the progress of the Liaison Conferences. (Diary  
14 October 29, 1941, exhibit 1162) He told me at that  
15 time that the Conference was generally taking a course  
16 toward evasion of war. I expressed to him my desire  
17 to see this policy realized."

18 I will skip the next two sentences.

19 "At that time it seemed that the fighting  
20 services were steadily pushing war preparations. It  
21 was a matter of deep concern for those who knew America  
22 and things American. I knew, and others close to me  
23 knew that if one was to come to an understanding with  
24 America, he should put forth all-out efforts for the  
25 purpose, using no bluff. When I had the interview

1 with Prime Minister TOJO on October 29, 1941, I drew  
2 his attention to this point. Prime Minister TOJO,  
3 who apparently took a different view of the matter,  
4 told me that negotiation would be brought to an amic-  
5 able conclusion only when we manifested our firm  
6 determination and that in this sense, preparations  
7 for both peace and war were necessary.

8 "230. With its study mostly concluded on  
9 October 31, 1941, the Government undertook to reach a  
10 conclusion on the basis of its study. The Prime  
11 Minister so advised me, as mentioned in my diary of  
12 October 31, 1941, as follows:

13 "'October 31, 1941....At 4:40 Premier TOJO  
14 came to the Palace. After conferring with the Emperor,  
15 he called on me with reports on the progress of the  
16 Liaison Conference. He said that from tomorrow the  
17 conference is going to enter upon the final stage of  
18 discussion....'

19 "On that occasion, and also on November 2, 1941,  
20 the Prime Minister told me that he wanted to avoid war  
21 with America as much as possible, but as the result of  
22 studying various situations in an all-round way, the  
23 Government would be called upon to prepare for both  
24 peace and war, especially since consideration would  
25 have to be paid to the worst eventuality of a rupture



1 in the negotiation. Therefore, I knew that the  
2 Government was preparing for both peace and war instead  
3 of for peace alone since October 31, 1941 and further  
4 that it was the fundamental attitude in which the  
5 Government faced the decision of the Imperial Confer-  
6 ence of November 5, 1941.

7 "231. As shown in prosecution exhibit 1168,  
8 my diary for November 5, 1941, the Imperial Conference  
9 held that day lasted 4-1/2 hours, and it decided  
10 Japan's policy toward U.S.A., England and the Nether-  
11 lands, according to the principles studied by the  
12 Liaison Conferences. I, of course, was not present  
13 at this Imperial Conference, and after it was over  
14 Premier TOJO told me of its results with little details.  
15 He told me in effect that a final effort should be  
16 made for settling the negotiations by dispatching Mr.  
17 KURUSU to America and, on the other hand, the Southern  
18 Army should be organized in the event of eventual  
19 rupture of the negotiations. I listened to him and  
20 made no comment.  
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1 "232. The war party in Japan, which mis-  
2 took the emergence of the TOJO Cabinet for the open-  
3 ing of hostilities between Japan and America was in  
4 high spirits for a time, but when it was disillusioned,  
5 a transformation came over the atmosphere  
6 overnight, which became a very ugly one. For instance,  
7 my home used to be guarded by some ten policemen,  
8 but about this time the number of policemen was  
9 increased to fifteen in the daytime. At night my  
10 home was guarded by 25 men, including 10 additionally  
11 detailed from the special guard. Further, I had to  
12 follow a different route every day in driving to and  
13 back from office. My views against war was the reason  
14 for this increased protection.

15 "233. As days rolled on the situation between  
16 Japan and America showed no indication of easing.  
17 In this country, the solidarity of the young  
18 military and naval officers, who formed the mainstay  
19 of the fighting services, was further tightened with  
20 the result that an atmosphere was created in the  
21 fighting services themselves, opposing to the policy  
22 of the leaders of the army and navy for adjusting the  
23 relations between Japan and America. On the other  
24 hand, news emanating from America became inflammatory,  
25 thereby stiffening the attitude of the fighting



1 services. Meanwhile, propaganda was spread to the  
2 effect that if she further dilly-dallied, Japan would  
3 be attacked by America. Fretful impatience was the  
4 order of the day. I strove to prevent a Pacific war  
5 by all means. On November 19, 1941, I counseled the  
6 Emperor to strongly deprecate entering into a state  
7 of war with the passing of the end of November as if  
8 it was a mere matter of routine business and instead  
9 handle the situation with a most cautious attitude as  
10 it was conceived that the negotiation with America  
11 might be in one of various stages. My advice is set  
12 forth in my diary of this date, prosecution exhibit  
13 1181, as corrected by Language Section, p. 11, 143.  
14 As is also shown in that exhibit, I advised His Majesty  
15 'when the Premier solicits his final decision, if  
16 circumstances require, the Premier should be ordered  
17 to hold the council in the Imperial presence with the  
18 participation therein of all the senior statesmen.'  
19 In other words, I felt that the mere fact that the  
20 end of November was approaching did not warrant the  
21 inevitability of war as decided in the Imperial  
22 Conference of November 5, 1941, and I believed a re-  
23 examination should be made of this Imperial Conference  
24 decision depending on the state of negotiations with  
25 America at that time. To be frank, I secretly thought

1 that I could bring the negotiations to an amicable  
2 conclusion at some time according to the progress of  
3 the negotiations, by invoking Imperial intervention.  
4 The situation between Japan and America failed to  
5 show any indication of improvement; while news, flashed  
6 from abroad became more and more stimulating with the  
7 passage of time. The Emperor, who was deeply con-  
8 cerned over the situation, expressed his desire to me  
9 to seek the views of senior statesmen on November 26,  
10 1941, when I was received in audience. In reply I  
11 stated that His Majesty's decision this time would  
12 become a final one, there being no retreat from it,  
13 so that it was desirable that every possible measure  
14 be taken so that His Majesty might not be sorry for  
15 it later. For the purpose I counseled His Majesty to  
16 issue commands to the Prime Minister freely. This is  
17 set forth in my diary of November 26, 1941, prosecu-  
18 tion exhibit 1190, as corrected by the Language Sec-  
19 tion, record, p. 10,429, as follows:

20 "26 November 1941.

21 "I met HARA, President of the Privy Council,  
22 to consult with him about a senior statesmen's con-  
23 ference. I saw the Emperor from 11:15 a. m. to 11:45  
24 a. m. He said that as for the future outlook of the  
25 Japanese-American talks it was feared to our regret



1 that the worst might come to the worst. Under these  
2 circumstances, our final decision as to the war should  
3 be carried into practice after another senior states-  
4 men's conference which should be convened to have  
5 broader and more complete discussions on the matter.  
6 The Emperor also said that he wanted to tell his idea  
7 to Premier TOJO.'

8 "I answered as follows:

9 "Once the final decision is made this time  
10 it would truly be the last and irretrievably final  
11 one. Thus, if there should be any doubt or any  
12 better idea to surmount the difficulties in your  
13 Majesty's mind I pray that your Majesty be pleased  
14 to elucidate the same without the least reserve and  
15 appropriate steps which your Majesty might not repent  
16 of afterwards. I therefore pray that Your Majesty  
17 command the Premier without reserve.'

18 "The prosecution, in document 0001, p. 271,  
19 entirely omits my advice to the Emperor as set forth  
20 in this exhibit.  
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"234. Prosecution exhibit 2249 is a telegram  
1 dispatched from Washington by NOMURA and KURUSU on  
2 November 26, 1941, and received in the Foreign Ministry  
3 here on the morning of November 27, 1941. In it,  
4 substantially, they suggest that if the condition does  
5 not change, negotiation must be given up by them; that  
6 they were humiliated at their lack of influence and  
7 in this case the only way to bridge the difficulty  
8 would be to let President Roosevelt cable the Emperor,  
9 if permission from the Foreign Office was obtained,  
10 and then ask the Emperor to answer. The telegram also  
11 discusses occupancy of Netherlands East Indies and ends  
12 with a wish that the telegram be shown to the Lord  
13 Keeper of the Privy Seal. I never saw this telegram.  
14 I have no recollection of ever talking to Foreign  
15 Minister TOGO about it. I do not deny that he spoke  
16 to me but if he did talk to me about it, it must have  
17 been after receipt of Secretary of State Hull's  
18 message of the same date had reached Japan, which  
19 created a changed situation and minimized the impor-  
20 tance of the telegram from NOMURA. I am sure, however,  
21 that I never had any weighty conference with TOGO  
22 about it. If he spoke to me, it must have been very  
23 slightly due to its conditional nature, and after he  
24 consulted TOJO, else I would have remembered it. I had  
25



1 nothing to do with Foreign Minister TOGO's answering  
2 telegram of November 28, 1941, prosecution exhibit 1193.  
3 I never saw it until this trial.

4 "235. The formula for saving the situation  
5 by invoking Imperial intervention, which I secretly  
6 evolved in my mind, was found to be impossible of  
7 execution when Japan received Hull's document of  
8 November 26, 1941. The American proposal was so strong,  
9 it being entirely beyond the pale of contingencies  
10 anticipated by me and laid before the Throne on  
11 November 19, 1941, exhibit 1181, as corrected. The  
12 government said that it was tantamount to an ultimatum.

13 "236. Pursuant to my general suggestion to  
14 the Emperor on November 19, 1941, arrangements were  
15 made, and on the morning of November 29, 1941, at  
16 9:30 A.M., the senior statesmen met in conference at  
17 the Palace with the government, and they listened to  
18 a full report given by the Prime Minister on the  
19 development of the negotiation with America up to date.  
20 This meeting was not attended by the Emperor, nor by me.  
21 It recessed at 1:00 P.M., at which time the senior  
22 statesmen, some cabinet members, and I had the honor  
23 of having luncheon with the Emperor, at which time  
24 I was told what transpired in the morning.  
25

1           "237. After luncheon the Emperor had a one  
2 hour meeting from 2:00 P.M. to 3:00 P.M. with the  
3 senior statesmen, at which TOJO and others from the  
4 government were present. I attended on His Majesty  
5 at this meeting solely to be at his service. I did  
6 not participate nor say anything at this meeting.  
7 The meeting was entirely different than the so-called  
8 Senior Statesmen's Conference for the selection of a  
9 new Prime Minister at a cabinet change. The senior  
10 statesmen gave their unreserved views to the Emperor.  
11 At the conclusion of this meeting, at 3:00 P.M., the  
12 senior statesmen resumed their meeting with the  
13 government until 4:00 P.M. Neither the Emperor nor I  
14 attended this meeting. Prince KONOYE told me what  
15 transpired at this meeting when it terminated.  
16 Prosecution exhibit 1196, my diary of November 29, 1941,  
17 was introduced by the prosecution on November 14, 1946,  
18 completely revised by the prosecution on December 10,  
19 1946, approved by the language section on December 11,  
20 1946, and the revised excerpt was substituted and  
21 submitted and read into the transcript on January 24,  
22 1947. Even the revised exhibit is not a complete  
23 record of my diary for that day. Parts are omitted.  
24 The complete entry is as follows:  
25



1           "Saturday, fine. November 29, 1941.

2           "At 9:00 A.M. saw and had a talk with  
3 Mr. IKEDA, Hideo who called on me at home. At 10:00  
4 A.M. attended on duty and conferred with the Grand  
5 Chamberlain on the present situation. It had been  
6 arranged that the government would hold a round table  
7 conference together with the Primary Vassals of State  
8 at the Court today from 9:30 A.M. to discuss the  
9 question of the negotiations with America and the  
10 other relevant important matters of the moment and  
11 after its close all present at the conference would  
12 receive the honour of being present at the Court  
13 dinner. However, the round table conference consec-  
14 utively continued its sitting up to 1:00 P.M. and  
15 went into recess. We then finally attended the  
16 Court dinner. Such being the case, it appeared that  
17 they discussed all the questions seriously.  
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1           "From 2 o'clock for about an hour in the  
2 study, the Emperor listened in person to the Senior  
3 Statesmen's opinions. The following is a summary.

4           "The Emperor remarked, "The times have be-  
5 come very difficult, haven't they?" To this Baron  
6 WAKATSUKI at once replied, in substance as follows:

7           "WAKATSUKI: "I am not worried about the  
8 spiritual strength of our people but in the matter of  
9 materials the question of whether or not we can really  
10 stand a long-range war deserves careful study."

11          "OKADA: "I think that today we are truly  
12 confronted with a critical situation. I am concerned  
13 as to whether we can put full confidence in our ability  
14 to supply necessary materials. There was an explana-  
15 tion by the Government a short while ago, but I am still  
16 not convinced."

17          "HIRANUMA: "His Excellency WAKATSUKI has  
18 spoken of the spiritual strength of our people and I  
19 agree with him on this point. But if today, when we  
20 have already been engaged in war for four years,  
21 things should further develop into a protracted war,  
22 it would become necessary to endure hardships and  
23 privations. I therefore consider that adequate  
24 measures and efforts for bracing up public sentiment  
25 are necessary."



1           "KONOYE: "I deeply regret that I have not  
2 been able to do anything toward the adjustment of  
3 Japanese-American relations despite my efforts since  
4 last April. But I beg to express my appreciation to  
5 the present cabinet for zealously striving to attain  
6 this end. To my great regret I am forced to conclude,  
7 on the basis of this morning's explanation by the  
8 Government, that further continuation of diplomatic  
9 negotiations would be hopeless. Still, is it neces-  
10 sary to resort to war at once even though diplomatic  
11 negotiations have been broken off? Would it not be  
12 possible, I wonder, while carrying on things as they  
13 are to later find a way out of the deadlock by per-  
14 severing to the utmost under difficulties? I think  
15 that I would like to question the authorities concern-  
16 ed on this point later."

17           "YONAI: "I do not have any data with me  
18 so I cannot express any definite opinion, but if Your  
19 Majesty will permit me to use the vernacular, I pray  
20 that we may take care 'not to lose everything by try-  
21 ing to avoid becoming poor gradually.'"

22           "HIROTA: "After having talked on conditions  
23 of each of the world powers since the World War, Japan  
24 has adopted every possible means to avoid the inter-  
25 vention of Britain and America in the China Incident.

1 In spite of this the diplomatic situation has become  
2 so serious as it is today. According to the explana-  
3 tions of the Government we seem to stand now face to  
4 face with a diplomatic crisis. Though the diplomatic  
5 crisis has a close relation to the strategic moment, I  
6 think the true intentions of both sides in diplomatic  
7 negotiations are only revealed after passing through  
8 several crises. Why should we hastily rush into war  
9 immediately after being confronted with the present  
10 crisis? Granting that war is inevitable, I believe  
11 we should always be on the watch to seize the oppor-  
12 tunity for a solution by diplomatic negotiations even  
13 though blows have been exchanged."

14 "HAYASHI: "I have no reference data with me  
15 but on the whole there is no alternative but to rely  
16 on the conclusions arrived at by the cabinet after  
17 thorough cooperation and study with Imperial Head-  
18 quarters."

19 "ABE: According to the Government's ex-  
20 planation it seems as the continuation of diplomatic  
21 negotiations will be difficult and that we are not  
22 placed in a really grave situation. I believe that  
23 we cannot expect anything further from the Cabinet  
24 as it appears to have studied matters very minutely  
25 from every conceivable angle. But it will be neces-



1 sary to carefully take into account the attitude of  
2 the Chinese people, for I believe it will be possible  
3 by one false step to lose all the gains hitherto  
4 achieved."

5 "WAKATSUKI: We have today, I believe,  
6 arrived at a really important moment. I should like  
7 to say one thing: If it is necessary for the preser-  
8 vation and self defense of Empire, we must rise to  
9 arms even though the country be reduced to ashes and  
10 though we can foresee defeat. But it is dangerous  
11 indeed to execute state policy or to make use of the  
12 national strength to achieve such ideas as the 'estab-  
13 lishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'  
14 or of the 'Stabilizing Power of East Asia.' I pray  
15 that Your Majesty will give careful consideration to  
16 this point."

17 "The conference of Senior Statesmen and the  
18 Government had been finished and Prince KONOYE came to  
19 see me at my office and we had a close conversation,  
20 primarily on our relations with America and on other  
21 matters of importance. At 7:00 p.m. proceeded to the  
22 Palace of H.I.H., the Prince KAYANOMIYA and attended  
23 the funeral service for the late Princess Dowager.'

24 "238. As can be seen, all the Senior States-

1 men expressed very cautious and prudent opinions  
2 with respect to any decision regarding war. In  
3 Appendix E of the Indictment I am charged with  
4 having been present at, and concurred in the deci-  
5 sions taken at the conference of November 29th, 1941.  
6 (Ex-Premiers). Furthermore, in prosecution document  
7 0001, page 273, the prosecution has completely mis-  
8 construed the meetings held on that day and very  
9 briefly summarizes my diary entry as though there  
10 was one continuous meeting. As shown I was present  
11 only at the one hour meeting from 2 p.m. to 3 p.m.  
12 with the Emperor, Senior Statesmen and TOJO and  
13 others. It was called primarily for the Emperor to  
14 hear the opinions of the Senior Statesmen. TOJO  
15 spoke very briefly at this meeting, but I have no  
16 recollection of what he said other than that he said  
17 generally war was inevitable. No decision was made  
18 at this meeting of the Senior Statesmen and TOJO  
19 and others at which the Emperor and I were present.  
20 As a matter of fact it was reported to me that no  
21 decisions were made at the other two meetings  
22 either -- one in the morning and the resumed one in  
23 the late afternoon, and I was not present at either  
24 of them.  
25



1 "239. On November 30, 1941 the Emperor  
2 summoned me at 3:30 p.m. and said that Prince  
3 TAKAMATSU had told him in substance that the Navy  
4 appeared to be opposed to war and wanted to know  
5 what was the real intention of the Navy. I advised  
6 His Majesty that a decision at that time was of a  
7 grave nature and would be irrevocable and it was  
8 necessary for him to take every precaution. I  
9 further advised him to send for the Navy Minister  
10 and the Chief of the Naval General Staff to ascertain  
11 their real intentions, and also to convey the matter  
12 to the Premier. The Premier, who was planning to  
13 hold an Imperial Conference the next day, saw the  
14 Emperor a few minutes later and requested that it be  
15 called but His Majesty withheld his consent. After  
16 the Emperor spoke with the Navy Minister and the  
17 Chief of the Naval General Staff, I was summoned and  
18 I was told that they had answered the Emperor's  
19 questions with confidence. I do not know what they  
20 told him. The Emperor then told me to advise the  
21 Premier to proceed with the Imperial Conference the  
22 next day as planned. Prosecution exhibit 1198 as  
23 corrected by Language Section, record 12,480, my  
24 diary for November 30, 1941, is as follows:  
25

"November 30, 1941 -- I visited the

Emperor at 3:30 p.m. in response to his request.

1        "He said that Prince TAKAMATSU had told  
2        him that the Navy's hands were full, and it appeared  
3        that they wished to avoid a Japanese-American war.  
4        But really how is it? I replied that His Majesty's  
5        decision is of such gravity that, once decided, it  
6        could not later be retracted. Hence it is felt that  
7        if there is the least uncertainty every possible pre-  
8        caution should be taken to do that to which His  
9        Majesty can give assent. Accordingly, I requested  
10       that the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval  
11       General Staff be called at once and the true inten-  
12       tion of the Navy be ascertained, and that the matter  
13       be conveyed frankly to the Premier also.

14       "At 6:35 p.m. I was summoned in audience  
15       and was ordered as follows:

16       "The Navy Minister and the Chief of the  
17       Naval General Staff have answered my question about  
18       the previous matter with considerable confidence, so  
19       instruct TOJO to proceed as planned."

20       "In prosecution document 0001, pages 273,  
21       274, my diary for November 30, 1941, is summarized as  
22       stating that, 'Later, the Emperor told KIDO that in  
23       view of the fact that the Navy Minister and the Chief  
24       of the Navy General Staff had given affirmative  
25



1 answers as to the success of war, he had told the  
2 Premier to act accordingly.' This is not in accord-  
3 ance with the facts shown above. Furthermore, it is  
4 based on the prosecution's original translation before  
5 it was changed by the language section, and even at  
6 that, it is an improper interpretation of that  
7 translation. As shown, the Emperor's instructions  
8 were to proceed with the Imperial Conference, not  
9 the war.

10 "240. The next day, December 1, 1941, the  
11 council in the Imperial presence decided on war with  
12 America, and the Premier called on me to consult about  
13 the Imperial rescript on the declaration of war and  
14 I reminded the Premier of His Majesty's instructions  
15 given on October 13, 1941. My diary for that day is  
16 prosecution exhibit 1210. The words 'at last'  
17 (Tsuini) used in this entry is not an expression of  
18 realization of an expectation. It is simply an  
19 expression of an end result, a finality. It is an  
20 objective, not a subjective term. I used the same  
21 word in my diary of November 24, 1940, upon hearing  
22 of the death of Prince SAIONJI.  
23  
24  
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1 "241. On December 6, 1941, Secretary INADA  
2 of the Cabinet consulted me about the wording of the  
3 Imperial Rescript and I offered suggestions in ac-  
4 cordance with the Emperor's wishes. As shown in  
5 prosecution exhibit 1220, my diary for December 7,  
6 1941, I had a conversation with HOSHINO, HOSHINO  
7 at that time merely reported to me that the Rescript  
8 had been corrected in accordance with the suggestions  
9 I gave to INADA the day before as requested by the  
10 Emperor. It was a very short interview and we dis-  
11 cussed nothing else.

12 "242. At 12:40 AM on the morning of December  
13 8, 1941, Foreign Minister TOGO telephoned me and said  
14 that Ambassador Grew had brought to him a telegram  
15 from President Roosevelt, addressed to the Emperor,  
16 and he asked me for my advice in handling the message.  
17 I told him that I thought he should talk with the Pre-  
18 mier about it and that I didn't believe His Majesty  
19 would mind being disturbed even at midnight. At  
20 1:30 AM MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo, Minister of the Imperial  
21 Household, also called me and told me about the tele-  
22 gram. I was notified that TOGO had proceeded to the  
23 Palace, so I went there at 2:40 AM. I only spoke with  
24 Foreign Minister TOGO for a few minutes. I did not  
25 see the telegram nor did he tell me of its contents



1 and I went home, arriving there at 3:30 AM. I heard  
2 nothing in advance about the dispatch of a telegram  
3 to America, in connection with the breaking off of  
4 Japan-American negotiation. The next morning a  
5 little after 6 o'clock, one of the aide-de-camps  
6 called me on the telephone and told me about the naval  
7 attack on Hawaii. He did not go into details. This  
8 was the first information I had about the Pearl  
9 Harbor attack when the Japanese fleet had left Japan  
10 proper for Pearl Harbor. I did not know in advance  
11 that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked, nor did I know  
12 of any plan to do so. These were all strictly mili-  
13 tary matters of the greatest secrecy and I understood  
14 later that even various military men in high places  
15 did not know of the Pearl Harbor attack before it  
16 occurred. This was not unusual due to the fact that  
17 I and other court officers were not in sympathy with  
18 war with America and we were not taken into the con-  
19 fidence of the naval officials with respect to their  
20 proposed plans. Furthermore, after the assassination  
21 of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal during the Feb-  
22 ruary 26, 1936 incident, the Emperor advised the Lord  
23 Keeper of the Privy Seal about matters pertaining to  
24 the High Command as little as possible so as to avoid  
25 any implication that the Lord Keeper of the Privy

1 Seal was interfering with military operations.

2 "243. Before leaving my home I heard over  
3 the radio about the attack but few details were given.  
4 On my way to the office where I arrived at about  
5 7:15 AM, as shown in my diary for that day, prose-  
6 cution exhibit 1239, as corrected by the Language  
7 Section, p. 16,192 of the record, I was naturally  
8 thinking of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and as a  
9 patriotic Japanese I could not but wish for the  
10 success of the attack. I heard more details of the  
11 attack when I arrived at the office. In this exhibit  
12 prosecution has again used the words 'at last' in  
13 such a manner as to indicate that I knew of the at-  
14 tack before it occurred. The word 'Tsuini' (at last)  
15 does not appear. This was the word used in my diary  
16 of December 1, 1941. The word used in my diary of  
17 December 8, 1941, is 'Iyo Iyo', the character used  
18 meaning 'certainly' or 'really'. This does not  
19 connote waiting and perhaps hoping for the occurrence,  
20 and I did not so express myself. I used the word ob-  
21 jectively.

22 "244. After December 7, 1941, Prince KONOYE  
23 and I continued to confer with one another. As shown  
24 in my diary entry of December 6, 1941, prosecution  
25



1 exhibit 1268, he visited me on that day. Once the  
2 war against the United States of America and Great  
3 Britain was commenced, our people were as if intoxi-  
4 cated with brilliant victory gained at the outset.  
5 As a result, an outcry was raised against Prince  
6 KONOYE accusing him of his evading the responsibility  
7 for opening war. This weighed upon Prince KONOYE's  
8 mind. He confessed that he wanted to give up the rank  
9 and honour of peerage and retire from the active ser-  
10 vice in order to take the political responsibility.  
11 So I earnestly requested him to be discreet and said,  
12 'It is too rash for you. The prospect of war allows  
13 of no optimism. I think the time will surely come  
14 when you will have to exert yourself again.'

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1 "245. My diary of December 18, 1941,  
2 prosecution exhibit 1269 as corrected by the Language  
3 Section, record 11351, states in part: 'Premier TOJO  
4 visited me and mentioned the need for control of dis-  
5 cussion about Prince KONOYE.' This translation is  
6 not quite accurate. It was I who mentioned this need  
7 to TOJO. The cause of this discussion about Prince  
8 KONOYE is set forth above in my diary of December 16,  
9 1941, prosecution exhibit 1268."

10 I will skip the next sentence.

11 "When the original exhibit was served the  
12 translation of the exhibit was: 'Premier TOJO visited  
13 me and mentioned the need for "muzzling" Prince KONOYE.'  
14 The prosecution corrected it and read it into the  
15 record, page 11,309, as Premier TOJO 'mentioned the  
16 need for muzzling Prince KONOYE' and it was then referred  
17 to the Language Section and corrected as set forth in  
18 the beginning of this paragraph.

19 "After the Language Section corrected the  
20 exhibit--" I will skip that sentence.

21 "246. The military achievements, attained  
22 by the Japanese armed forces at the initial stage of  
23 the war, including the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor  
24 were brilliant. For the first six months after the  
25 outbreak of the war, the nation was intoxicated, as



1 it were, with an unbroken string of victories, gained  
2 by the Japanese armed forces at various fronts in  
3 quick succession one after another. I, as one of  
4 the Japanese nationals, shared their rejoicings but  
5 none the less I could not believe in spite of myself  
6 that Japan would be able to emerge victorious from  
7 this war. But I inwardly thought it necessary for me  
8 to exert every effort to pave the way for peace with  
9 America and Britain. It was my belief that Japan would  
10 commit an irretrievable blunder if she went too deep  
11 in it, elated over her initial successes. This fear  
12 haunted me from the very beginning.

13 "247. The leaders of the army and navy,  
14 however, apparently did not think too seriously about  
15 the matter. For instance, Marshal SUGIYAMA, Chief  
16 of Staff of the army, in response to an Imperial  
17 inquiry on the draft agenda of the Imperial Conference  
18 of September 5, 1941, optimistically stated that  
19 the southern campaign would be finished in three months.  
20 I could not share his sanguine optimism, which made  
21 me feel apprehensive about his very strategy, both  
22 military and political. On February 5, 1942 when I  
23 was received in audience by the Emperor, the talk  
24 happened to drift in that direction. I took occasion  
25 to submit my frank views to the Throne to the following

1 effect: 'The enemy has an indomitable fighting will,  
2 though he has suffered a series of reverses. The  
3 Pearl Harbor attack has signally served not only to  
4 strengthen a feeling of hostility against Japan, but  
5 also to unify the public opinion of America. There-  
6 fore, the Pacific War will not easily end. The  
7 shortest way to peace will be to fight it out, but  
8 at the same time, we must pay due attention to cons-  
9 truction. No less necessary will it be to seize  
10 occasion to return to peace as soon as possible for  
11 the purpose of minimizing the ravages to be wrought  
12 by the second world war and saving humanity from  
13 further calamities. The army and navy have recently  
14 vauntingly stated that they have gone through ela-  
15 borate preparations and training; but it is highly  
16 problematical if the picked troops, who have gone through  
17 special training, will be maintained for long in the  
18 future with replacements. It is inevitable that the  
19 time will come when a difference in the resources of  
20 the contending powers counts. Full consideration must  
21 be paid by the leaders of the army and navy to this  
22 point, starting right now.'

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1 "248. The Emperor seemed rather surprised  
2 at my strong note of warning which was sounded at a  
3 time when the entire nation was expecting the fall of  
4 Singapore momentarily. But His Majesty appeared to have  
5 fully understood that an alarming situation was in  
6 store for Japan in the future. Then His Majesty told  
7 the Empress what was in his mind. It caused Her Majesty  
8 great concern, so that she communicated with Deputy  
9 Grand Chamberlain KANROJI, who was worried very much,  
10 came to my room and told me to that effect, when I  
11 told him all about the matter. In this connection,  
12 my diary for February 6, 1942, says:

13 "Friday, February 6: 1942; Deputy Grand Chamber-  
14 lain KANROJI came to my room and told me that the Em-  
15 peror expressed to the Empress his impressions about  
16 my views laid before the Throne yesterday. Yesterday  
17 when I was received in audience by the Emperor, I sub-  
18 mitted my views to His Majesty that the Pacific War  
19 would not easily end and therefore that the shortest  
20 way to peace would be to fight it out, while paying due  
21 attention to construction."  
22

23 "249. My statement, submitted to the Throne,  
24 resulted in causing concern to the Emperor. But it  
25 served to help His Majesty grasp the full significance  
of the war. On February 12, 1942, when I was received

1 in audience by the Emperor, His Majesty told me that  
2 he gave Prime Minister TOJO instructions, which were  
3 very pertinent, as shown in my diary for the day. I  
4 thought that my statement was not submitted to the  
5 Throne to no avail. I was struck by the Emperor's  
6 sagacity all the more strongly. My diary for February  
7 12, 1942, says:

8 "Thursday, February 12, 1942. Had an audience  
9 with the Emperor from 10:20 to 11:05 a. m. On that  
10 occasion, the Emperor told me that when Prime Minister  
11 TOJO was received in audience the day before yesterday,  
12 he reported to the Throne that all home and foreign  
13 policies in the future would be studied by the Liaison  
14 Conference between the Government and the High Command.  
15 In that connection, His Majesty added that he told the  
16 Prime Minister to the following effect: "I presume  
17 that you are paying full attention so as not to miss the  
18 opportunity to terminate the war. It is not desirable  
19 for the sake of humanity and peace to have the war drag  
20 on needlessly, extending the ravages wrought by it.  
21 The longer the war goes on, the worse the troops will  
22 become in quality. It goes without saying that the  
23 question has the other party to reckon with. Its solu-  
24 tion may depend on the future attitude of America and  
25 Britain. It may be also necessary to ascertain the



1 future development of the situation between Germany  
2 and the Soviet Union. It won't do to fail to attain  
3 satisfactory results, either, in handling the natural  
4 resources in the south, due to half-measures taken.  
5 By paying full consideration to all those points you  
6 are requested to leave nothing desirable undone.'

7 "Thus it is to be seen that the Emperor, follow-  
8 ing my recommendation of February 5, 1942, expressed  
9 His desire for the termination of the war as early as  
10 February 10, 1942, to Prime Minister TOJO.

1 "250. But Singapore fell on February  
2 16, 1942. With military successes achieved one  
3 after another in quick succession at the initial  
4 stage of the war, Army and Navy circles, made  
5 more pronouncements to the effect that elaborate  
6 care had been taken to make war preparations. For  
7 instance, it was claimed that the surprise attack  
8 on Pearl Harbor had been preceded by furious  
9 mock attacks on a harbor near Kagoshima, whose  
10 topography closely resembled that of Pearl Harbor;  
11 that rigid training in jungle warfare had already  
12 been gone through; and that no less rigid training  
13 had been also gone through in landing operations.  
14 These pronouncements captured the fancy and  
15 imagination of the people, who reposed still  
16 greater confidence in the fighting services. I  
17 and others were not aware that special training  
18 had been gone through by Army and Navy units.  
19 Therefore, I felt all the more surprised at the  
20 big successes, achieved at the initial stage.  
21 The Emperor himself was not aware, either that the  
22 Army and Navy had gone through such elaborate  
23 training. In consequence, His Majesty was not  
24 free from uneasiness at first. Later, however,  
25 the Army and Navy leaders seized every possible



1 occasion to report to the Throne on special  
2 training gone through. I could not help  
3 feeling skeptical that even if it were true  
4 that picked troops had gone through elaborate  
5 training, could they maintain success for any  
6 long time. The result was uneasiness which  
7 obsessed me that the difference in the resources  
8 of the contending countries would eventually  
9 tell, so that Japan, weaker in resources would  
10 come to grief. The attack on Pearl Harbor was  
11 a big success, but at the same time it went a  
12 long way for stirring up a feeling of hostility  
13 in America against Japan. I thought, therefore,  
14 that it would be no easy task to terminate the  
15 war quickly.

16 "251. As appears in prosecution exhibit  
17 1985, diary entry of March 13, 1942, Minister of  
18 the Imperial Household MATSUDAIRA called at my  
19 office to talk about the speech delivered by the  
20 British Foreign Minister Eden who referred to  
21 violence committed by the Japanese troops against  
22 the British war prisoners in Hong Kong. Mr.  
23 MATSUDAIRA said 'As the British usage, that the  
24 Foreign Minister delivered such a kind of speech  
25 in the Parliament shows, I think, that she has

1 taken this problem seriously. So we have to pay  
2 considerable attention to it.' I reported the  
3 above effect to the Throne and, as a consequence,  
4 His Majesty consulted War Minister TOJO. The War  
5 Minister, in accordance with His Majesty's instruction,  
6 examined into the state of affairs in Hong Kong  
7 and received a report that there was no such instance  
8 as set forth in the speech and that the treatment  
9 of war prisoners was just and fair. I felt relieved  
10 at being informed of it and I replied to the Throne  
11 to that effect. In view of the fact that the treat-  
12 ment of war prisoners at the time of the Russo-  
13 Japanese War by Japan was quite proper and won praise  
14 from foreign countries, I believed the above report  
15 and even until the termination of war I was anything  
16 but dubious on this point.

17 "252. Meanwhile the enemy forces in Java  
18 and Boendang surrendered. A string of successes  
19 were achieved by the Japanese armed forces in quick  
20 succession, so that the people apparently became  
21 more intoxicated with victory. Such being the case,  
22 it was no wonder that none thought of peace with the  
23 exception of a very limited number in the country.  
24  
25



1 "253. Ambassador SHIGEMITSU happened to  
2 return home about that time from China. At 3:30 p.m.,  
3 April 11, 1942 I met the Ambassador at my official  
4 residence to hear from him about the recent situa-  
5 tion in China. Disclosing that the actual situation  
6 in China was not developing so satisfactorily as  
7 claimed by the Army at home, and giving a full re-  
8 port on the actual situation in that country, Am-  
9 bassador SHIGEMITSU stressed the necessity for radi-  
10 cal reorientation of Japan's policy toward China.  
11 In short, the Ambassador emphasized that China's  
12 independence and sovereignty be fully recognized  
13 and that China be returned to the Chinese, that the  
14 two countries should work on a cooperative rather  
15 than punitive basis. I approved the Ambassador's  
16 moderate, peaceful policy unstintedly and promised to  
17 support him. With it as a turning point, I thought  
18 that it might be possible to settle the China Affair,  
19 which fact, in turn, might pave the way for the  
20 termination of the Pacific War itself. My dairy for  
21 April 11, 1942 says:

22 "April 11, 1942.

23 "At 3:30 p.m., I met Mr. SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru,  
24 Ambassador to China and heard from him about the re-  
25 cent situation in China. I cannot but think that the

1 future situation will be very grave.'

2 "254. On May 21, 1942 the Chief Aide-de-  
3 camp advised me that the flyers who had raided Tokyo  
4 on April 18, 1942 had been taken prisoner in China  
5 and that they would be dealt with in a court-martial  
6 in Tokyo. As this was a military matter, I expressed  
7 no opinion, assuming they would be given a fair trial  
8 because the Emperor had previously reprimanded General  
9 SUGIYAMA when he had suggested they be executed immedi-  
10 ately. We also discussed air raids in general as it  
11 concerned air defense in the Imperial Palace grounds.  
12 That I had a talk with him appears in my diary of  
13 May 21, 1942, prosecution exhibit 1986."

14 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half-  
15 past nine tomorrow morning.

16 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjourn-  
17 ment was taken until Thursday, 16 October  
18 1947, at 0930.)  
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